U.S. Tripathi, J.
1. This first appeal from order has been preferred under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (d), C.P.C. against the order dated 6.8.1994 passed by the District Judge, Ghazipur, acting as Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, rejecting the application of the appellant under Order IX. Rule 13. C.P.C.
2. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of appeal.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties on the question of maintainability of appeal.
4. The facts giving rise to this first appeal from order are that the respondent No. 2 filed Motor Accident Claim Pelition No. 31 of 1989 in the Court of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal /District Judge. Ghazipur, for grant of compensation on account of death of Smt. Bigni Devi in a motor accident, which took place on 5.5.1989 at 1.00 p.m. by vehicle No. DEP 3099. Notices to above claim petition were served on the appellant. He appeared before the Tribunal on 12.2.1992 but absented thereafter. Therefore, the Tribunal proceeded ex parte, vide order dated 26th November, 1992. The claimant adduced evidence and on considering his evidence, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 18,000 as compensation against the appellant payable along with interest at the rate of Rs. 9% per annum from 27.02.1991 to the date of actual payment, vide judgement/ award dated 7.1.1992.
5. The appellant on 28.10.1993 moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13. C.P.C. for setting aside the above ex parte award on the grounds that petition was filed showing wrong parentage of appellant and he was not served with the notice. He came to know about the ex parte award only on 24th October. 1993.
6. The above application was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 238 of 1993. The Tribunal found that there was no sufficient ground for allowing the application. Consequently, it rejected it, vide order dated 6.8.1994.
7. Aggrieved with the above order, the appellant has come up in this first appeal from order.
8. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that appeal against award is provided under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act. 1988, but this appeal has not been preferred against the award, but against the order rejecting the application for setting aside ex parte award, under Order XLIII. Rule 1 (d), C.P.C. That the proceeding arose under Motor Vehicles Act, which is self contained Act. Under Motor Vehicles Rules. 1989, the provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Motor Vehicles Act and therefore, there is no provision under Motor Vehicles Act or Rules to prefer an appeal against the order rejecting the application for setting aside ex parte award and therefore, the appeal is incompetent.
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the provisions of Order IX, C.P.C. are applicable to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and therefore, remedy of appeal provided under C.P.C. against the rejection of application under Order IX is also available.
10. It has been laid down in a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts that appeal, review or revision are creation of statute and no one has got inherent right to prefer an appeal, revision or review if it is not provided in the statute.
11. Section 173 of Motor Vehicles . Act. which provides appeals reads as under :
"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court :"
12. "Award" occurring in Section 173 means award given under Section 168 of Motor Vehicles Act. i.e.. after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, holding an enquiry into the claims, or as the case may be. each of the claims, and subject to the provisions of Section 162 made an award determining the amount of compensation, which appears to it to be Just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. Admittedly, the order against which this appeal has been preferred is not an "award."
13. Rule 221 of U. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 as well as Rule 21 of the Accident Claims Tribunal (U. P.) which make certain provisions of C.P.C. applicable to the proceedings under Motor Vehicles Act reads as under :
"The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely. Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V. Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII ; Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI ; Order XVII ; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII."
14. The above Rule does not make Order XLI11. Rule 1. C.P.C. applicable to a proceeding before Claims Tribunal. No doubt, provisions of Order IX of C.P.C. have been made applicable to the proceedings before Claims Tribunal and the appellant has admittedly availed that provision before the Tribunal itself. Since. Order XLIII Rule 1 has not been made applicable by the Statute to the proceedings arising before Claims Tribunal, no appeal lies against an order rejecting an application under Order IX, Rule 9, or Rule 13. C.P.C. in respect of a proceeding arising out of Motor Accident Claims.
15. A Division Bench of this Court in a recent decision in Lallu Bharati v. Anwar, 1998 (2) TAC 9 (All). has clearly held that appeal filed against an order dismissing restoration application is not maintainable. A similar question was referred to the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Shivraji and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others. 1997 (88) RD 562, as to whether it is open for the Consolidation Authorities to review/recall their final orders exercising inherent powers even though the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 1953. does not vest with them any review jurisdiction. The Full Bench held that it is not open for the consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders passed in a proceeding under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in exercise of inherent power, as there is no provision for review in U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the powers of review has to be specifically conferred and unless there is a provision in the Act permitting initiation of such proceedings, no review lies.
16. It was contended that even if there is no specific provision for appeal against an order rejecting the application for restoration of proceedings or setting aside ex parte award under Motor Vehicles Act, the Court can entertain appeal in its inherent jurisdiction. But powers of appeal, review or revision, if not specifically provided under the Statute, cannot be assumed under inherent powers of the Court.
17. In this way the appeal is incompetent and is not maintainable. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.