ORDER
R.L. Khurana, J.
1. The sole question falling for determination in the present revision petition is: "Whether the claim of maintenance under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights and Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short 'the Act') by a divorced muslim wife is restricted only to the period of 'Iddat'".
2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to the present petition may be thus stated. The parties were married to each other according to muslim rites at Nahan in the year 1990. As per "Nikahnama", the respondent-husband had agreed to pay to the petitioner wife "Mehr" of 32V 1/4 tolas of silver or the value thereof. The respondent divorced the petitioner on 31-1-1992. No child was born to the parties from this wedlock.
3. The petitioner on 23-1-1993, approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, with a petition under Section 3 of the Act, inter-alia, claiming the following reliefs :
(i) Rs. 2,257.50 paise being the value of 32 1/4 tolas of silver as "Mehr" agreed to be paid as per the "Nikahnama";
(ii) Rs. 1,000/-as maintenance for the period of "Iddat";
(iii) Rs. 15,000/- as the reasonable and fair provision for maintenance; and
(iv) return of dowry articles as detailed in Annexure-A to the petition or in the alternative Rs. 80,000/- being the value thereof.
4. The respondent, while resisting the petition, admitted the marriage and divorce. He also admitted that "Mehr" of 32'4 tolas of silver or value thereof was agreed. He, however, denied having been handed over the articles detailed in Annexure-A. It was pleaded that the petitioner, who was working as Female Health Worker at Nahan was transferred to District Mandi and such articles were to be transported to her new place of posting. However, since the petitioner did not join her new place of posting in District Mandi, the articles remained at Nahan. The respondent further pleaded that the amount of "Mehr" as well as maintenance for the "Iddat" period stood paid to the father of the petitioner in accordance with the agreement dated 29-11-1992. It was also pleaded that the petitioner was not entitled to reasonable and fair maintenance, since she herself was earning Rs. 3,500/- per month as salary. Objections as to estoppel and maintainability of the petition were also raised.
5. Following points for consideration were formulated by the learned Magistrate :
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to have from the respondent 32 1/4 tolas of silver or value thereof?
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to recover from the respondent Rs. 15,000/- as a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance?
3. Whether the petitioner is also entitled to recover from the respondent Rs. 1,000/- as maintenance for the iddat period?
4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to recover from the respondent the dowry articles mentioned in the list Ex. AW 1/C or the value thereof?
5. Final order.
6. The learned Magistrate answered points No. 1 to 3 in the affirmative and in favour of the petitioner. Under point No. 4, while holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the return of articles detailed in Annexure-A (Ex. AW 1/C), the learned Magistrate held the petitioner to be entitled to the return of articles detailed at serial No. 1 to 13 in para 14 of his order dated 27-5-1997 or the estimated value thereof.
7. The petition was allowed by the learned Magistrate and the respondent was directed :-
(a) to give 32 1/4 tolas of silver or to pay the value thereof as "Mehr" to the petitioner;
(b) to pay Rs. 1000/- as maintenance for the "iddat" period;
(c) to pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as reasonable and fair provision and maintenance;
(d) to return the articles detailed in para 14 of the order or to pay the estimated value thereof; and
(e) to pay Rs. 300/- as costs of the proceedings.
8. The respondent feeling aggrieved approached the learned Sessions Judge by way of a revision petition assailing the findings of the learned Magistrate.
9. The petitioner also feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate holding her to be not entitled to all the articles detailed in Ex. AW A/C, filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge.
10. Both the revision petitions have been disposed of by the learned Sessions Judge by a single order dated 11-2-1998, which is under challenge before this Court by way of the present petition.
11. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner. He, however, partly allowed the revision petition of the respondent. The learned Sessions Judge after maintaining the reliefs (a), (b) and (d) above granted by the learned Magistrate, set aside the findings of the learned Magistrate qua relief (c) above and held that the petitioner was not entitled to any maintenance beyond the period of "Iddat". Parties were directed to bear their own costs.
12. In the present revision petition, the petitioner has assailed the findings of the learned Sessions Judge on two counts, namely :-
(1) rejection of her claim as to the return of the articles detailed in Ex. AW 1/C; and
(2) holding the petitioner to be not entitled to maintenance under Section 3 of the Act for the period beyond "Iddat".
13. In so far as the first grievance of the petitioner with regard to the return of articles detailed in Ex. AW 1/C is concerned, it is significant to note that the petitioner was held not entitled thereto by the learned Magistrate. Her revision petition against such findings has also been dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge.
14. Sub-section (3) of Section 397, Code of Criminal Procedure,' specifically bars a second revision petition. Therefore, having failed before the learned Sessions Judge in assailing the order of the learned Magistrate by way of a revision petition, the petitioner cannot assail the findings of the learned Magistrate by way of a second revision petition.
15. In so far as invoking of the powers under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, such powers cannot be exercised since the same would tantamount to permitting the petitioner to circumvent the specific provision contained in Section 397(3), Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well settled that the inherent jurisdiction of the court cannot be exercised as against the express bar provided in any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (See : Manjit Inder Singh v. Sarvinder Singh, Cr. M. P. (M) No. 1154 of 1996, decided on 31-12-1996).
16. Section 3 of the Act, in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of present petition, reads :
3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to-
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband;
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children;
(c) an amount equal to the sum of Mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.
(2) Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of Mahr or dower due has not been made or paid or the properties referred to in Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly authorised by her may, or her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be.
(3)&(4)...17. Emphasising on the words "within the iddat period" appearing in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that a divorced muslim woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance only during the period of "Iddat" and not beyond that. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly held the petitioner to be hot entitled to any maintenance beyond the period of "Iddat".
18. Per contra, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the word "within the iddat period" does not mean "for the iddat period". What the legislature intended is that all sums of maintenance of a divorced muslim woman to which she is entitled to must be paid to her by the husband during the "Iddat" period. It is only when the husband fails to pay such amount within the said period that the divorced woman has been conferred a right to approach the Magistrate with a petition under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act.
19. The question - whether a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to which a muslim divorced woman is entitled is limited only up to "Iddat" period or whether it is to be made and paid to her after visualising or contemplating her future needs-came up for consideration before Hon'ble M. B. Shah, J. (as his Lordship then was) of the Gujarat High Court in Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla v. Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai AIR 1988 Guj 141.
20. Dealing with the meaning of the word "within" occurring in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, it was held that the word "within" cannot be read as "for" or "during" because the same cannot be construed contrary to its meaning as the word "within" would mean "on or before", "not beyond" "not later than". It was further observed :-
...Therefore, the word 'within' which is used by the Parliament under to Muslim Women Act would mean that on or before the expiration of iddat period, the husband is bound to make and pay a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the wife. If he fails to do so, then the wife is entitled to recover it by filing an application before the Magistrate as provided in sub-s. (2) of Section 3 but nowhere the Parliament has provided that reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is limited only for the iddat period or that it is to be paid only during the iddat period and not beyond it.
The phrase "a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and to be paid to her" used in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act is very significant. By enacting such provision the legislature intended to ensure that the divorced muslim woman gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce and that she does not become destitute. The use of the word "provision" indicates that something is to be provided for in advance for meeting some future needs. In other words, a muslim husband, at the time of divorcing his wife, is required to anticipate and visualise the future needs of his divorced wife and to provide for the same. Such reasonable and fair provision may include :
(i) provision for her residence;
(ii) provision for her food;
(iii) provision for her clothes and other articles.
21. The learned single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in order to fortify the conclusion that a divorced muslim wife is entitled to a fair and reasonable provision and maintenance even for the period beyond "Iddat" has drawn support from the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Act, which read :-
5. Option to be governed by the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 of Act 2 of 1974.- If, on the date of the first hearing of the application under Sub-section (2) of Section 3, a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately, that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and file such affidavit or declaration in the Court hearing the application, the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, 'date of the first hearing of the application' means the date fixed in the summons for the attendance of the respondent to the application.
22. The learned Judge held that the above provision gives option to the parties either to be governed by the procedure contained in Sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the provisions of the Act. This would prima facie mean that there is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the general provisions of Sections 125 to 128, Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act. Had there been any inconsistency or repugnancy, the legislature would not have provided for the option to the parties by enacting Section 5 of the Act. Further, if Section 3(1)(a) of the Act is interpreted to mean that the former husband is bound to provide maintenance to the divorced wife only for the period of "Iddat", then in no set of circumstances it can be expected that a former husband would pay future maintenance because it is difficult to imagine that the person who has given divorce to the wife would be so chivalrous as to agree to pay future maintenance. The result would be that in almost all cases divorced woman would like to be governed by the provisions of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure and the former husband would refuse to be governed by such provisions. It cannot be imagined that the Parliament would pass an Act which gives absolute discretion to the former husband and leave a divorced woman at his mercy and sweet will. Normally, divorces are given because there are disputes between the parties. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the husband would agree to pay future maintenance if there is no specific provision in the Act. If the interpretation that a muslim former husband is liable to provide for maintenance of his divorced wife only during the period of "Iddat" is accepted, then Section 5 of the Act would be redundant or otiose. Normally, the provisions of the Act should be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the Court to resort to that extreme contingency. Therefore, the just and proper interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act is that the former husband is bound to make a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance after taking into consideration the future need of the divorced woman.
23. Similarly, a learned single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Md. Tajuddin v. Quamarunisa Begum 1989 Cri LJ 2285, while dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act has held that the expression used therein is "within the iddat period" and not "for the iddat period." The word "within" is quite plan and contemplation of the section is to make the provision and to pay the maintenance within the "iddat" period. The word "within" in the section would mean "on 'or before", "not beyond" and not later than". It cannot be said that the word "within" means "for" so as to limit the liability of the husband to make provision and pay the maintenance only for the "Iddat" period. The guiding factors for the purpose of determining the fair and reasonable provision and maintenance under Section 3 of the Act do imply that the provisions and maintenance is for the period far beyond "Iddat".
24. It was further held that the main intendment behind bring the legislation is to protect the interests of the divorced muslim women, that is, a legislation beneficial to the interests of the muslim divorced women. The interpretation of the word "within" to mean "for" would impose a restriction on the period for which a muslim divorced woman is entitled to the provision and maintenance and, therefore, is not permissible.
25. Referring to Sub-section (2) to Section 3 of the Act, it was observed :-
It is under Sub-section (2) to Section 3, the divorced woman would file the application for non-compliance with Section 3(1). The making of such an application shall be only after the Iddat period since the husband had time till the expiry of the Iddat period to comply with Section 3(1). While deciding that application under Section 3(3), the Magistrate determines the reasonable and fair provision and maintenance 'having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage. These guiding factors for purposes of determining the fair and reasonable provision and maintenance do imply that the provision and maintenance is for a period far beyond Iddat, lest the wording of the factors as quoted would have been quite different specifically confining the needs of the divorced woman to the period of Iddat...
26. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in K. Kunhammed Haji v. K. Amina 1995 Cri LJ 3371. It has been held that a divorced muslim woman is entitled to get a fair and reasonable provision made for her livelihood after the period of "Iddat" apart from her right to get maintenance during the period of "Iddat". The liability of a muslim husband is to maintain his divorced wife during her lifetime or till her remarriage. The Act has made such liability of making a fair and reasonable provision and maintenance within the period of "Iddat" a condition for freeing the husband from all his liabilities to the divorced wife after the period of "Iddat" under Section 3 thereof.
27. The question arose also for consideration before a Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Usman Khan Bahamani v. Fathimunnisa Begum AIR 1990 Andh Pra 225 : (1990 Cri LJ 1364). The majority view expressed by the Full Bench is that a muslim divorced woman under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act is entitled to maintenance only for the Iddat period and not beyond that. It was observed (para 24):-
...if the concept of reasonable and fair provision is to be read as one meaning that it is payable even for the period beyond the Iddat, then it would be defeating the very purpose for which the Act of 1986 has been enacted. The primary object of the Act is to bring the state of law in regard to payment of a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman in consonance with the principle of Muslim law. The language of Section 3(1)(a)is clear and it is provided that a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance should be made and paid 'within' the period of Iddat. If it is recognised that the liability of the husband to pay maintenance is limited to the period of Iddat, then there is no justification to hold that the liability of making a reasonable provision extends beyond the period of Iddat under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act of 1986. What has been recognised on one hand in regard to maintenance cannot be taken away by the other for providing reasonable and fair maintenance. There is another difficulty which clearly demonstrates the fallacy inherent in such a submission. If a reasonable and fair provision is to be made by the husband for a period beyond the Iddat of the divorced woman then it is clear that such a provision will have to be made within the period of Iddat which is normally a period of approximately three months. The essential fact to realise is that the making of a reasonable and fair provision and payment of entire maintenance is to be made in lump sum within the period of Iddat because the section clearly stipulates that the provision and maintenance must be made and paid in full within the period of Iddat. The question is, is it possible to make such a payment within the stipulated period of Iddat which may be deemed to be a reasonable and fair provision to cover up the necessities of life of the divorced woman for the entire period of her remaining life or until she gets remarried. In other words, how an assessment can be made that a provision is reasonable and fair provision payable within the period of Iddat forecasting the future needs that may arise fifty to sixty years hence. Let us test the strength of this argument from another angle. Suppose a fair and reasonable provision is made by the husband on the assumption that the wife is not going to get remarried. But if after a year or two, the wife remarries again, what will happen to the reasonable and fair provision made and paid by the husband during the period of Iddat? Would an actionable claim lie on behalf of the husband to recover the sum paid as a fair and reasonable provision? The obvious result of such discussion seems to be that the term 'fair and reasonable provision and maintenance' will have to be read in a compendious form. Even if there is a concept of a reasonable and fair provision separate from the payment of maintenance, such a reasonable and fair provision is to be made for the upkeep of the divorced wife during the period of Iddat only. No liability can be cast on the husband to make any reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife beyond the period of Iddat.
28. Bhaskar Rao J., constituting the minority view, however, held that the maintenance contemplated by Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act is limited to the "Iddat" period while the fair and reasonable provision to be made in terms of the same section runs for the future much beyond the "Iddat" period.
29. A learned single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan in Abdul Hamid v. Mst. Asia (1992) 2 Hindu LR 475, has taken the view that a divorced muslim woman is not entitled to maintenance after "Iddat" period in view of the provisions contained in Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. Similar view has been expressed by a learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court in Abdul Rashid v. Sultana Begum 1992 Cri LJ 76.
30. Recently, a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Kaka v. Hassan Bano (1998) 118 Pun LR 1, after examining the divergent views on the question has held that the obligation of the husband to pay maintenance is not restricted to the period of "Iddat" alone, unless the husband has paid and made provision for fair maintenance within the "Iddat" period or thereafter which would be reasonable amount of maintenance keeping in view the mandatory in-. gredients specified in the provisions of the Act, for the rest of her life or till the time she gets remarried or earns any disqualification or guilt which would disentitle her from receiving such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance, in law.
31. The learned Sessions Judge in coming to the conclusion that a divorced muslim woman is not entitled to maintenance beyond the period of "Iddat" has placed much reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim (1997) 2 Sim LJ 1720: (1997 Cri LJ 3972).
32. The sole question involved before the Supreme Court was - whether the children of muslim parents are entitled to grant of maintenance under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, for the period till they attain majority or are able to maintain themselves, whichever date is earlier, or in the case of female children till they get married, or, is their right restricted to the grant of maintenance only for a period of two years prescribed under Section 3 (1.) (b) of the Act notwithstanding Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure.
33. The question as to. the right of a divorced muslim woman to maintenance beyond the "Iddat" period was never in issue before the Supreme Court. No doubt the learned Magistrate in the said case had restricted the maintenance awarded to the muslim divorced woman to the period of "Iddat" only, such findings of the learned Magistrate were not assailed before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Supreme Court never had the occasion to go into the question if a divorced muslim woman is entitled to maintenance beyond the "Iddat" period. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge has erred in basing his conclusions on the said decision of the Supreme Court.
34. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945 : (1985 Cri LJ 875), while dealing with the question of right of maintenance of a divorced muslim woman, after referring to the statements of law on the subject, as contained in Mulla's Mohammedan Law (18th Edition) Para 279 at Page 301, Tayabji's Muslim Law (4th Edition) Para 304 at pages 268-269 and in Muslim Law in Modern India by Dr. Paras Diwan, (1982 Edition at page 130) has observed :-
These statements in the text books are inadequate to establish the proposition that the Muslim husband is not under an obligation to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife, who is unable to maintain herself. One must have regard to the entire conspectus of the Muslim Personal Law in order to determine the extent, both in quantum and in duration, of the husband's liability to provide for the maintenance of an indigent wife who has been divorced by him. Under that law, the husband is bound to pay Mahr to the wife as a mark of respect to her. True, that he may settle any amount he likes by way of dower upon his wife, which cannot be less than 10 Dirhams, which is equivalent to three or four rupees (Mulla' s Mohammedan Law, 18th Edition, para 286, page 308). But, one must have regard to the realities of life. Mahr is a mark of respect to the wife. The sum settled by way of Mahr is generally expected to take care of the ordinary requirements of the wife, during the marriage and after. But these provisions of the Muslim Personal Law do not countenance cases in which the wife is unable to maintain herself after the divorce. We consider it not only incorrect but unjust, to extend the scope of the statements extracted above to cases in which a divorced wife is unable to maintain herself. We are of the opinion that the application of those statements of law must be restricted to that class of cases, in which there is no possibility of vagrancy or destitution arising out of the indigence of the divorced wife. We are not concerned here with the broad and general question whether a husband is liable to maintain his wife, which includes a divorced wife, in all circumstances and at all events. That is not the subject matter of Section 125. That section deals with cases in which, a person who is possessed of sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain, amongst others, his wife who is unable to maintain herself. Since the Muslim Personal Law, which limits the husband's liability to provide for the maintenance of the divorced wife to the period of iddat, does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125, it would be wrong to hold that the Muslim husband, according to his personal law, is not under an obligation to provide maintenance, beyond the period of iddat, to his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself. The argument of the appellant that, according to the Muslim Personal Law, his liability to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife is limited to the period of iddat, despite the fact that she is unable to maintain herself, has therefore to be rejected. The true position is that, if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the husband's liability to provide maintenance for her ceases with the expiration of the period of iddat. If she is unable to maintain herself, she is entitled to take recourse to Section 125 of the Code. The outcome of this discussion is that there is no conflict between the provisions of Section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the Muslim husband's obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself.
35. Though the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court led to some controversy as to the obligation of the muslim husband to pay maintenance to his divorced wife, which resulted in the enactment of the Act, this would not mean that with such enactment the judgment of the Supreme Court stands invalidated. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that a muslim husband has no obligation to maintain his divorced wife beyond the period of "Iddat".
36. At this stage, the use of different phraseology in Section 31 (1)(a) and 3(1)(b) of the Act can be noticed. In Section 3(1)(b) of the Act the legislature has specifically provided for provision and maintenance only for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of children. No such limitation as to the period has been imposed in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. It cannot be said that the legislature has used different phraseology in the two clauses of the same section unintentionally. Whenever different phraseology is used in different clauses of the same section, it can be said that the legislature used it in order to confer different benefits. In this regard reference can be made to Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes" at page 282 (12th Edition) :-
'From the general presumption that the same expression is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout an Act or a series of cognate Acts, there follows the further presumption that a change of wording denotes, a change in meaning. 'Where the Legislature', said Lord Tenterden, C.J.,' in the same sentence uses different words, we must presume that they were used in order to express different ideas.
37. Following the ratioLald down in Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla's case (AIR 1988 Guj 141) (supra), Md. Tajuddin's case (1989 Cri LJ 2285) (Andh Pra) (supra), Kaka's case (1998 (118) Punj LR 1) (FB) (supra), as well as the minority view in Usman Khan Bahamani's case (1990 Cri LJ 1364) (Andh Pra) (FB) (supra), it is held that a divorced muslim woman under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance even for the period beyond "Iddat" throughout her life or till she remarries or otherwise becomes disentitle therefor. The findings of the learned Sessions Judge holding to the contrary are bad and liable to be set aside.
38. The next question falling for determination is whether in the present case the petitioner is entitled to any fair and reasonable provision and maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act and if so, to what extent?
39. The petitioner in her petition made to the learned Magistrate had claimed a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as fair and reasonable provision and maintenance within the meaning of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. Such amount was awarded in her favour of the learned Magistrate. However, the learned Sessions Judge has disallowed this amount by holding that the petitioner was a Government servant drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 35,000/-. She was thus, having sufficient means and was able to maintain herself.
40. Under Sub-section (3) to Section 3 of the Act, while determining the reasonable and fair provision and maintenance payable to a divorced muslim woman, the Magistrate has to take into consideration :-
(a) the means of the former husband, and
(b) the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage.
41. Consideration of the "needs of the divorced woman" would mean that her own source of income, if any, has also to be taken note of while determine the quantum of reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. Therefore, before a divorced muslim woman is held entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the ambit of Section 31(1)(a) of the Act beyond the period of "Iddat" she has to show that she is unable to maintain herself.
42. There are no averments in the petition made under Section 3 of the Act by the petitioner that she is unable to maintain herself. The petitioner while appearing as her own witness as AW, 1 on 3-10-1994 has admitted that she is working as a Female Health Worker since 1984 and drawing the basic salary of Rs. 1600/- per month. Her net carry home pay packet comes to Rs. 2800/-per month. No evidence has come on the record as to the means of the respondent. While appearing as AW 1 also the petitioner has nowhere stated that she was unable to maintain herself.
43. In the absence of averments and evidence; that the petitioner was unable to maintain herself! and in the face of evidence that the petitioner is having means by way of salary being a Government servant, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly held that since the petitioner is able to maintain herself, she is not entitled to any provision and maintenance beyond the period of "Iddat".
44. Resultantly, subject to the above modification, the present revision petition is dismissed.