ORDER

N.D.V. Bhat, J.

1. In this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 29-1-1982 passed by the 1st respondent - Land Tribunal, Manvi in No. LRM.DEC/MNV/CKP/8/76-77.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are as under:

3. One Shankarappa, son of Veerabhadrappa, presumably the father of the instant respondent-3 had filed a declaration under Section 66 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (for short the Act) before the Land Tribunal, Manvi. The Tribunal by its order dated 24-10-1981 declared that the declarant was having 1.7 units as surplus land and that the declarant should surrender the same. It appears that thereafter, the Tribunal issued notice to the said person to intimate the particulars of Sy. Nos. which he proposed to surrender. It is seen that the aforesaid person did not respond to the same, with the result, the Tribunal by its order dated 29-1-1982 decided that an area of 4 acres 10 guntas (1.7 units) towards the eastern portion of Sy. No. 276/C of Chikalparvi village be surrendered to the Government.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that he has purchased the land in Sy. No. 271/D measuring 5 acres 15 guntas and Sy. No. 276/C measuring 6 acres 32 guntas of Cheekalparvi village by a sale deed dated 30-6-1980 from Pompanna, son of Shankarappa, that is to say, the instant respondent-3. The greivance of the petitioner is that the proceedings of the Tribunal had taken place without any notice to him and that the* petitioner was not aware of any proceeding pending before the Tribunal at any point of time. It is his case that if at all any area of land was required to be surrendered by respondent 3 the same should have been taken from his other lands from his holding and not from out of Sy. No. 276/C which was purchased by the instant petitioner in the year 1980 as pointed out earlier. He has also referred to the record of rights and other documents which according to him, support his version that he was in possession of the land purchased by him eversince the date of the sale deed. On these grounds, in pith and substance, he has prayed for quashing the order dated 29-1-1982 passed by the Land Tribunal, Manvi.

5. I have heard Sri B.S. Raikote, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Smt. A. Nimmi Swamy, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondents-1 and 2.

6. The only point that is pressed into service by Sri Raikote, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there was no notice to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. Dilating on this aspect, it was contended by the learned Counsel that the petitioner had purchased the property in question, viz., Sy. No. 276/C of Cheekalparvi village on 30-6-1980 itself, that is to say, even before the orders dated 24-10-1981 and 29-1-1982 were passed by the Tribunal. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel that had an opportunity been given to him he would have convinced the Tribunal that the land which was already sold to him in the year 1980 cannot form part of the land sold, for surrender in the order dated 29-1-1982 in furtherance of the order dated 24-10-1981. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also contended that the petitioner was a bonafide purchaser for value without notice and that therefore, equitable considerations do weigh in his favour. It was also submitted by him that Section 74 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (for short the Act) would not come in the way of the petitioner, having regard to the fact that the prescribed authority has not declared the transaction relating to the sale deed dated 30-6-1980 in his favour as illegal or void. In this connection, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the Decision in RAMAKANTARAO ARSHINIGI v. LAND TRIBUNAL, RAICHUR AND ANR., 1983(1) KLJ 303 and the Decision in SHAMALA D.S. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, MYSORE AND ORS., 1978 (1) KLJ 472. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also invited the attention of this Court to the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos. 249 to 316/1978 rendered on 12-12-1983, State of Karnataka v. Shamala. It is necessary to mention here that the said appeals were appeals preferred against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge in batch of Writ Petitions including the one filed by Shamala D.S. Reliance is also placed in the Decision in STATE OF MYSORE v. MYS. R.A.T., 1974 (1) KLJ 67 Sh.N. 231. It was argued by the learned Counsel for petitioner that in the context of the Decisions alluded to earlier hereinabove, it will have to be held that the order passed by the Tribunal and which is challenged in this petition is illegal and that therefore, the same is liable to be quashed.

7. On the other hand, Smt. A. Nimmi Swamy, learned Government Pleader for respondents-1 and 2 submitted that the question of issuing a notice to the instant petitioner did not arise at all having regard to the fact that the sale deed said to have been executed in favour of the petitioner was admittedly during the period when the proceedings under Section 66 of the Act was actually pending before the Tribunal and that therefore, the transaction in favour of the petitioner is void. Dilating on this aspect, it was argued by the learned Government Pleader that Section 74 of the Act itself declares that on and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act no person owning land in excess of the ceiling limit specified in Section 63 or 64 shall alienate his holding or any part thereof by. way of sale, gift, exchange or otherwise until he has furnished a declaration under Section 66 and the extent of land if any, to be surrendered in respect of that holding has been determined and an order has been passed under Section 67 and any alienation made in contravention of this Section shall be null and void. The learned Government Pleader argued that when the Section itself declares that transaction to be void, the question of the same being declared as void by the authorities, before it becomes void does not arise at all. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the authorities cited at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no application to the facts of the instant case.

8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side.

9. There is no dispute that there was a declaration filed under Section 66 of the Act in respect of the land even before the sale in question, took place in favour of the instant petitioner by Pompanna, the instant respondent-3. The copy of the sale deed is produced at Annexure-A. The proceedings wherein the order dated 24-10-1981 was passed by the Tribunal is numbered as LRM/DEEL/MNV/ CKP/86-76-77. It is therefore, clear that right from the year 1976-77 proceedings relating to the declaration under Section 66 was, in fact, pending before the Tribunal and the order relating to declaration was passed only on 24-10-1981. It is, therefore, clear that the provisions of Section 74 of the Act did apply to the facts of the case. Section 74 of the Act reads as under:

"74. Prohibition of alienation of holding. On and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act no person owning land in excess of the ceiling limit specified in Section 63 or 64 shall alienate his holding or any part thereof by way of sale, gift, exchange or otherwise until he has furnished a declaration under Section 66 and the extent of land if any, to be surrendered in respect of that holding has been determined - and an order has been passed under Section 67 and any alienation made in contravention of this Section shall be null and void."

10. It is seen that the Section unequivocally declares the sale, gift etc., in contravention of Section 74 during the period referred to there as null and void. The question for consideration is as to whether the sale, gift etc., in contravention of Section 74 ipso facto becomes void or whether it should be declared to be void, before it can be said to be void. In the Decision in State of Mysore v. Mys. R.A.T. referred to earlier, it is pointed out by this Court that an alienation of land without the sanction of the prescribed authority under the Mysore Land Reforms Act, ipso facto, cannot be considered as invalid and it is for the Assistant Commissioner to make a summary enquiry under Section 83 of the Act and determine whether alienation was in contravention of the Act. It is pointed out in the said case that where no such determination has been made by the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner cannot, while acting under Section 95 of the Land Revenue Act, refuse permission for conversion. In Shamala D.S. case, the learned Single Judge of this Court has pointed out that the Land Reforms Act, in Sections 66 and 66A specially confers power, to decide the questions whether the vendor under a sale deed was obliged to file any declaration under Section 66 and whether the lands were non-agricultural lands, on the Tahsildar and that power cannot be exercised by anybody else. The Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction to invalidate sale transactions under Section 83 before any action is taken by the Tahsildar under Section 66A of the Act. In the said case, the petitioners had purchased under a registered sale deed executed between May and July 1974 certain lands belonging to the Trusts. It was the case of the petitioners that they had come in possession of the respective lands even prior to 1-3-1974, in pursuance of the agreements to sell, which they had obtained from the owners before the 1st day of March 1974. The Assistant Commissioner, Mysore Sub-Division, Mysore issued notices to them with a view to take action under Section 83 of the Act. The said notices were issued prior to 31-12-1974. The petitioners were by these notices required to show cause within 15 days from the date of service of notices as to why the safe transactions entered into between them and the Trusts should not be treated as null and void on the ground that the said transactions have been brought into effect in contravention of the provisions of Section 66 and 74 of the Act. The petitioners in the said case, took the stand by way of reply to the said notices that no action was called for under Section 83 of the Act in that the lands were non-agricultural lands and the provisions of the Act were not applicable. They also took a stand that at" any rate the vendors not being persons, holding lands beyond ceiling limit, were not required to file declarations under Section 66 of the Act. They, therefore, took a stand that the proposed action was not called for and they also relied on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The Assistant Commissioner made a common order declaring that the transactions as void as offending Section 74 of the Act. The petitioners challenged the said order of the Assistant Commissioner in Writ Petitions. The learned single Judge by his order dated 31-1-1978 allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the order of the Assistant Commissioner. The Government of Karnataka in Writ Appeals Nos. 249 to 316 of 1978 challenged the said common order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of this Court which heard the appeals has, among other things, in the course of its Order dated 12-12-1983 observed as under:

"3. The learned single Judge has taken the view that until the question of ceiling is determined either under Section 67 or under Section 66A of the Act, the Assistant Commissioner could not have taken action under Section 83 of the Act. There is considerable force in this conclusion of the learned single Judge. Further, we find that the Assistant Commissioner proposed to take action under Section 83 by issuing notices before the 31st of December 1974. The last date for filing a declaration under Section 66 of the Act being 31-12-1974, the Assistant Commissioner could not at all have invoked his powers under Section 83 of the Act for the purpose of declaring that the sale transactions have been brought about in contravention of Section 74 of the Act even before the last date for filing a declaration under Section 66 of the Act had not expired. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the action of the Assistant Commissioner was premature. Section 74 of the Act provides:

"On and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, no person owning land in excess of the ceiling limit specified in Section 63 or 64 shall alienate his holding or any part thereof by way of sale, gift, exchange or otherwise until he has furnished a declaration under Section 66 and the extent of land if any, to be surrendered in respect of that holding has been determined by the Tahsildar and an order has been passed by him under Section 67 and any alienation made in contravention of this Section shall be null and void."

Having regard to the provisions contained in Section 74 of the Act, it is inconceivable for the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act to take action for the alleged contravention of Section 74 of the Act even before the last date for making a declaration under Section 66 of the Act had not expired."

10. In the Decision in RANGARAO v. RAGHAVENDRACHARYA, ILR (Karnataka) 1973, 21 it is pointed out that the question whether a transaction is contrary to any of the provisions of the Mysore Land Reforms Act has to be decided by the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act and not by any other authority. It is further pointed out that it follows that the Civil Court cannot decide whether the transaction is void or not, and that before the Civil Court could grant the relief of possession in favour of the plaintiff, there should be an adjudication regarding the validity of the transaction- under Section 83 of the Act by the prescribed authority.

In the Decision in MEENAKSHAMMA v. LAND TRIBUNAL, RAICHUR AND ORS., 1978 (1) KLJ 220, it is held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that though Sections 66 and 67 of the Act and Rule 24 of the Rules do not expressly provide for or prohibit notice and opportunity to other persons who claim ownership rights or an interest in the lands in respect of which a declaration is filed by the land-holder, it would be proper to read into the provisions of the Act and Rules an opportunity of hearing, particularly when the action to be taken would affect the property rights of other persons. The principles of duty to act judicially and giving opportunity are applicable in construing the provisions regarding declarations under the Land Reforms Act and determination of excess lands and their surrender and that therefore, persons claiming fights in the land are entitled to notice and opportunity of hearing from the Land Tribunal.

In the Decision in MASKI GANGAMMA v. BOHARA, 1975 (1) KLJ Page 67 Sh.N. 200, it is pointed out that where in a suit on mortgage defendant contended that the mortgage was void as being in contravention of Section 80, there is no provision under the Act under which the Civil Court can refer the issue to the Assistant Commissioner and if the defendant files an application before the Court producing proof, of his having made an application before the Assistant Commissioner, the Court has to stay the suit until the adjudication by the Assistant Commissioner.

In the Decision in GUNDAJI SATWAJI SHINDE v. RAMACHANDRA BHIKAJI JOSHI, it is pointed out that the combined effect of

Sections 70, 85, 85A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (67 of 1948) is that where in a suit properly constituted and cognizable by the Civil Court upon a contest an issue arises which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with the same is not only ousted but the Civil Court is under a statutory obligation to refer the issue to the Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act to decide the same and upon the reference being answered back, to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act. It is also pointed out in the said case that where the plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract for sale of agricultural land governed by the provisions of the Tenancy Act in the Civil Court and the defendant appeared and raised a contention that in view of the provisions contained in Section 63 of the Tenancy Act the plaintiff not being an agriculturist is barred from purchasing the land, the issue would directly and substantially arise whether the plaintiff is an agriculturist and that such an issue being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar, it is incumbent upon the Civil Court to refer the issue to the Competent Authority under the Tenancy Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide or deal with the same.

In the Decision in VICON LTD. AND ORS. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE REVENUE DIVISION, 1979 (1)KLJ 383, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed that there is a clear distinction between illegal transaction in contravention of the provisions of law and transactions merely declared to be void or invalid. It is further pointed out that every illegal transaction is void but every void transaction is not illegal. It is also pointed out in the said case that Section 80 of the Act declares that certain transactions shall not be valid in favour of certain persons. It is further held therein if at Section 80(1) does not prohibit any transaction but merely declares that the transactions referred to would not be valid. It is also pointed out that transactions falling within Section 80 are not only not forbidden by law and therefore not illegal, but are also not really invalid, being legally effective. It is further held that transactions falling under Section 80 being legally effective, any inquiry with respect to such transactions are wholly outside the jurisdiction of the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act whose function is to hold inquiry regarding illegal transactions.

fn the Decision in Ramakantarao Arshinigi v. Land Tribunal, Raichur and Anr., it is pointed out that where a transfer had been made by registered sale deed, the reasoning of the Tribunal that the lands stiff stand in the name of the transferor cannot be sustained and no blame can be attributed to the transferor, if the vendee and the registering authority had not performed their duty under Section 128(4), Karnataka Land Revenue Act to give information to the village accountant to make mutation entries. It is further pointed out that where objections have been filed before the Tribunal, it cannot ignore them and if it did not want to act on the objections, but desired to have further positive evidence, it ought to give opportunity to produce such evidence.

11. The different Decisions cited at the Bar are dealt with in detail hereinabove with a view to see as to whether any of the said Decisions has answered the question in controversy directly in issue in this case. On a careful examination of the ratio laid down in the different Decisions, in the context of the facts relevant for consideration in those cases would go to show that this aspect is not dealt with in the said Decisions. The aspect which directly arises for consideration in this case is as to whether a declaration by the prescribed authority in the context of the contravention of Section 74 of the Act is necessary before holding that the transaction contravening Section 74 of the Act is void. Section 83 of the Act reads as under:

"83. Inquiry regarding illegal transactions -

The prescribed authority shall, after a summary enquiry, determine whether the transaction reported to it under Section 82 or coming to its notice in any other manner is in contravention of (or is unlawful or invalid under) the provisions of this Act, (as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act) and make a declaration accordingly. Any transaction so declared in contravention of (or is unlawful or invalid under) any of the provisions of this Act as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act shall be null and void. (The land in respect of which such transaction has taken place shall, as penalty, he forfeited to and vest in the State Government, (free from all encumbrances). No amount is payable therefor."

Section 74 of the Act reads as under: "74. Prohibition of alienation of holding:-

On and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act no person owning land in excess of the ceiling limit specified in Section 63 or 64 shall alienate his holding or any part thereof by way of sale, gift, exchange or otherwise until he has furnished a declaration under Section 66 and the extent of land if any, to be surrendered in respect of that holding has been determined (xxx) and an order has been passed (xxx) under Section 67 and any alienation made in contravention of this Section shall be null and void."

In so far as the contravention of Section 74 of the Act is concerned, Section itself provides that alienation made in contravention of the Section shall be null and void. In so far as the contravention of the other provisions is concerned, the transaction shall be null and void only after a declaration to the effect that the transaction is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. If really the intendment of the Legislature was that even a transaction in contravention of Section 74 of the Act shall be void only after a declaration to that effect is made by the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act, it was not necessary for the Legislature to provide in Section 74 of the Act itself that any 'alienation' made in contravention of this Section shall be null and void. It is reasonable to presume that the Legislature does not employ any expression unnecessarily. Under these circumstances, the only conclusion which flows from what is stated hereinabove is that Section 74 is self-contained and the question as to whether any alienation is in contravention of Section 74 of the Act and that therefore, it is null and void does not depend upon any declaration made by the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act. If this line of interpretation is not adopted, it will result in "a head on clash" between two Sections of the same Act viz., Sections 74 and 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid "a head on clash" between two Sections of the same Act. The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another "unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them". Further the rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. A construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber" or "dead letter" is not a harmonious construction. In this connection, the Decision of the Supreme Court in SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU AND ORS. v. STATE OF MYSORE AND ORS., is indeed instructive. In para-29 therein the Supreme Court has observed among other things, as under:

"The result then is that there are two provisions of equal authority, neither of them being subject to the other. The question is how the apparent conflict between them is to be resolved. The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. Applying this rule, if the contention of the appellants is to be accepted, then Article 25(2) (b) will become wholly nugatory in its application to denominational temples, though, as stated above, the language of that Article includes them. On the other hand, if the contention of the respondents is accepted, then full effect can be given to Article 26(b) in all matters of religion, subject only to this that as regards one aspect of them, entry into a temple for worship, the rights declared under Article 25(2)(b) will prevail. While, in the former case, Article 25(2)(b) will be put wholly out of operation, in the latter, effect can be given to both that provision and Article 26(b). We must accordingly hold that Article 26(b) must be read subject to Article 25(2)(b)."

In the context of what is stated hereinabove, I am indeed of the view that it is possible to harmoniously construe the provisions of Section 74 of the Act and Section 83 of the Act. As pointed out earlier, in the context of the language of Section 74, it is not necessary for the prescribed authority or for that matter for any other authority to declare that the transaction is contrary to the provisions of Section 74 of the Act before it can be held that the transaction is void. If in a given case it is shown patently that the transaction is in contravention of Section 74 of the Act, the question as to whether such a transaction is null and void would not depend upon any declaration by any other authority before it can be held that the same is null and void, because Section 74 of the Act itself says that such a transaction is void. In the instant case, it is not disputed by the petitioner that he purchased the land Sy. No. 271/D measuring 5 acres 15 guntas and Sy. No. 276/C measuring 6 acres 32 guntas of Cheekalparvi village by a sale deed dated 30-6-1980 from Pompanna, son of Shankarappa who is respondent-3. It is also not in dispute that a declaration under Section 66 of the Act filed by the instant respondent-3 was actually pending before the Tribunal during the said period and that the extent of the land to be surrendered in respect of the holding of the declarant was not yet determined and an order under Section 67 of the Act was yet to be passed at that time. Under these undisputed facts, and having regard to the statutory effect flowing from the provisions of Section 74 of the Act, it would follow that the alienation made by respondent-3 in favour of the instant petitioner was null and void.

12. Once when it is held that the transaction in question is null and void no useful purpose will be served by remitting the matter to the Tribunal, with a direction to issue notice to the instant petitioner. All that the petitioner can make a submission before the Tribunal if at all is all that he has submitted before this Court. Once when it is held that such a transaction is null and void, the Tribunal giving a direction to the Government or respondent-3 that the lands sold to the instant petitioner by respondent-3 shall not be included among the lands to be surrendered to the State Government, does not arise.

13. Looked at from any point of view, therefore, I do not find any merit in this Writ Petition.

14. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Writ Petition is dismissed.