JUDGMENT

N.C. Sharma, J.

1. This is writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Kanta Sahgal challenging the termination of her service by respondent No. 5 by an order Annexure-3 dated January 9, 1989 (mistakenly written as dated January 9, 1988).

2. Facts as alleged in the writ petition, in brief case that the Gurudawara Sri Guru Nanak Sat Sang Sabha (for short, here in after, "Sabha"), respondent No. 4 is a registered society. It has established Shri Guru Nanak Deo Vidyalaya Seva Sangh situated at Gurudwara Building, Rajmal-ka Talab, Jaipur. Administration and management of this Vadyalaya is carried on by respondent No. 5. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in the pay scale of Rs. 110-5-160-8-200-10-230 under a letter of appointment dated July 1,1972 issued under the signatures of the then Secretary of the Vidyalaya. Thereafter she was made substantive on the post of school teacher with effect from July 1,1975 and her pay was fixed at Rs 395/- in the scale of 355-570/-. Her present emoluments are stated to be Rs 1,800/-. It is alleged that the petitioner had worked satisfactorily for over 16 years. She was also appointed as Head Mistress in the said Vidyalaya. However, suddenly and arbitrarily the petitioner was removed from service of the School by order Annexure/3 issued on January 9, 1989. In Annexure/3 it is mentioned that in accordance with the directions of the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee and Five-person Special Committee, the petitioner's services are terminated by paying to her one month's salary in advance.

3. The petitioner's grievance is that respondents No. 4 and 5 did not communicate to her any specific charges or grounds for removing her from service. The grounds mentioned in the communication dated November 22, 1988 were vague, irrelevant and extraneous. It is further stated that removal order was passed without giving to the petitioner any reasonable opportunity of being heard and without holding any enquiry. It is also pleaded that the action of removal is opposed to the rules of recognition of educational institutions in this State.

4. The formost question which falls for determination is whether a writ lies against respondents No. 4 and 5 on the rests alleged by the petitioner in her writ petition Art, 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III and for any other purppose. The expression, "any person" used in Article 226 of the Constitution can include within its ambit respondents No. 4 and 5. How ever, it is well-settled that the High Court will issue writ only for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III, or for the enforcement of any legal right vested in the petitioner and if those legal rights have been violated by the person upon whom a legal duty is imposed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in J. K. Reddy v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. . In that case the petition had filed a writ petition for quashing the decision of the Board of Directors, Allahabad Agricultural Institute taken in a meeting where in it was held that the petitioner had ceased to be member of the Board of Directors after the date of superannuation. He also sought for a writ for quashing the Government order recognising the Agricultural Institute as a minority institute and further a writ of mandamus directing the respondents therein to pay his salary for the month of October 1984, accumulated leave and to consider his pension matter It was held by the Allahabad High Court that there is abundant authority for the proposition that writ petition lies against a private body for enforcement of performance of any legal obligation or duty imposed by statute. It was simultaneously stated that no writ how ever lies against a private body where there is neither statutory nor public duty imposed on that body by a statute, nor is there any legal right for enforcement of such statutory or public duty. For that purpose, reference was made to the decision in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual and Ors. .

5. The next decision relied upon is in the case of Manmohan Singh v. Commissioner, Union Territory. Chandigarh It may be mentioned that in Manmohan Singh's case (supra) Guru Nanak Khalsa High School was an aided school and, hence, it was governed by The Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969. Admittedly, that school was receiving 95% of its expenses as grant from the Government. His Lordship Desai, J. speaking for the court, referred to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [AIR 1981 SC 487], which was also a case relating to aided school receiving 95% of expenses by way of grant from the public exchequer. In Ajay Hasia's case (supra), Bhagwati, J. observed that "the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with governmental character. "The Corporation was, therefore held to be a State agency or instrumentality. More or less similar was the position in Vidya Dhar Pande v. Vidyut Grih Siksha Samiti [AIR 1989 SC 341], The matter in Vidya Dhar Pande's case (supra) was relating to the Regulations framed by the Board of Secondary Education Under Section 28(2)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1955 and the regulations had statutory force. The school was receiving 100% aid from the Government.

6. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony P.S E. Association v. Union of India . In that case, the matter was governed by Delhi School Education Act, 1973. Section 8(2) of the Act provided for obtaining prior approval of the Director for dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service of an employee of a recognised private school. This provision was held to be objectionable by the Supreme Court. I fail to understand how this decision helps the petitioner.

7. A going through of all the decisions would go to show that in each of them the matter was governed by statute and a legal right was created in favour of the petitioner and also an obligation on the institutions involved therein. In two Supreme Court cases, since the institutions received 95% to 100% Government aid, they were regarded as State for the purpose of Part-III of the Constitution. In the present case, respondent No. 5 is not at all receiving any aid from the Government. It has not been pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition that it is receiving any financial aid from the Government. The learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to certain rules issued by the Government for recognition of educational institutions. Firstly, it maybe mentioned that they are not statutory rules and their status is nothing more than that of executive instructions. Secondly, even these rules do not create any right in favour of the petitioner and do not impose a statutory obligation on respondents No. 4 and 5 to frame charges against a delinqent teacher, to held a departmental enquiry, or to give a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard Rather. Clause (xi) of these Rules provided that every teacher is employed under an agreement of Service approved by the Department. Amongest other things, this agreement shall provide that any dispute arising between the parties shall be decided by an Arbitration Board consisting of one member nominated by each of the party to the dispute and a nominee of the Director of Education will act as Chairman of the Board. The decision of the Board shall be binding on both the parties. It is, thus clear that the relationship of the petitioner with respondent No. 5 is regulated by an agreement of service. The petitioner does not have any statutory status and no statutory right of having a reasonable opportunity to defend against any charge levelled by the Vidyalaya Seva Sangh. In contrast to this, reference may be made to rules which govern disciplinary matters in relation to those institutions which received financial aid from the Government. In respect of them, it has been provided in the relevant rules framed by the Government of Rajasthan that no employee will be removed from service or reduced in rank unless the charge against him is proved and he had been afforded an opportunity of being heard. The provisions in this regard are contained at page 31 of the Education Code in Hindi, published by the Unique Traders.

8. It is well settled that there are four categories of relationships of masters and servants. The first category is of civil servants, whose conditions of service and tenure are governed by the provisions contained in Arts. 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India. The other category of servants are the those whose relationship with their employers are regulated by labour and industrial legislations which create by itself the rights and obligations The third category is where the relationship of master and servant is regulated by statutory rules or regulation framed under a statute In relation to them, the statute applies. Last category is that of an ordinary master and servant. Their position is governed by the contract entered into between them. If there is breach of contract, the remedy is always by way of suit for damages, and in relation to them if is not within the competence of ordinary civil courts as well as of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to make a declaration that the termination of service was wrongful, or that they continue to be in service. The petitioner's case falls in last of the categories.

9. No writ under, Article 226 of the Canstitution can be granted in favour of the petitioner. This writ petition has no force in it and it is here by dismissed in limine.