K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.
1. In these writ appeals and the S.T.R.P. facts being similar, common questions arise for consideration as to whether the bottle and crate deposits collected by the respondent-dealer formed part of the sale turnover exigible to tax under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 and whether charges for packing materials, charged separately form part of the sale price in view of the provisions of rule 6(4)(ff) of the karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957. In other words whether the judgment of the learned single Judge in Write Petitions Nos. 18690 and 2305 of 1980 hoding that such deposits and charges are not exigible to tax, and that the issuance of show cause notices suo motu by the appellant was unwarranted, is sustainable.
2. Since the questions involved in these matters are common they have been heard together and we propose to dispose them of by a common judgment.
3. Writ Appeal Nos. 275 and 276 of 1984 have been filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore City Division, Bangalore, against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petitions Nos. 18690 and 23015 of 1980. The Mysore Breweries Ltd. (respondent herein), was the petitioner in the two writ petitions. The aforesaid Mysore Breweries Ltd., is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of liquor, and is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 ("the Act" for short). The liquor manufactured by it is sold in bottles and crates, using packing materials. For ensuring safe return of bottles and crates, it receives deposits from the purchasers. The deposit is refunded on return of bottles. It filed returns for the period from October 1, 1975 to December 31, 1975 and from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1976, claiming certain sums representing packing materials as not forming part of the taxable turnover and, therefore, deductible under rule 6(4)(ff) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules (hereinafter called "the Rules"). Likewise the petitioner also disclosed certain amounts received by it as bottle and crate deposits made by the purchasers, which is claimed were not taxable not forming part of the sale price.
The assessing authority after examining the returns and other relevant documents allowed the deductions. But the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore Division, Bangalore, acting suo motu, by two separate show cause notices, dated November 27, 1980 and August 4, 1981 issued to the petitioner under section 21(4) of the Act, proposed to revise the assessment orders made by the Assistant Commissioner in so far as they allowed the aforesaid deductions. The validity of the said two show cause notices was challenged by the respondent by filing two writ petitions before this Court. In the show cause notices, the Deputy Commissioner has called upon the petitioner to show cause why the assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner, be not revised as the deduction allowed on the following items was inadmissible, having regard to the facts of the case :
(1) Packing charges ... Rs. 4,04,104.80
(2) Bottle deposits ... Rs. 11,61,333.00
(3) Crate deposits ... Rs. 4,48,482.00
4. The learned single Judge, after examining the contentions of the parties held that though the Assistant Commissioner allowed deductions relating to the packing materials, the Deputy Commissioner, without adverting to the relevant rule or the reasoning adopted by the Assistant Commissioner, vaguely stated that the deduction was impermissible. Further, he held that the law permitted deduction on packing material if the same did not form part of sale price and was charged separately. In any event the Deputy Commissioner's proposal to disallow deduction on packing materials was vague and illegal.
5. With regard to the deposits for bottles and crates the learned single Judge, relying on the judgment in Dyer Meakin Breweries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.  29 STC 69 (All.), held that deposits made by the purchaser as bottle deposits or crate deposits can hardly be treated as forming part of sale price. The learned Judge having regard to the orders of the Assistant Commissioner held that the Deputy Commissioner's action to revise them and initiate action suo motu under section 21(4) of the Act, was wholly unwarranted as no circumstances existed justifying the exercise of jurisdiction under section 21(4) of the Act. Consequently, he quashed both the show cause notices.
6. In S.T.R.P. the facts and circumstances under which the deduction for bottle deposits was claimed by the dealer and the deduction allowed on such deposits as not forming part of the sale price are similar. Respondent, M/s. Canara Liquor Agencies, have been dealing in liquor as second and subsequent dealer and the taxable turnover related to the supposed sale of empty beer bottles in respect of which certain deposits were taken by the sellers (manufacturers) from the respondent so as to ensure return of the empty bottles. The Commercial Tax Officer, III Circle, Mangalore, assessed the appellant for the financial year 1979-80 on May 7, 1982, on gross and taxable turnover of Rs. 54,059, surcharge of Rs. 5,406 and additional tax. This included the amount representing bottle deposits. Respondent preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Mangalore, contending that the empty bottles were returned by it to the seller and were, therefore, not sales. Relying on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Dyer Meakin Breweries  29 STC 69, and the Kerala High Court in McDowell's case  46 STC 79, it claimed that the deposits given in respect of the bottles was to ensure the return of the same to the seller, and it did not form part of the sale price. The appellate authority did not acceded to the contentions, and despite the fact this the matter was covered by the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal of the respondent. Hence, it filed and appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore. After considering the respective contentions of the respondent as well as the Revenue, the appellate authority noticed the judgments of the Allahabad, Kerala and Madras High Courts, reported in  29 STC 69 (Dyer Meakin Breweries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax),  46 STC 79 [Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes) v. McDowell & Co. Ltd.] and  46 STC 85 (State of Tamil Nadu v. McDowell and Company Ltd.) and relying on the judgment of this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 18690 and 23015 of 1980 (which is presently under appeal) allowed the appeal. While allowing the appeal, the Tribunal observed :
"We are unable to see any difference between the case of a manufacturer collecting deposit, and a wholesaler or retailer returning the bottles and reclaiming the deposit amount left with the manufacturer. If, as held by our High Court, there is no sale of the bottles when deposit is collected, there cannot be any sale of the bottles when they are just returned and the amount deposited taken back. We, therefore, hold that the deposit collected by the assessee on returning the bottle is not taxable turnover. The appeal is allowed and the orders passed by the authorities below are set aside. The amount of the deposit which has been returned to the assessee by the manufacturer shall be excluded from the taxable turnover."
7. Both the writ appeals and the S.T.R.P. were heard together. The learned Government Pleader submitted that in S.T.R.P. No. 50 of 1984, the Tribunal has failed to notice that bottle deposits were part of sale price and ought to have seen that the agreements between the dealers and the purchasers do not create any obligation on the purchasers to return the bottles, nor was any time fixed for the return. He further contended that payment of the amount in respect of the bottles in advance (deposit) was a term of the sale and the amount taken for the bottles could only be the cost of the bottles. He also submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the deposit collected by the respondent-dealer formed part of the sale turnover exigible to tax under the Central and the Karnataka Sales Tax Acts.
8. In the writ appeals, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the learned Single Judge has misread rule 6(4)(ff) of the Rules in holding that the charge for packing materials charged separately would not form part of the sale price. He also contended that the learned Judge ought to have held that the amount taken by the dealers from the purchasers towards bottles deposit formed part of the sale price and the transaction included sale of bottles and crates by the dealer to the purchaser and as such was liable to be assessed to sales tax under the Act. He also contended that the learned Judge ought not to have allowed the writ petitions but ought to have remitted the matter for finding out whether there was a written agreement as to the deposit of amount towards bottles and crates for ensuring return of the same. In the event, the Deputy Commissioner had issued only show cause notices and at that stage it was prematurely challenged, though necessary materials were not available for purpose of finding out whether there was an express or implied contract to support the conclusion that the deposits on bottles and crates were taken only for purpose of securing return of the same.
9. We have carefully considered the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant by the learned Government Advocate, but we have come to the conclusion that those contentions cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, we have had the advantage of the well considered order of the learned single Judge (Puttaswamy, J.), who found that there was no justification for issuance of the show cause notice, when the respondent claimed deduction on the packing materials, which had been separately charges and did not form part of sale price, and the assessing authority (Assistant Commissioner) being satisfied with the same allowed the same. The Deputy Commissioner, could not have proposed to disallow deduction on packing materials when rule 6(4)(ff) was so clear. We find that the fact that the respondent charged separately for packing materials is not disputed in the show cause notice. The Assistant Commissioner having held that deduction was permissible under rule 6(4)(ff) of the Rules, there appears no reason to question the deduction allowed. The learned single Judge taking into consideration the conspectus of these facts had reached the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner has illegally proposed to disallow the deduction on packing materials, and in our view, he has rightly held so.
10. The second contention of the learned Government Advocate is that the bottle and crate deposits taken by the respondent from the purchasers while selling liquor amounts to a sale of such bottles and crates, and though it is intended to ensure the return of the bottles and crates no deduction could be allowed, and the Deputy Commissioner has rightly issued show cause notices, proposing to disallow the deductions. In the show cause notices facts and figures as to deposits for bottles and crates have been shown item-wise. The learned Government Advocate, further contended that there is no express written agreement as to the terms and conditions under which the bottles as well as crates are to be returned. Further, he pleaded that the matter will have to be investigated into, and as such the matter ought to have been remitted back for investigation to the authority concerned. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision in Rayalaseema Enterprises v. State of Andhra Pradesh . This decision is inapplicable to the facts of this case for the facts borne out in this case do clearly establish that there was no sale of the bottles and crates, and the very fact that deposits were made for ensuring returns of the bottles and crates, support an implied agreement between the seller and purchaser that there was no transfer of title in such bottles and crates which were required to be returned.
11. A perusal of the show cause notices also discloses that they contain statement of facts which are not in dispute, and further establish that there was implied contract between the dealer and the purchaser, that bottles and creates were not sold along with the liquor. The Deputy Commissioner in the said show cause notices states as follows :
"Purchasers such as wholesaler/retailers and the consumers are aware of the fact that they were paying the cost for the beer contained in the bottle and not for the bottle itself. There is no implied or express contract between the seller and the purchaser for the sale of bottle along with the beer. Price received by the dealer is towards beer only but not the bottles."
12. In view of the undisputed factual foundation on which the show cause notices proceed, we see no reason to accept the contention of the Government Advocate to remit the cases for investigation to find out whether there was an express or implied contract between the seller and the purchaser of liquor with regard to the bottles and crates in question.
13. The contention of the learned Government Advocate that the amounts taken by the dealer from the purchasers as deposits for bottles and crates, though termed as deposits are really part of the sale price cannot be accepted.
14. Let us examine the position to find out as to whether the deposits do form part of the sale price; and whether such amounts taken by the seller from the purchaser amount to sale of bottles and crates.
15. At the outset it may be stated that the very fact of taking deposits by the seller from the purchaser is to ensure return of bottles and crates. The learned single Judge, after referring to the Chambers Dictionary has observed that the term "deposit" in the context the meanings given to the term, viz., something entrusted to another's care, a pledge, a bailment, where one entrusts goods to another to be kept without recompense appears to be apposite.
16. "Sale" is defined to mean a contract between two parties called respectively the "seller" and the "buyer" by which the former in consideration of the payment or promise of payment of certain price in money transfers to the latter the title and possession of the property. Sale is also to be distinguished from bailment and the difference is to be found in the fact that the contract of bailment always contemplates the return to the bailer the specific article delivered. But sale never involves the return of articles, but only consideration in terms of money. This amount, viz., deposit made by the purchaser with the seller as bottle deposits or crate deposits while selling liquor cannot be treated as forming part of the sale price.
17. In Dyer Meakin Breweries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.  29 STC 69, the Allahabad High Court has held, that deposit, made with the manufacturer and the seller of liquor does not form part of the sale price and is not assessable to sales tax under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948.
18. Similar view was also expressed by the High Court of Kerala in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes) v. McDowell & Co. Limited  46 STC 79 and by the Madras High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. McDowell and Company Ltd.  46 STC 85. Relying on these decisions the learned single Judge, has held that the deposit relating to bottles and crates does not form part of the sale price and it is not exigible to tax. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge.
19. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we do not accept any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants in these writ appeals, as well as in the S.T.R.P. No. 50 of 1984.
20. The appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed.
21. Similarly, S.T.R.P. No. 50 of 1984 is also dismissed.
22. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
23. Writ appeals and revision petition dismissed.