Om Parkash vs Union Of India &Amp; Ors on 8 February, 2010
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Supreme Court of India
Bench: Verma], Sirpurkar]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1415 OF 2010
[Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.9389 of 2005]
Om Parkash ....Appellant Versus
Union of India & Ors. ....Respondents W I T H
C.A.No.1515 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9498 of 2005]; C.A.No.1516 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.10871 of 2005]; C.A.No.1517 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) No.18087 of 2005]; C.A.No.1518 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23338 of
2005]; C.A.No.1519 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22867 of 2005]; C.A.No.1520
of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22953 of 2005]; C.A.No.1521 of 2010 [arising
out of SLP(C) No.23339 of 2005]; C.A.No.1522 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C)
No.22971 of 2005]; C.A.No.1523 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23083 of 2005];
C.A.No.1524 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23390 of 2005]; C.A.No.1525 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.24910 of 2005]; C.A.No.1526 of 2010 [arising out
of SLP(C) No.24934 of 2005]; C.A.No.1527 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25786
of 2005]; C.A.No.1528 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25789 of 2005];
C.A.No.1529 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25790 of 2005]; C.A.No.1530 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25792 of 2005]; C.A.No.1531 of 2010 [arising out
of SLP(C) No.25794 of 2005]; C.A.No.1532 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25795
of 2005]; C.A.No.1533 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25895 of 2005];
C.A.No.1534 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25168 of 2005]; C.A.No.1535 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1621 of 2006]; C.A.Nos.1536-38 of 2010 [arising
out of SLP(C) Nos.1608-1610 of 2006];
C.A.No.1539 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25836 of 2005]; C.A.No.1540 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1611 of 2006]; C.A.No.1541 of 2010 [arising out
of SLP(C) No.1612 of 2006]; C.A.No.1542 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1613
of 2006]; C.A.No.1543 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1614 of 2006];
C.A.No.1544 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1616 of 2006]; C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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C.A.No.1545 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1617 of 2006]; C.A.No.1546 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.26418 of 2005]; C.A.No.1547 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) No.26431 of 2005]; C.A.No.1548 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26738 of
2005]; C.A.No.1549 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1618 of 2006]; C.A.No.1550
of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26537 of 2005]; C.A.No.1551 of 2010 [arising
out of SLP(C) No.26881 of 2005]; C.A.No.1552 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C)
No.26900 of 2005]; C.A.No.1553 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1619 of 2006];
C.A.No.1554 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4552 of 2010] (CC No. 553);
C.A.No.1555 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4553 of 2010] (CC No. 757);
C.A.No.1556 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1874 of 2006]; C.A.No.1557 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.4554 of 2010] (CC NO. 993);
C.A.No.1558 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4075 of 2006]; C.A.No.1559 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.4164 of 2006]; C.A.No.1560 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) No.4642 of 2006]; C.A.No.1561 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6077 of
2006]; C.A.No.1562 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6078 of 2006]; C.A.No.1563
of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6016 of 2006]; C.A.No.1564 of 2010 [arising
out of SLP(C) No.6089 of 2006]; C.A.No.1565 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C)
No.6069 of 2006]; C.A.No.1566 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7483 of 2006];
C.A.No.1567 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.8261 of 2006]; C.A.No.1568 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.11240 of 2006]; C.A.No.1569 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) No.6138 of 2006]; C.A.No.1570 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6140 of
2006]; C.A.No.1571 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.13138 of 2006]; C.A.No.1572
of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.15800 of 2006]; C.A.No.1573 of 2010 [arising
out of SLP(C) No.15804 of 2006]; C.A.No.1574 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C)
No.258 of 2007]; C.A.No.1575 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.12932 of 2007];
C.A.No.1576 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4558 of 2010] (CC No.1003);
C.A.No.1577 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4559 of 2010] (CC No.1931);
C.A.No.1578 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18566 of 2007]; C.A.No.1579 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7102 of 2008]; C.A.No.1580 of 2010 [arising out
of SLP(C) No.20180 of 2007]; C.A.No.1581 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4419
of 2007]; C.A.No.1582 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.20591 of 2006];
C.A.No.1583 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4420 of 2007]; C.A.No.1584 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.4421 of 2007]; C.A.No.1585 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) NO.4422 of 2007]; C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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C.A.No.1586 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4423 of 2007]; C.A.No.1587 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.137 of 2007]; C.A.No.1588 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) No.167 of 2007]; C.A.No.1589 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.11290 of
2007]; C.A.No.1590 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18822 of 2007];
C.A.Nos.1591-92 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.4565-66 of 2010] (CC
Nos.10441-10442);
C.A.No.1593 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6912 of 2006]; C.A.No.1594 of 2010
[arising out of SLP(C) No.6913 of 2006]; C.A.No.1595 of 2010 [arising out of
SLP(C) No.7690 of 2007]; C.A.No.1596 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9394 of
2007]; C.A.No.1597 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25103 of 2005]; C.A.No.1598
of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25119 of 2005]; C.A.No.1599 of 2010 [arising
out of SLP(C) No.25141 of 2005]; C.A.No.1600 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C)
No.25417 of 2005]; C.A.No.1601 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25436 of 2005];
C.A.No.1602 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25440 of 2005]; C.A.No.1603 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.21662 of 2005]; C.A.No.1604 of 2010 [arising out
of SLP(C) No.22607 of 2005]; C.A.No.1605 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22722
of 2005]; C.A.No.1606 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4573 of 2010](CC No.
711);
C.A.No.1607 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4575 of 2010] (CC No. 779);
C.A.No.1608 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4579 of 2010] (CC No. 803);
C.A.No.1609 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4580 of 2010] (CC No. 850);
C.A.No.1610 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4581 of 2010] (CC NO. 906);
C.A.No.1611 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4583 of 2010] (CC NO. 928);
C.A.No.1612 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4584 of 2010] (CC No. 963);
C.A.No.1613-1614 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.15791-15792 of 2009];
C.A.No.1615 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.27029 of 2008]; C.A.No.1616 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9504 of 2009]; C.A.No.1617 of 2010 [arising out
of SLP(C) No.538 of 2007]; C.A.No.1618 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4586 of
2010] (CC No.10061);
C.A.No.1619 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25787 of 2005]; C.A.No.1620 of
2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4588 of 2010] [CC 13301]; and
C.A.No.1621 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4589 of 2010] [CC 13568].
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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J U D G M E N T
Deepak Verma, J.
1. Permission to file Special Leave Petitions is granted.
2. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed.
3. Leave granted.
4. For planned development of Delhi, Lt. Governor issued notifications under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act') on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 to acquire more than 50,000 bighas of land
situated in 13 different villages falling within Delhi.
5. The land owners, feeling aggrieved by the issuance of the said notifications
under Section 4 of the Act, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi
challenging the same on variety of grounds. The said judgment rendered on
15.11.1983 in the case of Munni Lal & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi &
Ors. is reported in ILR (1984) I Delhi 469. After considering the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners - Munni Lal & Ors., the
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that the writ
petitions challenging the validity of the notifications dated 05.11.1980 and
25.11.1980 issued under Section 4 of the Act, deserve to be dismissed and C.As
@ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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accordingly were dismissed. We have been given to understand that against this
judgment and order, no appeal was filed and this judgment thus attained
finality.
6. These appeals arise out of Judgment and Order passed by Delhi High Court in
Writ Petitions preferred by appellant and other similarly situated appellants
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein challenge was primarily
and basically to the declaration/notifications issued by Delhi Administration
under Section 6 of the Act.
7. The said petitions having been dismissed by different Orders passed by
Division Benches of Delhi High Court, these appellants are before us
challenging the same on variety of grounds.
8. The cases have a long and chequered history. For the sake of convenience, we
are taking the facts of the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9389 of
2005, Om Prakash Vs. Union of India and Others as issue involved in these cases
is almost identical and common.
9. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of the case are mentioned
hereinbelow.
10. Notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued on two different
dates, viz., 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980.
11. Pursuant thereto, further declarations/notifications as C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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contemplated under Section 6 of the Act were issued on 20.5.1985, 6.6.1985,
7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986.
12. Admittedly, appellant and several such other appellants are in possession
as owners of different parcels of land situated in 13 villages, within Delhi.
13. Notifications issued under Section 4 for planned development of Delhi had a
caveat that three types of land were exempted from the purview of these
notifications i.e government land, land already notified under Section 4 or 6
of the Act or land in respect of which lay-out plans/building plans were
sanctioned by Municipal Corporation of Delhi before 05.11.1980.
14. It is not in dispute that initially appellants had not challenged the
notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, by filing writ petitions or
resorting to any other remedy in accordance with law.
15. Obviously, there could not have been any order of stay passed by any court
in their favour. In other words, there was no order of restraint from issuance
of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
16. According to the appellants, the Act provides that the said declaration
should have been issued within a period of three years from the date of
issuance of notifications under C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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Section 4 of the Act, that is to say, positively on or before
24.11.1983. But no such declaration having been issued on or before 24.11.1983,
i.e., within the statutory period of three years, it is contended that
acquisition is illegal and void qua appellants' lands. In the aforesaid appeal,
last declaration under Section 6 of the Act was finally issued on 07.06.1985,
which according to the appellant, was clearly beyond statutory period of three
years. Thus, whole proceedings of acquisition should be rendered illegal and
void ab initio. However, the last declaration was still issued on 26.2.1986.
17. It has also been appellants' case that the stay order granted in
favour of the other land-owners, who had challenged either the notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act or the declaration under Section 6 of the
Act, would not be applicable or operative to the appellants' land as obviously
it would be confined only to those who had approached the Court and were
granted stay.
18. Like appellant, there were many such land-owners who had challenged
the said declaration/notification issued under Section 6 of the Act before the
High Court of Delhi and their petitions having been allowed on 14.8.1988,
appellant claimed parity on the ground that due to some bona-fide mistake, the
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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appellant's petition which was filed in the year 1987 could not be listed
along with batch matters but subsequently, appellant's petition came to be
dismissed. Thus, for this reason he should not be put to an irreparable loss of
losing his land.
19. Appellant's petition came up for hearing before Division Bench of
High Court of Delhi on 25.11.2004 and on the said date following order of
dismissal came to be passed: "We find that the issue raised in the
petition with regard to validity of the
Declaration issued under Section 6 of the said Act, stands
concluded against the petitioner by the decision of the Apex Court in Abhey Ram
and Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 (which approved the full
Bench
decision of this court in B.R. Gupta's case. AIR 1987 Delhi
239 on the issue that the
declaration under Section 6 was not beyond
time) and Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip
Singh Uban and Ors. (1990) 7 SCC 44, wherein their Lordships
were pleased to observe that those who had not filed objections under
Section 5(A) of the said Act could not be
allowed to contend either that Section 5
enquiry was bad, or that Section 6 Declaration must be struck
down and that the Section 4
notification would lapse. Admittedly, in the present case, no
objections have been filed by the petitioner under Section 5 (A) of the Act.
Consequently, the writ petition and application for interim relief are dismissed
and interim order dated 9.2.1987 stands
vacated."
Sd/-
Sd/-
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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20. Perusal of the aforesaid order would make it abundantly clear that
while considering the appellant's petition, High Court was of the opinion that
in the light of the opinion expressed by Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta Vs.
Union of India reported in AIR 1987 Delhi 239 (refered to as B.R.Gupta-I),
affirmed by this Court in Abhey Ram (Dead by LRs) and Ors. Vs. Union of India
& Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 decided on 22.04.1997, holding therein that
declaration issued under Section 6 was not beyond time.
21. Impugned order further shows that it placed reliance on another
judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 7 SCC 44, Delhi Administration Vs.
Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. wherein it has been held that all those land-owners
who had not preferred objections under Section 5A of the Act, could not be
allowed to contend that either enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was bad or
the declaration issued under Section 6 must be struck down on the ground of
limitation or consequently, notification issued under Section 4 of the Act
would stand lapsed. Thus, the appellant's petition was not entertained and
ultimately came to be dismissed.
22. It has neither been disputed here nor before the High Court that some
of the appellants herein and many similarly situated land-owners had not
preferred objections under C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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Section 5A of the Act. There are other appeals, in which objections were
preferred but have been decided against them or even though objections were
preferred but were not pressed, on account of subsequent developments that have
taken place. We would deal with those type of matters little later.
23. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for appellant contended that in this
batch of appeals, broadly three categories can be formulated :
Category No. 1 - where land-owners had admittedly not filed objections
under Section 5A of the Act, but essentially, the challenge was only to
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act, being time-barred. Category No.
2 - even though land-owners had preferred objections under Section 5A of the
Act, wherein an enquiry was held, but the same were rejected.
Category No. 3 - during the pendency of the objections under Section 5A
of the Act, some of the land-owners had sold their lands. Pursuant to the
execution of said sale-deeds in favour of the vendees, they continued to press
objections preferred by their vendors but the same were also rejected.
24. It has been fairly conceded by learned senior counsel for appellant that he
had neither challenged the notification C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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issued under Section 4 of the Act nor had preferred any objection under
Section 5A of the Act independently. Thus, obviously there could not have been
any stay order granted in his favour by any court. Therefore, ordinarily, the
period of limitation would be three years as contemplated under Section 6 of
the Act (first proviso read with Explanation 1 appended thereto).
25. To appreciate the aforesaid arguments, it is necessary to understand
the true and correct import of Section 6 of the Act, reproduced hereinbelow :
"6. Declaration that land is required for a public
purpose.-(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the
appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made
under Section 5A, sub- section (2), that any particular land is
needed for public purpose or for a Company, a declaration
shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such
Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and
different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different
parcels of any land
covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section
(1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been
made (wherever required) under Section 5A, sub-section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a
notification
under section 4, sub-section (1),-
(i) published after the commencement of the C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967
but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall
be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the
notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date
of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such
declaration
shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public
revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local
authority.
[Explanation 1. - In computing any
of the periods referred to in the first
proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to
be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-
section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
excluded.
[Explanation 2. - Where the
compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out
of the funds of a
corporation owned or controlled by the State, such
compensation shall be deemed to be
compensation paid out of public revenues.]
(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official
Gazette, [and in two daily
newspapers circulating in the locality in
which the land is situated of which at least one shall be in
the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the
substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places
in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving
of such public, notice being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication
of the declaration), and such
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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declaration shall state] the district or other territorial
division in which the land is
situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate
area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such
plan may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that
the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be;
and, after making such declaration the appropriate Government may acquire the
land in manner hereinafter appearing."
26. It has strenuously been contended by learned senior counsel Shri P.P.
Rao that even if appellant had not preferred any objection under Section 5A of
the Act, his right to challenge issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the
Act after the stipulated period of limitation, cannot be taken away, especially
in the light of the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of
India. It was also submitted by him that both rights are independent and
accordingly can be invoked separately. He also submitted that language of
Articles 21 and 300A of the Constitution is almost identical, thus, no person
should be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
27. We were also taken through Article 17 of Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which safeguards the interest of persons in properties. He,
therefore, submitted that if the C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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property of the appellant is sought to be acquired in this fashion then it
would tantamount to violation of human rights as guaranteed under Article 17 of
the Universal Declaration.
28. A further point has also been tried to be hammered before us that
Land Acquisition Act being expropriatory in nature, its provisions deserve to
be construed strictly and each and every step required to be taken by the
respondents must be strictly adhered to.
29. Lastly, it was submitted by him that in any case, Government is not
likely to suffer any loss, much less an irreparable loss, even if the land
owned, possessed and occupied by the appellant is exempted from acquisition
whereas the appellant would suffer a greater loss and injury as with long
passage of time he has constructed his house, is residing therein for long
number of years and acquisition thereof would lead to serious consequences and
would be disastrous to him and other similarly situated land owners. In other
words, it has been contended that equitable justice is required to be meted out
to the appellant and this Court shall ensure that no injustice is rendered to
this appellant and other such hundreds of appellants.
30. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel for
the appellant submitted that following C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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questions of law would arise in this and the connected appeals:
(i) Whether proposition of law propounded in Delhi Administration
Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. (Supra), (referred to as No.1) has correctly
been understood by the Division Bench in the impugned order?
(ii) Whether the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram and Ors. Vs.
Union of India & Ors. (Supra) which approved the Full Bench opinion of
Delhi High Court in B.R. Gupta-I, (Supra) has indirectly been over-ruled in the
case of Oxford English School Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (1995) 5
SCC 206?
(iii) If, that being the legal position, even though Abhey Ram's
case (supra) rendered by three learned Judges of this Court, can still be
interpreted to grant benefit to the appellant as otherwise great injustice
would be caused to appellant.
31. Shri P.N. Lekhi, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the
appellants has taken us through the history of the Act and the various
amendments which have been incorporated from time to time. He has also advanced
the same arguments as have been put forth by Mr. P.P. Rao, that the effect of
stay order granted in other matter should not be logically and C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 16 -
legally made applicable to those who had not even approached the Court, as it
would always be an order of stay in personam and not an order in rem.
32. It is brought to our notice that he appears for all those appellants,
who are subsequent purchasers, after issuance of declaration under Section 6 of
the Act. Sale Deeds in favour of these appellants have been executed between
the period from 18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997, i.e., the period between the date of
judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of B.R. Gupta-I and
the date of judgment of this Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra). According
to him, this was the eclipse period as in some of the matters, notifications
under Section 4 were quashed on account of failure of Delhi Administration to
issue further declarations under Section 6 of the Act, within a period of three
years from the date of issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act.
Since even thereafter, no steps were taken by Delhi Administration to issue a
fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act, the subsequent purchasers were
fully justified in purchasing the lands from previous owners. Thus, all
purchases by them between the aforesaid period would be said to have been made
during the eclipse period and therefore, they should be called owners rather
than subsequent purchasers.
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
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33. He has also put forth an argument that prior to coming into force of
Amendment Act of 1984, there was no exclusion clause appended to Section 6, by
way of an explanation and therefore, exactly three years' period has to be
computed between the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of
the Act and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act for determining as
to whether the same had been issued within the aforesaid period or not. In
other words, he has contended that irrespective of the fact that there was any
stay or there was no stay, in either case, the period of three years should be
calculated from the actual date of publication of notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act till the date of publication of notification under Section
6 of the Act.
34. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing in some appeals
contended that primarily petitions of these appellants have been dismissed on
the ground of laches. He has contended that in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of
India & Others reported in 37 (1989) DLT 150 [hereinafter referred to as
'B.R. Gupta-II'], notification with regard to acquisition of lands situated in
11 villages was quashed and in subsequent judgment, notification with regard to
two more villages was quashed. Therefore, there was no occasion on the part of
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 18 -
these appellants to have continued to prosecute their objections preferred
under Section 5A of the Act.
35. According to him, from the year 1989 to 1997, there was an absolute
silence with regard to the acquisition, which had initially commenced in the
year 1980. Therefore, no prudent man would have taken legal action during the
aforesaid period. He, therefore, contended that appellants were justified in
not taking any action during the aforesaid period. Only when fresh proceedings
commenced with regard to acquisition, appellants were prompt enough to file
writ petitions either in the year 2000 or 2002. Thus, delay having been
explained properly, the Division Bench has grossly erred in dismissing the same
on the ground of laches.
36. Our attention has been drawn to the letter of Mrs. Gita Sagar, Joint
Secretary, (L & B) dated 31.3.1989 mentioning therein that in the light of
the Division Bench Judgment of Delhi High Court in B.R. Gupta-II quashing the
notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, nothing more was required to
be done and acquisition proceedings be dropped. This further stood fortified
vide subsequent circular issued by Delhi Administration on 07.12.1999.
According to him, thus the appellants were entirely justified in not taking any
action. In other words, he contended that from the year 1990 C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 19 -
to 1997, the judgment in the case of Delhi Administration Vs Gurdip Singh Uban
reported in (1999) 7 SCC 44 held the field whereby notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act was quashed and no further action was taken by Delhi
Administration.
37. Thus, any prudent man would be given to understand that nothing more
was required to be done and therefore they sat quiet over the matters. He,
therefore, contended that dismissal of appellants' writ petitions on the ground
of laches was wholly unjustified and uncalled for, more so, when the reasons
for the delay were fully assigned satisfactorily.
38. Arguments were advanced by him on the Doctrine of 'Legitimate
Expectation'. He also contended that the right to hold property as envisaged
under the Constitution being constitutional right conferred under Article 300A,
cannot be permitted to be taken away without authority of law. Even though, it
is not a Fundamental Right nevertheless, it continues to be a constitutional
right, and such right was never taken away from Article 14 of the Constitution.
39. It is further submitted by him that Sections 5A and 6 of the Act
cannot be separated as the right envisaged under Section 5A is a collective
right and cannot be equated with Section 6. It has also been argued on the
"Doctrine of Public C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 20 -
Law" to contend that there was no case for dismissal of the petitions of
these appellants on the ground of laches. According to him, it would amount to
discrimination to these appellants vis-a-vis the other land-owners who have
been extended the benefit of quashment of notifications, thereby exempting
their lands from being acquired, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to
stand.
40. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some other
appellants contended that he is appearing for those land-owners, who had
actually filed their objections under Section 5A of the Act and belong to
village Shayoorpur. The said petitions were filed in the year 1985.
41. However, unfortunately, when the said petitions were heard on
3.3.2005, learned counsel for the appellants was absent as a result whereof,
the petitions came to be dismissed. Thus, they were constrained to file review
petitions but same also came to be dismissed on 27.4.2006.
42. It has further been contended that on account of difference of
opinion between Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar (as he then was) and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur on the question of import and interpretation
of Section 5A of the Act, the matter was referred to Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S.
Thakur (as he then was). Hon'ble Mr.Justice Thakur agreed with C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 21 -
the views expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur. While concurring,
he held that hearing as contemplated under Section 5A of the Act would mean an
effective hearing and it is not an empty formality and the provision thereof
has to be strictly adhered to and principles of natural justice have to be
followed. The said judgment titled Chatro Devi Vs Union of India & Ors. is
reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14.
43. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, strenuously contended before us that in B.R.
Gupta-II, it was specifically held with regard to land-owners of Shayoorpur
that the enquiry was bad and invalid. The report as sent by Collector to the
Lt. Governor and his satisfaction thereon was also bad. If this was already
held so by Division Bench of the said Court then in subsequent orders passed by
Division Bench, it could not have been over-ruled by the said Bench, it being a
coordinate Bench. It was also contended by learned counsel that certain
observations made in B.R.Gupta (supra) and Abhey Ram (supra) would not
constitute ratio decidendi as they could, at best, be treated as obiter which
is not binding on this Court.
44. It was reiterated by learned Senior Counsel that the declaration
under Section 6 of the Act, having not been issued within a period of three
years from the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, the
whole process has C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 22 -
been rendered redundant and has become non est.
45. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some other
appellants submitted that he represents those land- owners, whose lands are
situated in village Chhatarpur but their petitions have been dismissed solely
on the ground of laches. According to him, they purchased the lands from
original owners some time in the month of April, 1985 but had filed the
petitions in the High Court in the year 2004.
46. It has also been submitted by him that original owners, that is the
vendors of these appellants had already filed their objections under Section 5A
of the Act but the present appellants did not prosecute the same any further.
Thus, obviously, they came to be dismissed. He further informed that
appellants still continue to be in possession of the lands, and have already
constructed houses over the same, without any permission or sanction, since at
that time no permission/sanction was required to be obtained either from
Panchayat or Municipal Corporation.
47. As regards laches, it has been tried to be explained by contending
that First Master Plan was published on 1.9.1962 but it lapsed in 1981. The
second Master Plan was in force upto 2001. On account of serious confusion due
to variety of reasons, the land-owners were in a lurch as to what legal C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 23 -
steps are required to be taken due to the fact that Delhi Administration
itself had dropped further acquisition proceedings. He, therefore, contended
that when there was such a massive confusion, not only amongst the litigating
public but also amongst the advocates representing them, thus, they were fully
justified in not taking up the issue earlier and their petitions could not have
been dismissed solely on the ground of delay or laches when the same were
sufficiently explained to the Bench.
48. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appeared for
Springdales Educational Society, whose land is also situated in village
Chhatarpur. According to him, appellant is the original owner of the land
having purchased it in the year 1966-1967. On coming to know about the
acquisition proceedings, appellant had filed objections under Section 5A of
the Act within 30 days and had specifically sought an opportunity of hearing to
it, which was not granted.
49. He contended that appellant is imparting rural education to the
residents of that area and the purpose for which appellant's society has been
set up is public charitable purpose. Thus, when specific opportunity of hearing
to support objections filed by it under Section 5A of the Act was sought,
further declaration under Section 6 of the Act should C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05
etc. (contd.)
- 24 -
not have been issued till the objections were finally decided. He, therefore,
submitted that since notifications have been quashed in respect of many
villages, it is a fit case where notification as far as this appellant is
concerned, should also be quashed. He has also pressed into service the legal
maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit," meaning thereby that an act of
the court shall prejudice none. He also reiterated that there was total
confusion with regard to the action required to be taken by the land-owners.
Thus, the petitions could not have been dismissed on the ground of laches, more
so, where equitable principles are invoked, laches would not come into play and
especially in such type of cases, where there was no occasion for the
respondents to file counter affidavit.
50. Almost identical arguments have been advanced by Mr. Vikas, Mr. Y.P.
Mahajan, Mr. R.N. Keshwani, Mr. Bhargava V. Desai, Mr. Ravinder Singh, Mr.
Amarjit Singh Bedi, Mr. Vikas Mehta, Mr. M.R. Shamshed, Mr. N.S. Vasisth,
appearing for the other Appellants.
51. In addition, they have also raised the ground that all the subsequent
purchasers have purchased the lands after fully complying with the provisions
contained in Section 5 of Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, which
mandate upon C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 25 -
the land-owners of Delhi to seek permission from the competent authority that
the said land is not under orders of acquisition. They also contended that
since permission was granted by the competent authority for sale and transfer
of their land, it would automatically mean that the land was free from
clutches of acquisition, otherwise no permission in this regard would have been
granted to them.
52. Learned counsel appearing for respondents Shri Hiren Rawal, ASG,
Ms.Indira Jaising, ASG, Mr. D.N. Goburdhan and Ms. Gita Luthra opposed the
prayer of the appellants and contended that matters have now been settled by
long catena of cases either by High Court or by this Court, ever since the
notifications were issued in the year 1980. Thus, it is too late in the day for
the appellants to challenge the same on any other grounds.
53. Learned ASG for respondent No.1, Union of India, Mr. H.S. Rawal has
taken us through the aims and objects of Amending Act No. 13 of 1967 and
Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, primarily to bring to our notice the purpose and
reasons for bringing various amendments in the original Land Acquisition Act
1894. He submitted that vide Amending Act No. 13 of 1967, amending provisions
thereof came into operation with effect from 12.4.1967.
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 26 -
54. It has been submitted that the challenge by land owners to the
issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act stood concluded in favour
of the respondents by a Division Bench Judgment in the matter of Munni Lal
(supra). Argument was, therefore, advanced that the said judgment has already
attained finality as the aggrieved party had not challenged the same by filing
any further appeal in the Supreme Court. Thus, it should be deemed that the
notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act by respondents were legal,
valid and beyond the pale of judicial review as the lands are acquired for
public purpose.
55. It has been contended by him that generally the objections preferred
under Section 5A of the Act were on a cyclostat format raising the same grounds
against acquisition, still, full and complete hearing on the said objections
was afforded to them by Land Acquisition Collector as contemplated under the
Act.
56. He has brought to our notice that in Munni Lal (supra), the Division
Bench of Delhi High Court had passed an interim order of stay on 18.3.1981,
reproduced herein below:- "Case for 27.4.1981 in the meanwhile,
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are restrained from issuing any
declaration under Section 6 of
the Act."
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 27 -
57. In the light of the aforesaid interim blanket order of stay passed by
Delhi High Court, learned counsel for respondents contended that the hands of
the respondents were tied by the said order and they could not have proceeded
further to issue any declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The words used in
the interim order were "any declaration" which completely restrained
them from proceeding further in this direction. It was also contended that the
aforesaid order came to be confirmed on 4.5.1981. Similar interim orders
thereafter came to be passed in various other writ petitions preferred by land-
owners. In the light of the various interim orders passed by Delhi High Court
from time to time, the respondents could not have issued further declaration
under Section 6 of the Act, otherwise they would have exposed themselves for
committing contempt of the Court.
58. It was then contended that all objections preferred by land-owners
under Section 5A of the Act were considered between the period from 8.5.1985 to
13.6.1985. After hearing arguments on the objections, along with the report of
the Land Acquisition Collector, the same were forwarded to Lt. Governor of
Delhi between the period from 13.5.1985 to 22.6.1985. Lt. Governor then examined
the objections together with reports enclosed therewith prepared by Land
Acquisition Collector and C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 28 -
gave his approval for acquisition of the land. In other words, it has been
contended that the provisions of the Act have fully been complied with and
there has not been any violation thereof.
59. He has further brought to our notice that W.P.(C)No.2850 of 1985 was
filed in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same issue with regard to
period of limitation prescribed between issuance of notification under Section
4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act, which came to be
dismissed by Division Bench on 25.11.1985. Pursuant to the said order,
respondents had taken possession of part of the land sought to be acquired vide
order dated 14.7.1987.
60. It has not been disputed before us that Mrs. Gita Sagar had written a
letter on 31.3.1989 mentioning therein that on account of several developments
and judgment of the High Court of Delhi in B.R.Gupta-II the acquisition
proceedings are being dropped. It was followed by another circular issued by
respondent on 07.12.1999 but it has been contended before us that they were not
addressed to any of the appellants or land owners whose lands were sought to be
acquired and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that all further
proceedings of acquisition of land were dropped. However, in our opinion,
critical reading thereof makes it abundantly C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc.
(contd.)
- 29 -
clear the proceedings were dropped pursuant to the judgment in the case of the
B.R. Gupta-II. Consequently, the benefit of the said communication can be
extended qua the petitioners who had approached the High Court and not to all
other land owners.
61. Coming to the question of delay and laches in filing the petitions by
various petitioners in the High Court, it has been contended that as a matter
of fact, cause of action for filing the petitions had accrued to them in the
year 1985, when on four different dates, declaration under Section 6 of the
Act was issued. Therefore, it was necessary on the part of the appellants to
have explained the delay from 1985 onwards. He thus, contended that it is to be
explained in three stages viz:
(i) from 1985 till B.R. Gupta-II came to be decided on 18.11.1988;
(ii) from the period from 18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997 when Abhey Ram
(supra) came to be decided and finally, (iii) post Abhey Ram's case, till the
filing of the petitions.
62. It has been contended that unless the appellants are able to
successfully overcome the first hurdle from the year 1985 till 1988, the
question of their explaining delay and laches C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc.
(contd.)
- 30 -
for the second or third stage would not arise.
63. Apart from the above, it has also been strenuously contended before
us that perusal of each and every petition filed by the appellants would show
that there has been no concrete foundation in the pleadings explaining delay
and laches. According to respondents, it was incumbent on the part of the
appellants to have specifically pleaded as to why they could not approach the
Court earlier and to have explained the laches. Since this onus, which lay
heavily on the appellants was not discharged and their petitions having been
dismissed on this ground, the question of meeting the same by the respondents
by way of their counter did not arise.
64. It was thereafter contended that in all the matters, awards have been
passed between the period from 19.5.1987 to 17.6.1987 pertaining to all the 13
villages and money had also been deposited. Once awards have been passed, in
the light of various judgments of this Court, it was neither justified nor
legally competent on the part of the appellants to have challenged the
declaration issued under the Act on the ground of limitation or on any other
ground. To buttress this ground, learned counsel for respondents have placed
reliance on the following judgments :
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 31 -
1) Vishwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association Vs. Under Secretary,
Delhi Administration reported in (1990) 2 SCC 268; 2) Star Wire (India) Ltd.
Vs. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698; and
3) Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan
(2008) 4 SCC 695.
65. It was then submitted that as regards grant of permission was
concerned, the same has not been issued by the competent authority as
prescribed under the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.
Therefore, advantage thereof cannot be taken by the appellants. To put forth
further arguments in this regard, reliance has been placed on a recent judgment
of this Court reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 Meera Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor of
Delhi. It has been brought to our notice that NOCs produced before this Court
for perusal, would show that the same have been issued under the seal and
signature of Tehsildar and not by the competent authority as defined under
Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Therefore, no advantage
thereof could be claimed by the appellants, who are subsequent purchasers from
original owners.
66. To contend further in this regard, we have been taken through the
affidavit of Shri U.P. Singh, OSD (Litigation), C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc.
(contd.)
- 32 -
Building Department of Government of NCT, Delhi, in which it has categorically
been mentioned with regard to the alleged NOC that the same is of no
consequence as it has not been issued by the competent authority as
contemplated under the said Act. It has been contended that the said NOC cannot
be construed as a valid permission to the subsequent purchasers in the light
of provisions of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.
67. Additionally, it has been argued that in any case, the said NOC
issued by Tehsildar is of no consequence because Tehsildar was not the
competent authority at the relevant point of time. In the wake of this
categorical denial of valid NOC possessed by subsequent purchasers, it has been
contended that even grant of alleged NOC would not carry the appellants' case
further to their advantage.
68. It is emphasised by him that in the light of judgment of this Court
in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 296 known
as Gurdip Singh Uban-II, all points having already been considered, no fresh
look is required by this Court. More so, when each and every point argued,
hammered and contended by the appellants has already been decided against them.
It was also submitted by him that in the name of unfair treatment, matters
which stood closed either by C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 33 -
several judgments of this Court or of Delhi High Court and also keeping in
mind that land acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 1980, nothing
more is required to be done and the appeals deserve to be dismissed.
69. Learned ASG, Ms. Indira Jaising, appearing for Delhi Development
Authority argued on the similar lines, which have already been advanced by Mr.
H.S Rawal. In addition, she has contended that once notification under Section
4 of the Act is issued, the same never dies or becomes ineffective unless it
is specifically revoked as required under the Act in accordance with law. To
substantiate this contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on Section 21
of the General Clauses Act. She has also placed reliance on two judgments of
House of Lords titled Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council and Others
reported in 1956 AC 376 and F. Hoffmann- LA Roche and Co. A.G. and Others Vs.
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry reported in 1975 AC 295, in this
regard.
70. She has further submitted that in view of three earlier judgments of
this Court, it has been held that Explanation 1 appended to first proviso to
Section 6 would apply squarely to the facts of the case therefore, it is
neither legally permissible nor warranted to take a different view. C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 34 -
71. Coming to the question of legitimate expectation, it was contended
that no advantage of noting on the files or inter se circulars issued by
Departments can be taken by the parties. It was also submitted that the letter
of Mrs. Gita Sagar as also the Circular issued thereafter would show that none
was addressed to any of the appellants and the same had died their own natural
death, on which appellants cannot build up their cases invoking the doctrine of
'Legitimate Expectation'. She has also submitted that as the cause of action
had actually accrued to the appellants in the year 1985 unless they are able to
successfully show to this Court and reasonably explain the delay caused in
filing the writ petitions in the High Court, the High Court was fully
justified in dismissing the same on the ground of delay and laches.
72. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, several authorities have
been cited by her but in nutshell they are the same which have already been
cited by the learned counsel for other side. Nevertheless, we would deal with
the same in the latter part of the judgment
73. Ms. Gita Luthra and Mr. D.N.Goburdhan, learned Counsel appearing for
Govt. of NCT of Delhi reiterated the same grounds which have already been
argued and advanced by Mr. C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 35 -
Rawal and Ms. Indira Jaising. Additionally, it has been contended that in some
of the matters, objections under Section 5A of the Act were not filed, yet they
got the benefit, when 73 petitions came to be disposed of, in batch matters by
Delhi High Court. It has also been brought to our notice that at a much later
stage, appellants had sought permission to amend their petitions by raising a
ground under Section 5A of the Act but the Court was constrained to reject the
same. Mr. D.N. Goburdhan contended that delay in approaching the Court in
filing a petition under Articles 226-227 cannot be condoned unless the same is
reasonably and satisfactorily explained and that the Court must be fully
satisfied with regard to the plausible explanation of not being able to reach
the Court earlier.
74. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court
wherein it has been held that even delay of 17 months could not be condoned and
was not found to be reasonable by this Court. With all these arguments having
been advanced by learned Counsel for respondents, their contentions have come
to an end.
75. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions advanced by the
parties, we proceed to decide the matter as C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc.
(contd.)
- 36 -
under.
76. Explanation 1 appended to first proviso of Section 6 of the Act, as
reproduced hereinabove, makes it crystal clear that where any order of stay has
been granted in favour of land owner, while computing the period of limitation
of three years for issuance of Section 6 notification, the actual period
covered by such order of stay should be excluded. In other words, the period of
three years would automatically get extended by that much of period during
which stay was in operation. The question which, therefore, arises for our
consideration is whether even in those cases where there has been no stay order
granted or passed in favour of the land owners, the period of limitation would
be three years from the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of
the Act or it would be more on account of stay order granted in other matter in
which such appellants were not parties.
77. On account of difference of opinion between two Benches of High Court
of Delhi, matter was referred to a Full Bench, referred to as B.R. Gupta-I, the
only question posed before it for opinion was with regard to effect of grant of
stay, where challenge is to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the
Act vis-a-vis other land owners who had not challenged it. After considering
the ambit, scope and nature C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 37 -
of stay granted especially in land acquisition matters, Full Bench has
expressed its opinion in paragraphs 26 to 31, reproduced hereinbelow :
"26. Learned counsel for the petitioners is to some extent right in his
contention that broad as the above observations are, these
cases are slightly different in that they all dealt with
the effect of the operation of
stay order only vis-a-vis one of the parties to the
litigation in which the stay order is passed. But we are of opinion that these
decisions are of guidance as to the proper
approach to such a question. In the first place, they show
that a stay of execution of a decree can be pleaded as a ground for
conclusion of the period of stay even by a
judgment-debtor who did not seek the stay.
To that extent, the insistence by the
petitioners that the exclusion can operate
only against the party who obtained the stay order would
not be correct. Secondly, these decisions show that the prohibition on action
need not be the direct effect of a stay order of a court. Thus, in the present
cases, even if in terms the court be held not to have
stayed a declaration in other cases, such was the indirect
effect of the stay order in
these cases. Thirdly, they lay down that we should not
interpret a provision of this type rigidly but should give it an interpretation
that gives effect to the object of the
legislature.
27. We, therefore, think that, in
proceeding to interpret the scope of the
explanation, we should keep in mind the
nature of the proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act and the nature of the
proceedings in which stay orders are obtained. So far as the
first of these
aspects is concerned, while it is possible
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 38 -
for the Government to issue notifications
under S. 4 in respect of each plot of land
sought to be acquired, it is not feasible or practicable to
do so, particularly in the context of the purpose of many of the
acquisitions at the present day. It is
common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as
many other capital cities, vast extents are being acquired
for 'planned development' or public projects. The acquisition is generally part
of an integrated scheme or
plan and, though, technically speaking,
there can be no objection to individual
plots being processed under Ss. 5A, 6, 9,
12, etc., particularly after the amendment
of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that at least
substantial blocks of land
should be dealt with together at least upto the stage of the
declaration under S.6. To
give an example, if a large extent of land
is to be acquired for the excavation of a
canal, the scheme itself cannot be put into operation unless
the whole land can be
eventually made available. If even one of the land owners
anywhere along the line
applies to court and gets a stay of the
operation of the notification under S. 4, in practical terms,
the whole scheme of acquisition will fall through. It is of no
consolation to say that there was no stay
regarding other lands covered by the scheme. To compel the
Government to proceed against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the
explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no stay order in respect
thereof) would only result in waste of
public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single
owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the S.4 notification and
in getting it quashed by
the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of
acquisition will fail and the government
will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in
respect of other lands. (See:
Shenoy Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1985 SC 621 and
Gauraya Vs. Thakur, AIR 1986 SC
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 39 -
1440). Assuming that where such final order is by a High
Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether,
in law, the quashing of the order enures
only to the benefit of the party who filed
the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the
moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the
others, they would come up with similar
petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in
many of the present day
notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and
the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the
whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of.
28. It is true that the object of having contiguity of all
plots sought to be acquired may fail for various reasons. For instance, there
may be items of properties exempt from acquisition in between. Again, it may
happen that a particular person may have been able to stave off acquisition of
his land for one reason or other, particularly since dates of declarations under
S.6, awards and taking of possession may vary from plot to plot.
Moreover, it is not in all cases that the
object of acquisition needs a number of
contiguous plots and may be workable even
without some of the intervening lands.
However, in considering a question of interpretation, one
should not go only by one particular situation but must consider all
eventualities to the extent possible. It is only on a broad
perspective of the scheme of present day acquisitions in large measure
that we say that any hurdle in regard to any one plot of land
can hold up an entire
acquisition, all promptness and expedition on the part of the
Government notwithstanding.
29. It was sought to be urged that the
interpretation sought to be placed by the
respondent would result in equating an
interim order with a final judgment and the C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 40 -
final judgment in a land acquisition case to a judgment in
rem and in this context
reference was made to S.41, Evidence Act, and to a passage in
Woodroffe on Evidence (14th Edition, Vol.2) at page 1225. We do not think this
analogy is correct. If the final order can operate to the benefit of all the
parties, there is no reason why the interim order cannot also affect them.
Moreover, we are considering the nature and effect of an injunction passed by
the court against one of the parties thereto who has to act in the same capacity
not only in the acquisition of the plot of land the owner of which has
obtained a stay order but in all proceedings consequent on or
in pursuance of the same
notification that is challenged in that
petition.
30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in
which stay orders are obtained are also very different from
the old pattern of suits
confined to parties in their scope and
effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ
petitions and it is now
settled law that in this type of proceeding, the principle of
locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can
challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general
grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter
parties simpliciter: it is a
public interest litigation which affects
wider interests. The grounds of challenge to the notification
may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than
not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact,
this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same
contentions just as the previous batch of
writ petitions challenging the notifications under S. 4
raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges
and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular
petitioners and C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 41 -
their lands would virtually provide persons with common
interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them
benefit; and if for some reason that
fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the
one presently raised, the
first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited
because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which
the acquisition is
intended.
31. We have, therefore, to give full effect to the language
of the section and the stay orders in question, in the above context and
background. The use of the word "any" in the explanation considerably
amplifies its
scope and shows clearly that the explanation can be invoked
in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed. It may be complete stay of
the operation of the entire notification or may even be a partial stay - partial
in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate.
The words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude
and there is no justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only
to the cases in which the stay order is actually obtained."
78. In the light of the aforesaid opinion having been expressed by Full
Bench, the original Writ Petition of the Petitioner-Balak Ram was placed before
a Division Bench for its disposal in accordance with law.
79. Division Bench of the High Court on 14.8.1988, pronounced only the
operative part of the judgment, to the effect that further acquisition
proceedings in all the said writ petitions stood quashed, reasons were to
follow. The C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 42 -
reasons in respect of the aforesaid operative part of the order were supplied
in a judgment referred to as B.R. Gupta- II.
80. The Division Bench while allowing the petitions recorded the
concession made by the Senior Advocate Mr. R.K. Anand, to the effect that he
was unable to support the declaration in view of the lack of opportunity of
hearing granted by Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5A of the Act to
the land owners. The concession so given is recorded in para 7 of the
judgment. The Court also examined the matter independent of the concession and
quashed the entire notification on many grounds. Thus, all the 73 Writ
Petitions filed by land owners came to be allowed and the acquisition
proceedings were dropped.
81. Against the order passed in writ petitions by Delhi High Court in
B.R. Gupta-II, the matter travelled to this Court in Abhey Ram (supra).
82. This Court after considering previous judgments on the controversy
involved in the matter held as under in paras 10, 11 and 12 reproduced herein
below :
"10. The question then arises is whether the quashing of
the declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other matters would
enure the benefit to the appellants also.
Though, prima facie, the argument of the
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 43 -
learned counsel is attractive, on deeper
consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance, to the
contention of Mr. Sachar. When the Division Bench expressly limited the
controversy to the quashing of the declaration qua the writ petitioners before
the Bench, necessary consequences would be
that the declaration published under Section 6 should stand
upheld.
11. It is seen that before the Division
Bench judgment was rendered, the petition of the appellants
stood dismissed and the appellants had filed the special leave petition in this
court. If it were a case entirely relating to section 6 declaration as has been
quashed by the High court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to others
also, though they did not file any
petition, except to those whose lands were taken possession of
and were vested in the
State under Sections 16 and 17 (2) of the Act free from all
encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to
the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons qua
the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore, the benefit of the
quashing of the declaration under Section 6 by the division Bench does not
ensure to the appellants.
12. It is true that a Bench of this Court
has considered the effect of such a quashing in Delhi
Development Authority v. Sudan Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430. But, unfortunately, in
that case the operative part of the
judgment referred to earlier has not been
brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the ratio
therein has no application to the facts in this case. It is also true that in
Yusufbhai Noormohmed
Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 531,this Court
had also observed that it
would ensure the benefit to those petitioners.
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 44 -
In view of the fact that the
notification under Section 4 (1) is a
composite one and equally the declaration
under Section 6 is also a composite one,
unless the declaration under Section 6 is
quashed in toto, it does not operate as if
the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen
that the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under
Section 5A."
83. In fact, after the pronouncement of the judgment in Abhey Ram (supra)
rendered by three learned Judges of this Court, nothing survives in these
Appeals, but looking to the vehement arguments advanced by learned senior
counsel Mr. P.P. Rao, we have once again examined the whole controversy in the
light of his arguments.
84. Even though judicial propriety and discipline create legal hurdles
and impediments, in coming to a different conclusion than what has already been
arrived at by three learned Judges of this Court in Abhey Ram (supra), but
looking to the arguments advanced, we proceed to decide it.
85. It has been submitted before us by Mr. P.P. Rao that admittedly,
appellants represented by him, had not preferred any objections under Section
5A of the Act, thus, in any case, they could not have been precluded from
challenging the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act being barred by
limitation. According to him, two issues being entirely different and separate
they could not have been clubbed C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 45 -
together so as to non-suit the appellants.
86. Even though the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the
appellants appear to be attractive, but, on deeper scanning of the same we are
of the opinion that on account of omission of the appellants, they cannot be
granted dividend for their own defaults. The appellants should have been more
careful, cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed along with those 73
petitions, which were ultimately allowed by the High Court. Not having done so,
the appellants have obviously to suffer the consequence of issuance of
notifications under Section 4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the
Act.
87. Perusal of the opinion of Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I would clearly
indicate with regard to interpretation of the word 'any' in Explanation 1 to
the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order
granted in one case of land owners to be automatically extended to all those
land owners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issued under
Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate
order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by Full Bench,
the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appear to be
reasonable, apt, legal and proper. C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 46 -
88. It is also worth mentioning that each of the notifications issued
under Section 4 of the Act was composite in nature. The interim order of stay
granted in one of the matters, i.e., Munni Lal (supra) and confirmed
subsequently have been reproduced hereinabove. We have also been given to
understand that similar orders of stay were passed in many other petitions.
Thus, in the teeth of such interim orders of stay, as reproduced hereinabove,
we are of the opinion that during the period of stay respondents could not have
proceeded further to issue declaration/notification under Section 6 of the
Act. As soon as the interim stay came to be vacated by virtue of the main order
having been passed in the writ petition, respondents, taking advantage of the
period of stay during which they were restrained from issuance of declaration
under Section 6 of the Act, proceeded further and issued notification under
Section 6 of the Act.
89. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the
matters of the land owners would put complete restraint on the respondents to
have proceeded further to issue notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had
they issued the said notification during the period when the stay was
operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for committing contempt
of court. The language employed in the C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 47 -
interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely restrained the
respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act.
90. No doubt, it is true that language of Section 6 of the Act implies
that declarations can be issued piecemeal and it is not necessary to issue one
single declaration for whole of the area which is covered under notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act. Parliament was aware of such type of
situation and that is why such a right has been carved out in favour of
respondent-State. In many cases, urgency clause may be invoked, therefore, the
right of filing objections under Section 5A of the Act would not arise. In some
cases, even though objections might be preferred under Section 5A of the Act,
but, may not be pressed in spite of knowledge of acquisition of land. Some of
the land owners may not prefer to file any objections at all. In order to meet
such type of exigencies as may arise in the case, power has been given by the
Parliament to the Executive to issue declarations in piecemeal under Section 6
of the Act, wherever it may be feasible to implement the scheme.
91. The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in the case in hand
as many as four declarations under Section 6 of C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc.
(contd.)
- 48 -
the Act were issued from time to time. Finally when declaration is quashed by
any Court, it would only enure to the benefit of those who had approached the
Court. It would certainly not extend the benefit to those who had not
approached the Court or who might have gone into slumber.
92. To us, this appears to be the scheme of the Act and that was the
intention of the Parliament. That being so, scheme of the Act as has been
legislated, has to be given full effect to.
93. We find no ground to grant the same reliefs to those appellants to
whom on earlier occasions, same relief was granted. At this long distance of
time, it would neither be proper nor legally justified to grant that benefit to
the appellants. If it is granted to even those who had not approached the
court, then it would frustrate the very purpose and scope of the Act. In the
light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that final quashment
of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act by any Court, in some other
matter, cannot be extended to the benefit of the present appellants. In any
case, there is no ground for us, to rise to the occasion to do so, much less to
the benefits of the appellants. In our considered opinion, it is not a fit case
where situation or circumstances call upon us to rise to the C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 49 -
occasion and to grant such inequitable reliefs to the appellants, after such a
long delay.
94. Obviously, the appellants cannot be rewarded on account of their own
lapse as they should have been vigilant enough to get their matters also listed
along with those in whose favour ultimately judgment was pronounced.
95. Looking to the scheme of the Act, it is obvious that the appellants
would certainly suffer the consequence of the interim order passed in some
other matters preferred by other land owners challenging the notifications but
finally benefit thereof cannot be accrued to the appellants as the same would
obviously be confined to those petitioners only in whose favour orders were
passed.
96. The arguments advanced by Mr. P.N. Lekhi appear to be attractive at
the first instance, but, after going through closer and deeper scrutiny of the
first proviso appended to Section 6 of the Act, we are of the considered
opinion that certain period has been saved. First proviso clearly indicates
that all actions which have taken place between the period, after commencement
of Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Ordinance 1967 but before the
commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, would be saved. There is
no dispute in these matters that notifications under Section 4 of C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 50 -
the Act were issued on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, the period which is covered
by the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act. Thus, this ground sought to be
advanced by Mr. Lekhi as well as Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, cannot be accepted and is
decided against them.
97. In fact, this aspect of the matter has been dealt with elaborately in
the opinion expressed by Full Bench in the case of B.R. Gupta-I. The proviso,
according to Full Bench opinion, is very elaborate and made Explanation 1
applicable to the computation of any of the periods referred to in first
proviso. In the said judgment, four situations have been carved out. Situation
No.(ii) would cover the present case which deals with notification issued under
Section 4 after 28.1.1967 but before 25.9.1981. Relevant portion of paragraph
11 thereof is reproduced hereunder :
"If the object of the legislature had been to confer
the benefit of the explanation
only to situations (iii) and (iv), it could have enacted the
proviso as indicated earlier and added an explanation that, in
computing the period of limitation, periods covered by stay
orders would be excluded.
The legislature need not have at all
referred to situation (ii) above. But the Legislature also
wanted to make it clear
that the explanation would apply in respect of notifications
under S.4 issued prior to
25-9-1981 as well. In doing so, the
provision could well have taken into account even S.4
notifications issued prior to 29-1- C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 51 -
1967 for it was quite conceivable that,
though the two year period for following
these up with declaration under S.6 had
elapsed by 28-1-1969, the failure to make a S.6 declaration
may have been the consequence of a stay order from a court.
But the Legislature decided to exclude this category from
the provision for extension in the explanation, and decided to confine
itself to all notifications under S.4 made
after 29-1-1967. This is very important and the manner in
which cl.(a) of the proviso is worded so as to cover all notifications
after 29-1-1967 and before 24-9-1984 precludes the
contention urged on behalf of the petitioners seeking to limit the operation of
the explanation. This contention is that the amendments of 1984
can at best only affect cases in which the
three year period prescribed in 1967 had not expired by
24-9-1984. In other words, the argument is that only cases covered by
notifications under S.4 issued after 25-9-
1981 can be affected by the amendments and
have the benefit of the extended period
contemplated in the explanation. This contention is clearly
unacceptable. It runs counter to the entire scheme of the proviso (which
specifically takes in all the period after 29-1-1967) and the explanation (which
is specifically made applicable to both the clauses of the proviso). We are,
therefore, of opinion that the language and intendment of the provision are
clear and unambiguous
and that the period of exclusion mentioned
in the explanation should be taken into
account in the cases of all notifications
issued after 29-1-1967 whether or not the
period otherwise limited under the proviso
for a follow-up declaration under S.6 in
respect thereof had expired or not. We, therefore, reject
the contention urged on
behalf of the petitioners."
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 52 -
98. Thus, considering the matter in the light of the opinion expressed by
Full Bench as also with the plain reading of the first proviso and explanation
(i) the following opinion can be safely deduced and the aforesaid conclusion
would be inescapable that the exclusion envisaged is available in respect of
notifications issued between the period commencing from 29.1.1967 and
24.9.1984.
99. As mentioned hereinabove, in Chatro Devi-I both the learned Judges
dismissed the writ petition in respect of the cases where Land Acquisition
Collector was the same who had heard the arguments then prepared the report and
also in respect of those who had not preferred any objections under Section 5A
of the Act. The decision of Division Bench of Delhi High Court in B.R. Gupta-II
(supra) was held to be incorrect and acquisition proceedings were upheld in
respect of aforesaid cases. However, difference of opinion was confined only
with regard to import and interpretation of Section 5A of the Act as to what
would constitute 'hearing'.
100. Primarily, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar (as he then was) was
of the opinion that even if matters have been heard by 'A' and decided by 'B',
it would amount to sufficient compliance of Section 5A of the Act but Hon'ble
Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur was of the view that if a matter C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 53 -
is heard by 'A' obviously it has to be decided by him only and if it has been
decided by 'B' then the same would amount to miscarriage of justice and
obviously would lead to violation of principles of natural justice.
101. Only to this limited extent, with regard to interpretation of
Section 5A of the Act, matter was referred to third learned Judge Hon'ble Mr.
Justice T.S. Thakur, (as he then was). In his separate judgment, Hon'ble
Mr.Justice Thakur concurred with the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Madan B. Lokur titled Chatro Devi Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 137
(2007) DLT 14 known as Chatro Devi-II.
102. We have been given to understand that, feeling aggrieved by the
majority opinion as expressed by two learned Judges in the matter of Chatro
Devi II, the Union of India had filed 39 Special Leave Petitions in this Court
wherein leave has been granted and appeals are now pending disposal in
accordance with law.
103. At the first instance, we thought of getting those matters also
listed before us for hearing so that once for all, the dispute pertaining to
the notifications issued in the year 1980 would come to an end, but we have been
informed that many of the respondents have not yet been served and some
matters cannot be listed on account of technical defaults. We C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 54 -
also requested learned counsel appearing for appellants to appear for those
respondents but they showed their inability in doing so as the respondents of
those appeals are not the same, who are appellants before us.
104. Thus, in this judgment, we are not considering the ambit, scope and
interpretation of Section 5A of the Act and have specifically left it open, to
be decided in the said 39 appeals.
105. It has not been disputed before us that after the opinion was
expressed by Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I all the connected 73 writ petitions
came to be heard by Division Bench in B.R. Gupta-II. All the said petitions
were allowed and the reliefs as claimed by them were granted vide order dated
18.11.1988. The question whether stay granted to some of the land owners
prohibiting the authorities from publication of declaration under Section 6 of
the Act would be applicable to others also, who had not obtained stay in that
behalf came to be considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case
of Abhey Ram (supra). In paragraph (9) thereof it has been held as under:-
"9. ..... The words 'stay of the action or proceeding' have been widely
interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the
orders passed by this Court would be an
inhibitive action on the part of the
authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting
an enquiry under
C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 55 -
Section 5A was put in issue and the
declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily
unless the Court holds that
enquiry under Section 5A was properly conducted and the
declaration published
under Section 6 was valid, it would not be
open to the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a
consequence, the stay
granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also
who had not
obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the
correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Section 5A enquiry and
consideration of objections as
it was not challenged by the respondent
Union. ...."
Further in the same judgment, in paragraph 12 it has been held as under :
"12. ... ... ... In view of the fact that the
notification under Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the declaration
under Section 6 is also a composite one,
unless the declaration under Section 6 is
quashed in toto, it does not operate as if
the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen
that the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under
Section 5A."
106. To satisfy ourselves with regard to the aforesaid arguments advanced
by learned counsel for the appellants, we have gone through the record and find
that Land Acquisition Collector had heard the objections and thereafter had
forwarded the same to Lt. Governor for his opinion. The dates from which the
objections were heard have already been given hereinabove. Similarly, the
manner in which the same were C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 56 -
dealt with by Lt. Governor has also been scrutinized. We do not find any
infirmity or illegality in the procedure adopted in the same. We are of the
considered opinion that there has been full, complete and strict compliance of
the provisions contained in the Act by the respondents.
107. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is not necessary for us
to consider the judgment of this Court in the case of Oxford English School
(supra). This was a judgment by two learned Judges of this Court whereas the
judgment in the case of Abhey Ram (supra) is by three learned Judges of this
Court. Secondly, the question as to whether an order of stay passed in one case
would be applicable to other similarly situated persons who had not been
granted stay was not directly in issue in Oxford School Case (supra) decided
by this Court. The question in the said case was primarily with regard to the
period of limitation of three years within which a declaration under Section 6
is required to be made.
108. In the light of the foregoing discussion, more so, keeping in mind
the ratio of which stood concluded by a judgment of Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra), we are of the opinion
that it is not a fit case where we are called upon to come to a C.As @
SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 57 -
different conclusion that subsequent declaration issued under Section 6 was
beyond the period of limitation. Fact situation does not warrant us to do so.
109. Impugned orders passed by High Court from time to time would reveal
that some have been dismissed primarily on the ground of delay and laches. We
have gone through the said orders critically and find that if the appellants
were under some bonafide mistake and had not challenged the issuance of
notifications or declaration under Section 6 of the Act within a reasonable
time then on the ground that there was an eclipse period during which they were
not supposed to take any legal action, would be of no help to them. For that
they have to thank their own stars. Some of the petitions have been filed
either in the year 2000 or subsequent thereto. Thus, the High Court was
justified in not entertaining such petitions on the ground of delay and laches.
Even though, they have tried to attempt to explain the delay but such a long
delay cannot be condoned more so, when proceeding of acquisition was initiated
in the year 1980.
110. It may be recalled that notifications were issued in the year 1980.
Almost 30 years have already passed by, but, no steps could be taken to
formally complete the scheme so far. Thus, after such a long lapse of time, it
will not only be C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)
- 58 -
harsh but inequitable also to quash the notifications so as to grant liberty
to the appellants to challenge same in accordance with law.
111. The contention that in the cases of Abhey Ram and Gurdip Singh Uban,
admittedly, no objections were preferred under Section 5A of the Act,
therefore, the appellants' cases stood on a higher pedestal than those which
were considered in the aforesaid two cases also has no merits. It was also
submitted that the so called satisfaction of Lt. Governor was not legally
tenable as admittedly no records were sent to him by the Land Acquisition
Collector after deciding the objections filed by the appellants along with his
report. We have already mentioned above that there has been application of mind
by the Lt. Governor to the facts of the case.
112. As has been mentioned above and held by this Court in Abhey Ram
(supra) that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act being composite one it
would not be proper and legally justifiable to quash the same more so when most
of the appellants had not filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act.
Thus, the declarations issued under Section 6 of the Act cannot be quashed.
113. The clear ratio of the aforesaid passage of this Court is that
unless the declarations issued by respondents on as C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05
etc. (contd.)
- 59 -
many as four dates, as mentioned hereinabove, in the year 1985, are quashed in
toto, it cannot be said that respondents could not have proceeded further with
regard to acquisition of those lands for which the same has not been quashed
earlier.
114. In other words, it has been held that for all remaining lands for
which neither the notifications under Section 4 nor declarations under Section
6 have been quashed, acquisition proceedings, notification/declaration issued
for remaining lands would continue to hold good and respondents can proceed
further.
115. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that
appeals have no merit and substance. The same are hereby dismissed with costs.
Counsel's fees Rs. 10,000/- in each case.
.......................J.
[V.S. SIRPURKAR]
.......................J.
[DEEPAK VERMA]
February 08, 2010.