E. Padmanbhan, J.
1. Both the writ appeals have been preferred by the Management of Canara Bank, a Nationalised Bank, being aggrieved by the common order of the Learned single Judge made in W.P.Nos.5801 and 6261 of 1989 made on 29.10.1991. As per the earlier orders both the writs appeals were consolidated together. As the appeals arise out of the common order of the learned single Judge between the same parties, the present two appeals are being disposed of by a common order.
2. Heard Mr.Karthick, learned counsel appearing for M/s T.S.Gopalan & Co for the appellants in both the writs appeals and Mr. AR.L.Sundaresn learned counsel appearing for the respondent in both the writ appeals.
3. There is no controversy in factual matrix leading to the present appeals and the counsel on either side advanced only by the legal contentions. The Appellant-Bank initiated two separate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent who was an Officer of the appellant-Bank on the date of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. The two sets of misconduct for which disciplinary proceedings were initiated relate to the period while the respondent was an award staff but proceedings were initiated after the respondent came to be promoted to the cadre of officer. In the two set of charges, enquiry officer was appointed who after conducting separate enquiry submitted separate report holding that the respondent is guilt of charges levelled against him. The disciplinary authority by proceedings dated 20th June, 1988 imposed the punishment of dismissal with respect to the charge sheet dated 25.4.1967. In respect of the second set of charges also after following identical procedure the competent disciplinary authority while accepting the findings of the enquiry officer by a latter order dated 30th June 1988 imposed punishment of one more dismissal on the petitioner.
4. Aggrieved by the said orders of dismissal the respondent preferred two separate appeals before the appellate authority. The appellate authority by two separate proceedings while holding that the findings of the enquiry authority do not call for interference, modified the punishment to reduction to a lower stage in the time scale by five stages and recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to petitioner of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by the negligence or breach of orders in respect of the one appeal preferred against the punishment of dismissal, by its order dated 27.2.1989 relating to the charge sheet dated 25.4.1987. In respect of another appeal preferred against the imposing punishment of dismissal for the charges framed on 26.6.1986, the appellate authority while holding that no interference is called for with respect to the findings of the enquiry authority, however, modified the punishment of dismissal to reduction to a lower stage in the time scale by five stages by his proceedings dated 7th March, 1989.
5. In both the appeals separate punishment of reduction to lower stages in the time scale by five stages had been imposed apart from ordering recovery of pecuniary loss cause to the bank by the negligence or breach of orders by the respondent. Challenging the said two proceedings the respondent filed Writ Petition Nos.5801 and 8261 of 1989. Both the writ petition were contested by the appellant-Bank.
6. In the writ petitions the learned counsel for the appellant Bank raised the following four contentions:-
(a) The disciplinary proceedings initiated by the respondents against the petitioner are vitiated by the violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch has the findings of the enquiry authority which was made use of by the disciplinary authority in arriving at the final decision to punish the petitioner were not furnished to the petitioner. The failure on the part of the disciplinary authority to issue a second show cause notice to the petitioner with the copy of the report of the enquiring authority resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was denied the opportunity of making his representation to the disciplinary authority to show that he was innocent and that th findings of the enquiring authority were erroneous, before the disciplinary authority took a final decision based on the report of the enquiring authority.
(b) The petitioner was a clerk on the date of the alleged incidents ion the basis of which charges were framed against the petitioner, that being so the petitioner would not be governed by the provisions of the Canara Bank Officer Employees (Disciplinary and Appeal) Regulations , 1976 hereinafter called the Regulations and that he would be governed only by the bipartite settlements between certain banking companies represented by the Indian Banks association and their workman, hereinafter called the Bipartite settlements, and hence the entire disciplinary proceedings initiated under the regulations is illegal and therefore the impugned orders are liable to be set aside.
(c) The disciplinary authority viz. the first respondent has issued the charge sheets to the petitioner in both the cases with a closed mind and he has prejudged the issue even at the stage of issuing the show cause notice and hence the disciplinary proceedings are void and the impugned orders are bad.
(d) The findings of the enquiring authority with regard to the charges framed against the petitioner in both the cases are not based on acceptable evidence, and, therefore, the orders challenged in these writ petitions are liable to be quashed."
7. In respect of the last of the two contentions the learned Judge had not rendered any findings, nor had answered the last two points as presumably the counsel for either side have not pressed those points. In fact in respect of the last two points (c) and (d) even in these appeals also Mr.AR.L. Sundaresan, learned counsel for the respondent did not advance any argument, nor did he seek to sustain the order of learned Single Judge on grounds (c) and (d). The learned counsel for the respondent represented that contentions (c) and (d) need not be considered as presumably there are no merits in those two contentions. In respect of the first and second contentions alone arguments were advanced by the counsel on either side.
8. The learned Single Judge allowed both the writ petitions by a common order while answering contentions (a) and (b) in favour of the respondent and quashed the proceedings of the disciplinary authority as modified by the appellate authority. Hence the present appeals by the appellant-bank.
9. Mr.Karthick, learned counsel for the appellant challenged the conclusions of the learned single Judge in respect of grounds (a) and (b) while Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent sought to sustain the order passed by the learned single Judge.
10. In this appeal the following points arises for consideration:-
(1) Whether the disciplinary proceedings initiated and conducted by the appellant bank against the respondent is vitiated by following procedure prescribed by Canara Bank Officers Employees (Disciplinary and Appeal) Regulations, 1976?
(2) whether the disciplinary procedure prescribed by the bipartite settlement for the award staff requires to be followed in respect of an employee who ceased to be an award staff on promotion as an officer of the Bank?
(3) Whether the failure to communicate the findings of the enquiry Officer vitiates the disciplinary proceedings and ultimate orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority?
(4) Whether the punishment imposed against the respondent is arbitrary, excessive and disproportionate and liable to be interfered?
(5) To what relief if any?
11. The learned single Judge held that as the misconduct was committed when the respondent was an award staff, the bank should have initiated and conducted the disciplinary proceedings as well as imposed the punishment by following the procedure prescribed in the bipartite settlement. In this respect the learned single Judge had relied upon an earlier decision of another learned Judge in Pavithran v. Central Bank of India, 1985 (1) LLJ 26 in that view it was held that the initiation of proceedings against the respondent herein under the Canara Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 as fatal in that the misconduct had been committed by the respondent while he was an award staff and therefore the proceedings, if any, should have been initiated, conducted and ultimate orders should have been passed in terms of the procedure laid down in the bipartite settlement.
12. In other words, according to the learned single Judge, the initiation as well as the entire procedure adopted and the exercise of powers under the Canara Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 is illegal and liable to be quashed. As already pointed out, the learned single Judge heavily relied upon the judgment in Pavithran v. Central bank of India, 1985 (1) LLJ 26.
13. We are not inclined to sustain the view taken by the learned Single Judge though Mr.AR.L. Sundaresan, learned counsel for the respondent persuasively contended that no interference is called for and the earlier decision in Pavithran v. Central Bank of India, 1985 (1) LLJ 26 has been holding the field. Concedingly, the respondent herein had been promoted to the cadre of Officer and he is governed by the Canara Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 on the date when the disciplinary authority initiated proceedings. Any proceedings or imposition of punishment, if any could be against the respondent only as an officer of the Bank as he had ceased to be an award staff. Merely because the misconduct related to the period while the respondent was an award staff, it cannot be taken that even after his becoming an officer, the respondent could insist for a procedure prescribed under the bipartite settlement to be adopted.
14. The legal position in this respect has since been settled by an unreported Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Canara Bank v. S.Natarajan, decided on 9.6.1998 in W.A.No. 276 of 1997. An identical contention was advanced before the Division Bench while relying upon the decision in Pavithran v. Central Bank of India, 1985 (1) LLJ 26. The Division Bench considered the decision in Pavithran's case, and did not approve the decision of the learned Single Judge in Pavithra's case.
15. The Division Bench in W.A.No. 276 of 1997 held thus:-
The learned single Judge then came to the conclusion that it is the Service Code governing the procedure for the award staff that should be applied. Keeping in view the fact that the article of charge against the person concerned relates to acts of misconduct committed by him while he was acting as a member of such award staff. With great respect to the learned single Judge who rendered the decision and after a careful consideration of the reasons assigned, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge it is beyond comprehension from anyone to assume that in spite of the erthwhile award staff becoming a member of the Officers cadre of service, the principles or procedure or any service code applicable to the award staff can be applied, merely because of the fact that the instances pertaining to the articles of charges related to the period when the person concerned was working as an award staff, when the said Code will cease to apply to a person, the moment he becomes an Officer of the Bank. The benefits, if any, in the matter of protection or procedure must be held to have been lost on a member of erthwhile award staff getting elevated and promoted to the category of Officer grade. Apparently, a more liberal and protective procedure is envisaged to award staff because they belong to a lower rank and having regard to the limitation on their attainments and capabilities and the same protection might not to have been though to be required or considered necessary when once such a person joins the stream of higher category of staff of Officers. Keeping in view the higher attainments and maturity and the capacity to manage his matters. Otherwise, there could be no justification to differentiate in the matter of procedures. Consequently, in our view, the procedure that should apply to a person in the matter of disciplinary proceedings or judging the nature of misconduct should be the one which is applicable to him when the proceedings with reference to the position he held when the disciplinary proceedings as such are commenced and conducted. Otherwise, it will lead to incongruous and absurd results in the matter of fixing the competent authority to impose punishment and the appellate authority to impose punishment and the Appellate Authority as also the authority who should conduct enquiry against him, the learned Single Judge who decided the M.N. Pavithran's case, 1985 (1) LLJ 26 does not appear to have adverted himself to all such essential considerations and practicalities in taking a particular view. We, therefore, overrule the objection taken by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner and also express our dissent from the view taken by the learned Single Judge."
16. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the earlier Division Bench which did not approve the decision of the learned Single Judge in Pavithran's case, 1985 (1) LLJ 26. We are not persuaded to take a Division Bench. In our view also the view of the teamed Single Judge cannot be sustained. The respondent having been promoted to the cadre of an officer, as already pointed out is governed by the regulations relating to the officer of the Banks and he cannot claim that he is still governed by the procedure prescribed by the bipartite settlement merely because the incident or misconduct is referable to the period while he was an award staff.
17. In this case initiation of disciplinary proceeding as well as the conduct of proceedings and imposition of punishment or penalty could be only under the rules which governs the employee. Hence we answer points 1 and 2 in favour of the appellant and hold that, the proceedings initiated, the enquiry conducted and ultimate orders of punishment as well as the proceedings of the appellate authority are in order, we hasten to add that the procedure prescribed by the bipartite settlement will have no application to the respondent an officer as he ceased to be an award staff even on the date of initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
18. In fact a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chief General Manager -cum- Disciplinary Authority v. State Bank of India v. S.Yesudas, 2000 (1) LLJ 487 also had taken an identical view.
19. In the circumstances on the first point we hold that initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the ultimate orders of punishment as affirmed by the appellate authority against the respondent is valid. On the second point we hold that the procedure prescribed in the bipartite settlement will have no application to the case of the respondent, who had been promoted to the cadre of officer long prior to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings in respect of both the set of charges.
20. As regards the third point it is true hat as pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the report of the Enquiry Officer had not been furnished to the respondent and he had not been given an opportunity to state his objections with respect to the findings reported by the enquiry officer. In fact the enquiry reports were communicated along with the order of punishment. The procedure prescribed in the Canara Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 do not contemplate the enquiry findings being forwarded to the delinquent before imposing the punishment. Nor the regulation requires that the delinquent should be given an opportunity to state his objections to the findings reported by the enquiry officer.
21. The learned single Judge in this respect while relying upon the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Md. Ramzan Khan's case, held that there is violation of principles of natural justice and therefore the impugned proceedings are vitiated. The learned Judge took the view that failure to communicate the findings of the enquiry officer and the failure to afford an opportunity to state objections to the findings of the enquiry officer is fatal to the impugned proceedings. In these appeals, Mr.Karthick learned counsel for the appellant contented that the charges were farmed in the present case on 25.4.1987 as well as 26.6.1986. The disciplinary authority had imposed the punishment of dismissal on 20th of June, 1988 in respect of the first set of charges and in respect of second set of charges also imposed the punishment of dismissal on 30th June, 1988. It is rather extraordinary for the Bank to dismiss the respondent once over on 30.6.1988 having already dismissed him from service on 20th June,1988.
22. The decision of the Apex Court in Ramzan Khan's case, was rendered on 20.11.1990 which is long after the order imposing punishment of dismissal against the respondent. It is also equally settled and it is the law declared by the Supreme Court that the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, is only prospective.
23. In Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, a five Judges Bench of the Apex Court had considered the entire case law on the subject. The Apex Court held thus:-
"The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with backwages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all the sundry occasions, whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, there even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequences would have followed. It would be a pervasion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which is itself is antithetical to justice.
Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present, the Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts since it is the Courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment and not any internal appellate or revisional authority there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside order of punishment.........
............It is for the first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case, that this Court laid down the law. The decision
made the law laid down there prospective in operation i.e. applicable to the orders of punishment passed after November 20, 1990. The law laid down was not applicable to the orders of punishment passed before that date notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings arising out of the same were pending in courts after that date. The said proceedings had to be decided according to the law prevalent prior to the said date which did not require the authority to supply a copy of the enquiry officer's report to the employee. The only exception to this was where the service rules with regard to the disciplinary proceedings themselves made it obligatory to supply a copy of the report to the employee.
24. It is needless to add that the direction with regard to the prospective operation of the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan' case, was followed by various benches of the Apex Court
Corporation of India v. Narendra Kumar Jain, and in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, .
25. In S.P. Viswanathan v. Union of India, 1991 Suppl (2) SCC 269 the Apex Court held thus:
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since a copy of the inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner the order of termination is vitiated. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohd.Ramzan Khan. It is true that this Court has held that if inquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent employee before passing the order of punishment, the order would be rendered illegal. But the decision of this Court is given a prospective effect it will not affect (he orders passed prior to the date of rendering of the judgment (November 29,1990) as would be clear from para. 17 of the judgment."
26. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma, , the Apex Court held thus:-
33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee:)
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case."
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this, procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent Officer/employee. They are generally speaking, conceived in this interest violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under-"no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provisions should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz-, whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given a opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called fro in such a case. To repeat, the testis one of prejudice, i.e. whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now this very aspect can also be looked at from the pint of view of directory and mandatory provisions if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looked at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where the violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision which is of a mandatory character it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him then the court or tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar the ultimate test is always the same viz. test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called."
27. The above pronouncements squarely apply to the facts of the present case. As per the regulation which governs the respondent there is no requirement to communicate a copy of the enquiry officer's report and this case has been decided long prior to the decision of the Apex Court in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, Further in this case no prejudice has been shown or established by the respondent. On the facts of the case, there has been a fair opportunity at every stage of in the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the respondent. The petitioner was communicated with a copy of the enquiry report along with the order of punishment. Thereafter the respondent preferred appeals challenging the findings as set out in the enquiry officer's report and had the full opportunity.
28. In the absence of a rule which requires the appellant to furnish enquiry Officers report and affording second opportunity as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B.Karunakar, and others as well as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, and there being no prejudice nor any prejudice having been established, this is not a fit case where this court would be justified in confirming the view taken by the learned single Judge. The Learned Single Judge has proceeded as if the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, is retrospective and applies to the case on hand
which cannot be sustained in view of the larger Bench pronouncement of the Apex in the later judgment viz., Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B.karunakar and others, . The learned Single Judge as already held is not right in holding that the procedure prescribed in the bipartite settlement relating to award staff applies and requires communication of the enquiry report. As already held that said procedure provided in Bipartite Settlement has no application. In the present case no prejudice has been established or shown. Nor any such contention had been raised in the writ petition, much less, in the appeal preferred before the appellate authority.
29. On facts, we hold that no prejudice has been established on the facts of the case to hold that there has been a violation of principles of natural justice and consequently the order impugned is vitiated. For the above reason while following the decision of the Apex Court in Managing director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar and others and State Rank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, we hold that no prejudice has been established by the respondent and failure to communicate the enquiry officers report to call for objections had not in any manner vitiated the proceedings. Hence, the third point is answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent.
30. As regards the quantum of punishment which is the last of the contentions advanced, certain features have to be pointed out before arriving at a conclusion as to whether the punishment awarded to the respondent is arbitrary or excessive or vitiate or any other reasons. At or about the same time, two set of charges have been framed. Simultaneously both the enquiry proceedings went on and two separate orders of dismissal have been passed against the same respondent by the disciplinary authority one after the other. It is rather strange having dismissed the respondent few days earlier once again the appellant- Bank had imposed punishment of dismissal in succession. It is well settled that an employee who had been dismissed once, being visited with dismissal, for the second time is unknown to service jurisprudence. Either the appellant should have passed a common order or should have atleast concluded with a caution that is needless to pass a separate order as the maximum punishment had already been imposed in the earlier proceedings.
31. Even the appellate authority also while holding that no interference is called for with respect to the findings in the two appeals, it interfered and reduced the quantum of punishment and imposed reduction in time scale by five stages in respect of each proceeding. This again is highly arbitrary as the appellate authority who had disposed of the appeals had not considered the gravity of the misconduct, the position of the respondent, passage of time, promotion earned and without reference to the earlier punishment of reduction in time scale by five stages once again imposed identical punishment with respect to the second set of charges while dealing with the appeal. In otherwords, in respect of the respondent in all reduction has been ordered in the time scale aggregating to ten times. This again would shoe that the appellate authority had not applied its mind and it is arbitrary. The punishment is disappropraite highly excessive and arbitrary, when this court pointed out this infirmity as well as the award of arbitrary and excessive punishment, the learned counsel for the appellant-Bank took instructions from the appellant-Bank and represented that the appellant-Bank itself will reconsider the quantum of punishment imposed with respect to the two set of charges against the respondent. It is also brought to our notice that the respondent had been working efficiently and there had been no subsequent complaint whatsoever, if that be so, it would be fit and proper to impose punishment instead of reduction of time scale by ten stages which would definitely result in the respondent drawing less than an award staff though he is an officer and the consequences will result in or lead to unintended result.
32. In the circumstances, while sustaining the disciplinary proceedings and holding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, we set aside the punishment of reduction in time scale by five stages separately imposed against the respondent in the said two proceedings and remit the matter back to the appellate authority to pass fresh orders with respect to the quantum if punishment to be imposed in both the proceedings. In the fitness of things, we hasten to add that reduction in time scale at two stages or at the maximum three stages fro both the set of charges put together would be appropriate. The appellate authority shall consider this and pass fresh orders with respect to the quantum of punishment alone.
33. No other point has been argued contentions has been advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent to sustain the order of the learned Single Judge.
34. Writ Appeals are allowed, the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No, 580l and 8261 of 1989 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority with a direction to pass fresh orders with respect to the quantum of punishment alone in respect of both the charges. The parties shall bear their respective costs throughout.