1. This writ petition has been filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the award dated 1.7.1987 made in I.D. No. 1 of 1985 on the file of the first respondent.
2. The petitioners were all workers of the second respondent-mill which has been in existence since 1966. Originally, there was one trade union affiliated to the I.N.T.U.C. and in theyear 1982 another Union came into existence which was affiliated to the C.I.T.U. Except petitioners 10 and 12 who belonged to the I.N.T.U.C, the rest of the petitioners belonged to C.I.T.U. The question of workload and wages in the second respondent mill are covered by settlements, the last of which was the one dated 7.8.1978 under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') with the I.N.T.U.C. Union. The said settlement was to be in force for a period of five years. It is claimed on behalf of the petitioners that according to the 1978 settlement, the workload was on par with the workload obtaining in most of the Textile Mills in Coimbatore, that while the settlement of the year 1978 was in force the second respondent/management put up a notice on 22.2.1983 demanding an increase in the workload, that the C.I.T.U. wrote a letter dated 23.2 1983 to the management stating that they should also be heard in the discussion regarding revision of workload, that without terminating the earlier settlement, the I.N.T.U.C. Union at the instance of the management made a demand for revision demanding wages, that the conciliation officer, Karaikal, fixed the conciliation proceedings relating to the dispute, on 24.8.1983 which ultimately was adjourned to 5.9.1983 on the objection raised by the C.I.T.U. on the ground that the matter was covered by an earlier settlement of 1978, that the dispute was again taken up on 1.10.1983 when the rival faction of the I.N.T.U.C. led by one Subramaniam and Rajagopal questioned the competency of Jawahar Batcha to continue to represent the I.N.T.U.C. and in view of the said dispute, the conciliation proceedings were adjourned without specifying a date, advising the rival factions of the I.N.T.U.C. to get the dispute among the rival groups properly adjudicated. It is also claimed by the petitioners that while matters stood thus, the management put up a notice on 3.10.1983 stating that they had come into a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Act relating to the revision of workload and wages with Jawahar Batcha, whose position as Secretary of the I.N.T.U.C. was disputed and the workmen were directed to give the new workload in terms of the settlement entered into, on 1.10.1983.
3. On coming to know of the settlement said to have been entered into on 1.10.1983, the rival factions of I.N.T.U.C. and the C.I.T.U. union appear to have sent telegrams on 4.10.1983 to the Labour Officer, Karaikal and the Commissioner of Labour, Pondicherry as well as to the Management and the management appears to have written a letter asking the Labour Officer to convert the settlement dated 1.10.1983 into a Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act to make it binding on all workers. It is also claimed that the Labour Officer refused to accede to this request and, therefore, the settlement dated 1.10.1983 continues to remain as a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Act. Despite this fact, the management appears to have threatened all workmen irrespective of the fact whether they were parties to Section 18(1) settlement dated 1.10.1983 or not, to give an increased workload on threat of disciplinary action. At that stage, it appears that the C.I.T.U. filed a writ petition before this Court against the management and inspite of interim orders granted therein, initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and by conducting farce of an enquiry, dismissed the petitioners by an order dated 26/27.5.1984. The matter was moved before the concerned authorities, which culminated in the passing of G.O. Rt. No. 79, Labour, dated 5.2.1985, referring the dispute as to whether the dismissal of the 12 workers of Soundararaja Spinning Mills, Nedungadu by the Management was justified and if not to what relief they are entitled to and to compute the relief in terms of money, if it can be so done.
4. The first respondent Labour Court by its award dated 1.7.1987 which is the subject matter of challenge in the above writ proceedings ultimately came to the conclusion that the management was justified in dismissing the petitioners/ workers from service. At the same time, taking into consideration the number of years of experience, the management was directed to pay their gratuity amount and also compensation amount equal to three months salary to each of the workers besides other benefits, if any. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the above writ petition.
5. Miss R. Vaigai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, made the following submissions:
(a) When admittedly a settlement duly entered into under Section 12(3) of the Act was in force, the same has to be substituted in accordance with law and merely because the management has expressed a desire to put an end to the earlier settlement, the settlement of the year 1978 could not be said to have been substituted validly. Consequently, petitioners 1 to 9 and 11 who were not members of the I.N.T.U.C. could not be proceeded against for not complying with the terms under Section 18(1) settlement in question.
(b) The first respondent Labour Court was only concerned with the implementation of Section 18(1) settlement and the question as to whether the terms of the settlement was fair and reasonable was not within the scope of the adjudication of the dispute referred to.
(c) Petitioners 1 to 9 and 11 are not members of the Union which entered into the Section 18(1) settlement and consequently, the same is not binding on them. Even in respect of the other two workers, it was claimed that the settlement was not entered into in accordance with the procedure laid down under the rules and merely on the ground of expansive notion of reasonableness the settlement cannot be thrust or forced upon those on whom it is not legally binding.
(d) The question of punishment has not been considered with due regard to the power under Section 11-A of the Act.
(e) The second respondent management has no right to vary the conditions of service as in this case without complying with the requirements of Section 9-A of the Act and that the petitioners have not committed any violation of Standing Orders 17(3)(a).
6. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Senior counsel for the second respondent/management submitted as follows:
(a) The questions raised have to be mainly dealt with and considered on the facts and circumstances of the case and the mere reference to some general principles of law has no relevance for case on hand. According to the learned Counsel, subsequent to the last settlement in the year 1978 sophisticated machinery worth several crores were installed in the mills which required a revision and enhancement of the workload and, therefore, it was agreed to revise the workload with consequent increase in wages. The majority of the workers though owed allegiance to the I.N.T.U.C, some of the members of the C.I.T.U. had accepted the settlement and have been giving the increased workload and had been receiving higher wages and consequently, the challenge by the petitioners to the terms of the Award is not well founded, (b) The first respondent Labour Court after going into the factual details and peculiar circumstances of the case rendered certain actual findings and that no exception could be taken to the same in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, (c) The first respondent was well within the scope of its powers to go into the question as to whether the terms and stipulations contained in the settlement in question are fair and just while dealing with the dispute referred to it, since according to the learned senior counsel, the said issue is an incidental one to the main dispute referred to for adjudication. (d) The terms and conditions of the settlement are not only just and reasonable, but when the majority of the workers undertook, to abide by the same, the management is entitled to call upon all the workers in the establishment to give the required workload as per the terms of the settlement and on their failure to do so, take disciplinary action for their act of defiance and disobedience. According to the learned Counsel, the provisions of $ec.9-A have no application to the case on hand and that the petitioners belonging to a majority Union cannot be allowed to scuttle the implementation of the settlement accepted by the majority of workers or permitted to create disharmony in the establishment. (f) So far as the plea based on Section 11-A of the Act is concerned, it is claimed that when the misconduct is held proved and the punishment is considered to be appropriate, the Labour Court is not obliged to go into the quantum while exercising such powers under Sec11-A of the Act.
7. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel on either side and the relevant case law produced in support of their respective view points. Before considering the legal issues, it becomes relevant to refer to the various findings of the Labour Court in the course of its award. (i) The settlement arrived at is fair and reasonable and the same has to be necessarily decided incidentally in view of the nature of the reference that has been made to the Court, and that the question of fairness and reasonableness is an aspect which is very intrinsic and without deciding it there cannot be any just decision, (ii) These persons when they signed the settlement representing the I.N.T.U.C. Union have been duly authorised and are persons competent to represent the I.N.T.U.C. Union and the settlement signed by them is perfectly binding on the I.N.T.U.C. Union. The refusal to give the additional workload as per the settlement arrived at renders the workers liable to be subjected to disciplinary action and their disobedience falls within the mischief of the Standing Order 17(3)(a). (iii) Since in the present case, the change has been effected in pursuance of the settlement, no notice of change under Section 9-A is necessary. (iv) Since I.N.T.U.C. which has got the majority members of workers have been properly represented before the management and once the settlement had been arrived at between the management and the recognised union comprising the majority of workers all the workers should abide by and adhere to the settlement and it would never amount to unilateral imposition of the terms thereof on members of C.I.T.U. Union. If any worker of the mill is aggrieved about the settlement he should have had the dispute referred to the tribunal for adjudication and the workers cannot take the law into their own hands by refusing to give the additional workload and dislocate the work leading to an atmosphere opposed to congenial and smooth running of the mill. On the above conclusions, the dismissal of the workers in question was found to be in order.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur and Ors. , wherein it has been held that
notwithstanding a notice of termination by the employer, the earlier settlement nevertheless remains operative till altered by fresh settlement, Award or valid legislation. The Apex Court also declared the position that after the expiry of the specific period contractually or statutorily fixed as the period of operation of an award or settlement, the same does not became non est, but continues to be binding inasmuch as law ab hors a vaccum and until a new contract or award replaces the previous one, the former settlement or award will regulate the relations between the parties. In Jhagrakhan Collieries (P) Ltd. v. G.C. Agarwal Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur and Ors. (1975) 1 L.L.J. 163, the Apex Court found that a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings binds not only the parties to the Industrial Dispute but all workmen in the establishment, present or future unlike a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Act, otherwise than in the course of the conciliation proceedings which becomes binding only on the parties to the settlement. The Supreme Court expressed the view that even if 99% of the workers have impliedly accepted the agreement by drawing the various dearness allowance under it, it will not, whatever its effect under the general law be, make it binding and conclusive on those who were not parties to the settlement. The decision referred to for the respondents in Madras District Automobile and General Employees Union v. State of Madras and Anr. (1969)2 L.L.J. 161, that when there were two unions and when a settlement is entered into with the majority union and the minority union challenges the same and seeks for a reference, the refusal cannot be said to be bad has no application to the issue before this Court. That apart in M/s. Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Workmen (1978)2 L.L.J. 22, the Apex Court held that a minority union can validly raise an industrial dispute as Section 2(k) does not restrict the ambit of the definition of the "industrial dispute" to a dispute between an employer and a recognised majority union but takes within its wide sweep any dispute or difference between employer and workmen including a minority union. It was also held therein that neither the fact that the majority of the workers agreed to the terms of the settlement nor that the benefits flowing from the agreement have been accepted by even persons who were not signatories to the settlement cannot operate as an estoppel against the minority union or its members in vindicating their rights in accordance with law. Consequently, I see force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that unless the settlement of the year 1978 entered into under Section 12(3) has been validly substituted by another settlement so as to govern the rights and conditions of services of all the workers the settlement dated 1.10.1983 cannot be said to be binding in respect of the members of the Union affiliated to C.I.T.U. particularly petitioners 1 to 9 and 11. So far as petitioners 10 and 12 are concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioners sought to reply upon the decision in Workmen of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. (1972)1 L.L.J. 99, to contend that unless the settlement has been arrived at after complying with the statutory rular prescribed therefor, the settlement will be invalid and not binding upon the concerned workmen. But in view of the categorical finding of fact by the Labour Court in this case that Nithiyanantham and Jawahar Batcha representing the I.N.T.U.C, Union were duly authorised and competent to represent the said union and that no other infirmity or violation of any other rules have been substantiated before me to render thesettlement executed under Section 18(1) to be vitiated so far as writ petitioners 10 and 12 are concerned, the plea that it is not binding on them does not merit my acceptance.
9. The further question that requires to be considered is as to whether the Labour Court was right in holding that it was entitled to go into the question of fairness and reasonableness as an issue incidental to the dispute referred to for its adjudication. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd., and Anr. v. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Employees Union and Ors. (1978) 2 L.L.J. 11, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a similar issue. The question before the Court was as to whether the reference to the National Tribunal regarding the implementation of the recommendations of the wage board for non-journalist employees justified a consideration of the claim for gratuity for non-working journalist employees as an incidental issue. On a consideration of the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, the court came to the conclusion that consideration regarding "a fair and just wage structure" did not exclude gratuity from its adjudication; In Workmen of Harrisons and Crosfield Ltd. Quilon (Cochin Branch) (by Cochin Commercial Employees 'Association) v. Harrisons and Crosfield Ltd. and Anr. (1969) 1 L.L.J. 61, a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court had also an occasion to consider a question as to whether gratuity is a matter incidental to settlement of a dispute relating to revision of salary. The question was answered in the affirmative by the learned Judge. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Ors. (1966-67) 30 F.J.R. 533 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 469, the question before the Supreme Court was the issue as to whether the workmen is entitled to wages for the period of lock-out can be decided a sub-issue if the issue in considering the main issue as to whether there was a strike or there was a lock-out in the industry concerned. In Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. The Workmen Employed represented by Firestone Tyre Employees Union , the reference was as to whether the workmen
shown in the schedule to the reference should be reinstated. In respect of the said dispute it was held that the issue of unfair labour practice of discrimination by reason of subsequent reinstatement of some workers could not be said to be in any way connected with or incidental to the right of reinstatement claimed by the workmen from the date of their dismissal. A consideration of the various decisions and the ratio laid down therein will go to show that there can be no hard and fast rule of any universal application in considering as to whether a particular issue can be said to be a sub issue or arising incidentally to the determination of the main issue and that the question has to be answered with reference to the fact situation and the nature of the dispute in a particular case. Viewed in the light of the above, the question is whether the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement in question can be said to be an issue incidentally arising in considering the dispute in question in the present case. In my view, if the settlement in question is to be taken to be binding on a particular worker, the question as to its fairness and reasonableness will be an issue incidental to the main dispute referred to for adjudication. If in a case, the settlement concerned is not legally binding on a particular group or groups of workers having regard to the provisions contained under Section 18 of the Act, the question of considering the reasonableness or fairness of the settlement vis-avis a dispute in respect of such worker or group of workers even as an accidental issue does not arise. It is only in a case where the settlement can be said to be binding the further question of fairness calls for determination. In a case where having regard to the terms of Section 18(1), the settlement, as in the case on hand cannot be said to be binding on writ petitioners 1 to 9 and 11 the question regarding the reasonableness or fairness of the settlement does not call for consideration as an incidental issue in adjudicating a dispute regarding their dismissal for non-complying with the terms of the settlement. Having regard to the peculiar fact situation of the case before me, the consideration by the Labour Court regarding the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement cannot be said to be wholly outside its jurisdiction at least in respect of the dispute concerning writ petitioners 10 and 12. Hence, this issue is answered accordingly.
10. The next question for consideration would be as to whether the refusal by the petitioners to give the additional workload justifies action under Standing Order 17(3)(a). The said Standing Order reads as follows:
17. Disciplinary action for misconduct:
(3) The following acts and omissions shall be treated as misconduct:
(a) Willful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with another or others, to any lawful and reasonable order of a superior.
The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners contended that wilful insubordination or disobedience should be of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior to attract the vice of the Standing Order and merely because an order of a superior is refused to be complied with it cannot per se constitute violation as alleged. I have already expressed my view that the settlement in question being one under Section 18(1) of the Act binds only the parties to the same and petitioners 1 to 9 and 11 who are not members of the I.N.T.U.C. Union with whom the settlement has been entered into will not be bound by the terms of the settlement. That being the position, the direction to give the additional workload under the settlement dated 1.10.1983 cannot be said to be a lawful and reasonable order of a superior, a disobedience of which could therefore, be said to be violative of the Standing Order in question. The lawfulness and reasonableness of an order of the superior cannot be determined by the fairness or reasonableness of a term of a settlement if it is not binding upon a particular worker or group of workers. It is only in a case where the settlement is not only lawful and binding, but also reasonable and when the superior directs the worker or group of workers to conform to the same, a refusal thereof could entail action under the Standing Order in question. This is not such a case. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that even assuming that the terms and conditions particularly relating to the additional workload is fair and reasonable without conceding the same, unless and until it is made a condition of service either by making the settlement, a part of the 12(3) settlement or an award binding on all workers or by varying the conditions of service after invoking the procedure contained under Section 9-A, non-compliance with a term of a settlement which is not binding on the worker, even when demanded does not justify an action under the Standing Order in question. On behalf of the respondents, reliance is placed on the decision in M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1981)2 L.L.J. 429: 1982 Lab. I.C. 1. That was a case where the Apex Court relying upon its earlier judgment in Her-bertsonLtd. v. Workmen of Herbertsons Ltd. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 322, came to the conclusion that if the settlement had been arrived at between the company and the Union of the workers by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored merely because a small number of workers was not parties to it or refused to accept it, or because the tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emolument then they themselves thought they did. As already referred to by me, the question of reasonableness of a term of settlement or as to whether the term is just and fair is totally different from the question as to whether the worker concerned when he fails to conform to thesamecan be proceeded against under the Standing Order is question and dismissed from service. The decision in Airlines Cabin Crew Association v. Indian Airlines Corporation and Ors. (1986) 2 L.L.N. 665, of a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court was relied upon. There also the decision appears to have been more on the question of reasonableness and to what extent the reasonableness of it can be said to depend upon the fact that the majority of the workmen of a Union have agreed, for it though the members of a different union are opposing the settlement, in question. The issue before the Supreme Court as well as the Bombay High Court was not the same as the one before me viz., whether for non-compliance with the term of a settlement to which they were not parties, the workers in question can be proceeded against and dismissed from service for having allegedly disobeyed the lawful and reasonable order of a superior.
11. Further, the plea on behalf of the respondent is that Section 9-A will have no application to the case on hand where the change is effected in pursuance of any settlement or award, as stipulated in proviso to Section 9-A. There is no question of any award in the present case prior to the award passed and is under challenge now. It is to be considered whether the change has been effected in pursuance of any settlement. The learned Counsel for the second respondent relied upon the definition of settlement' contained in Section 2(p) of the Act to contend that the word settlement as defined under the Act means a settlement arrived at in the case of conciliation proceedings and includes a written agreement between the employer and the workmen as in this case. I am afraid, I cannot countenance such a plea inasmuch as a settlement to have the benefit of proviso (a) to Section 9-A should be a settlement binding on the worker or group of workers concerned. This is made clear by the definition contained in Section 2(p) itself when it slates that in respect of settlement or agreement otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings it should be such an agreement which has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy forwarded as contemplated therein to the competent authorities. Consequently, what stands excluded by the proviso is only a change effected pursuant to any settlement or agreement whether legally rendered binding or mutually agreed to and entered in to between parties and, therefore, binding on the parties concerned. This is not such a case and consequently, the stand of the management that they need not comply with the provisions of See.9-A before calling upon the workers who are not parties to the 18(1) settlement and on whom it is not binding, to comply with the terms of the settlement even when it amounts to a variation in their conditions of service cannot be countenanced. The decision reported in Binny Ltd. v. Presiding Officer and Ors. (1986) 2 L.L.J. 220, of a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court relied upon for the management has no application to the case on hand. That was a case where the workmen and the management have reached a settlement in the course of conciliation superseding the terms of an earlier settlement without issuing any notice of termination and in that context the learned single Judge expressed the view that the proviso (a) to Section 9-A of the Act was attracted.
12. Equally untenable is the plea of the management that when the majority of the workers have thought fit to abide by the terms of the settlement, a few members alone cannot be allowed to scuttle the implementation of the settlement and create disharmony in the establishment. The apprehension is neither well founded nor reasonable. It is not as though the management is helpless and nothing prevented the management to issue the notice under Section 9-A and vary the conditions of service and thereupon take appropriate action in case of non-compliance of the conditions of service. The failure to adopt this reasonable course provided for in the Statute itself cannot be used as a point in their favour. The view taken by me as above is also fortified by the observations of the Supreme Court found expressed at paragraph 7 of thedecision in M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1981) 2 L.L.J. 429 : 1982 Lab. I.C. 1, in the following terms:
There is no quarrel with the argument addressed to us on behalf of the workers that mere acquiescence in a settlement or its acceptance by a worker would not make him a party to the settlement for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act vide: Jhagrakhan Collieries (P) Ltd. v. G.C. Agarwal , It is further
un-questionable that a minority union of workers may raise an industrial dispute even if another union which consists of the majority of them enters into a settlement with the employer (vide: Tata Chemicals Ltd v. Workmen . But then here the
company is not raising a plea that the 564 workers became parties to the settlement by reason of their acquiescence in or acceptance of a settlement already arrived at or a plea that the reference is not maintainable because the Telco Union represents only a minority of workers. On the other hand the only two contentions raised by the company are:
(i) that the settlement is binding on all members of the Sanghatana including the 564 mentioned above because the Sanghatana was a party to it, and
(ii) that the reference is liable to be answered in accordance with the settlement because the same is just and fair.
And both these are contentions which we fine fully acceptable for reasons already stated.
13. The learned Counsel for the petitioners in rebutting the plea on behalf of the Management that with the finding of the Labour Court that the settlement is just and reasonable and binding on all workers, it shall always be deemed to be position from its inception, thereby justifying recourse to action under Standing Order 17(3)(a) for disobedience, submitted that in a matter like this where the declaration by the Labour Court has the effect of creating a misconduct entailing penal action, no retroactive force or effect could be given to the finding and that if at all it is only after the declaration by the Labour Court in the Award that it may become binding upon the petitioners and the action taken in the present case at any rate cannot by any means be sustained or justified. It is by now well settled that a subsequent interpretation of a particular incident or fact in a particular manner may not be sufficient in law to constitute a misconduct or the basis or cause of an action for an alleged misconduct from a date anterior to the date of such declaration (vide: AL. Kalra v. P.E.C. India Ltd. (1984) 2 L.L.J. 186 at 193). Hence, the fact that the Labour Court in the reference in question, found that the settlement is binding and also just and reasonable does not provide a legal basis or just and valid cause for invoking the Standing Order in question against petitioners 1 to 9 and 11 and dismiss them from service for the alleged disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders of the Superior.
14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners finally argued that the Labour Court not only failed to consider the past record of service of the petitioners but also was unduly harsh in making an observation that the workers have to suffer for their conduct. Regarding the scope and manner of exercise of powers under Section 11-A of the Act, a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party in The Management of Engine Valves Ltd., Madras-16 v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras and Anr. W.A. No. 2311 of 1987 dated 27.11.1990, held as follows:
Having regard to the principles referred to above, we are of the view that the power and discretion conferred under Section 11 -A of the Act have to be exercised judicially and judiciously and that there should be sufficient indication in the order itself of the fact that the Court exercising powers under See 11-A of the Act was aware of and alive to the norms and requirements of Section 11-A of the Act. The Court exercising powers under Sec11-A of the Act after finding the misconduct to have been proved is first obliged to advert itself to the question of necessity or desirability to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management and, if the management could not justify the punishment imposed thereafter it must consider the question as to the relief that is to be granted to the employee. In so considering the relief to be granted, the Court has an obligation to consider whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate or shockingly severe to the charges held proved and if so whether a rain-statement has to be ordered or whether any other lesser punishment has to be imposed. A specific finding must be recorded whether it was expedient and proper to reinstate the employee or whether award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement will meet the requirements and ends of justice of the case concerned.
In the light of my conclusion that the charge itself is baseless and there was no contravention of the Standing Order in question, there is no need for me to deal with this question separately. 15 For all the reasons stated above, the impugned Award cannot be sustained in its entirety and that too in respect of petitioners 1 to 9 and 11. Consequently, the writ petition shall stand allowed in so far as writ petitioners 1 to 9 and 11 are concerned and dismissed in respect of writ petitioners 10 and 12. But in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.