appeal against accused Nos. 1 and 7; and partly allowing State's appeal against accused Nos. 5 and 6, the Court

HELD:

Per Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, JJ:

1.1. Accused No. 1 is guilty of all the charges which were already found to be proved and established by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. The sentence passed by the High Court is confirmed and the punishment awarded by the trial court u/s. 212 r/w Section 52(A) r/w. Section 120-B IPC is also restored. [Para 58] [1148-B]

1.2. Conviction under Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 could be based solely on the basis of the confessional statement and such conviction is also permissible on the basis of the confessional statement of the co-accused which could be used and relied upon for the purpose of conviction. [Para 59] [1148-C]

State v. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253; Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi (2002) 5 SCC 234; Jameel Ahmed v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 9 SCC 673, relied on.

1.3. Though it is proved and established from the records that accused No. 1 did not himself participate in the actual shootout, it is alleged against him that he was a part of the gang and he was in touch with the gang leaders in Karachi (Pakistan) and he also acted on behalf of the said gang so much so that he had effected payment of money arranged by the leaders of the gang to accused Nos. 5, 6, and 8 for causing the shootout. The evidence placed before this court clearly establishes that accused No. 1 was responsible for procuring a pistol and handing over the same to accused No. 5 which was used in the shootout. The said fact is also established and proved by the confessional statement of accused No. 5. [Paras 47 and 48] [1142-B-F]

1.4. The confessional statement of accused No. 1 substantially complies with the requirements of Section 18 of Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) r/w. rule 3 (6) of Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Rules (MCOC Rules). It was a categorical case of the prosecution that PW-51 who recorded the said confessional statement was never involved with the investigation of the case. On going through all the material available on record, the High Court came to the categorical finding that the aforesaid confessional statement was made voluntarily and while recording the same, post confessional formalities were followed. It was held by the High Court that although the confessional statement does not bear any certificate in the identical terms as specified under Rule 3(6) of the MCOC Rules, it nevertheless complies with the requirements of Section 18 MACOCA. Apart from that, there is also evidence on record indicating that accused No. 1 made several phone calls to gang leaders in Pakistan from various phone booths. The said fact is also accepted by the trial court as well as by the High Court. [Paras 51 and 52] [1145-E-H; 1146-A-C]

1.5. The confessional statement of accused No. 8 was held to be admissible by both the courts below in which he had categorically stated that he knew accused No. 1 from childhood and that accused No. 1 had brought him to act as a driver in the said shootout and also paid him Rs. 10,000/- for the job. Accused No. 8 in his confessional statement had also stated that accused No. 5 visited accused No. 1. The confessional statements of accused No. 5 and 6 are also relevant to prove and establish the involvement of accused No. 1 with the incident. [Paras 53 and 54] [1146-D-E]

1.6. The High Court while disbelieving the confessional statements of PWs 5 and 6, ignored the fact that there is evidence of PW-64, the typist who had deposed that the preliminary warning was in fact given which was so recorded. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no reason, not to accept the said statement of PW-64, the typist. The aforesaid confessional statement of the co-accused could be the basis of conviction under the provisions of MCOCA. [Paras 56 and 57] [1147-E-G-H; 1148-A]

1.7. There is also evidence of other witnesses namely PW-21, owner of an STD booth. He stated that accused No. 1 made a phone call to a specific number in Karachi (Pakistan). PW-35, who is the owner of another phone booth stated that he personally knew accused No. 1. He deposed that accused No. 1 would come to his booth regularly to make phone calls to Pakistan. PW-37, who was another witness stated in his evidence that accused No. 1 had made calls on specified numbers in Pakistan on certain dates. Evidence of PW-37 is also found to be corroborated by the evidence of PW-54. Similar is the evidence of PW-43 who deposed that calls were made by accused No. 1 to Pakistan. [Para 55] [1147-B-D]

2.1. There is no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the High Court so far as involvement of accused No. 4 in the incident is concerned. There are cogent and convincing evidence available against him to prove and establish his involvement in the entire incident which justifies his convictions and sentences on each count. The High Court rightly held that accused No. 4 had played an active and important role in the conspiracy even though he did not participate in the actual shoot out and that he had the knowledge of the conspiracy. [Para 71] [1159-D-G]

2.2. Accused No. 4 he was an active member of the gang who actively participated in the activities of the organized crime syndicate which fact is corroborated by his confessional statement. [Para 65] [1157-D]

2.3. The confessional statement of accused No. 4 is trustworthy and reliable. It is evidently clear from the records that his confessional statement was found to be in substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 18 of MCOCA. The High Court came to the categorical finding that post confessional formalities have been followed and although the confessional statement does not bear a certificate in the identical terms as specified under Rule 3(6) of the MCOC Rules, there is nevertheless compliance of Section 18 of MCOCA. There is no plausible ground to discard the view taken by the High Court in this regard. [Para 66] [1157-E-H]

2.4. The confessional statement is supported by the deposition of PW-53, who deposed that accused No. 4 led the police to the place from where he had bought six or seven mobile phones. The aforesaid confessional statement is also supported by the evidence of the Manager of a Petrol Pump, who corroborated the fact that the aforesaid Maruti car was brought by accused No. 4 to his petrol pump for repairs and servicing. Further, the evidence of PW-20, a pancha witness, whose name was kept secret, establishes and proves that accused No. 4 led the police to the said petrol pump. Accused No. 4 also led the police to Motor Training School wherefrom he obtained a duplicate driving license in the name in his brother. The evidence of PW-15 the real owner of the Maruti Car, proves that the car was stolen and that he had lodged a complaint to that effect. Another witness deposed about the seizure of the aforesaid Maruti car clearly throws light on the fact that accused No. 4 was using the stolen car. Confessional statement of a accused No. 7, which was found to be admissible in evidence by the trial court as well as the High Court, also corroborates and supports the facts admitted by accused No. 4 in his confessional statement with regard to his (accused No. 4's) role. It is clear that accused No. 4 had heard the conversation prior to the shootout and thus had the knowledge about the conspiracy. [Paras 68 and 69] [1158-C-H; 1159-A-B]

2.5. PW-18, who was an eye-witness to the incident described in detail what he saw on the day of the incident. He deposed that he had seen accused No. 4 along with accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7. Later he identified him during TIP. Apart from him, accused No. 4 was also identified by PW-2, PW-3, PW-12, PW-13, PW-22 and PW-30 in the TIP. [Para 70] [1159-C]

3.1. Order of acquittal passed by the High Court in respect of accused Nos. 5 and 6 is liable to be set aside in the appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra. Both the accused persons are convicted for the charges as alleged against them and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. [Para 90] [1169-E]

3.2. The evidence of PW-18 who was an eye-witness of the incident is credible and trustworthy as he described the incident as well as the assailants in detail. Furthermore, he identified the accused persons i.e. accused Nos. 4 to 7 in the court as well as during the TIP. His evidence has been found to be trustworthy and reliable by both the courts below. [Para 75] [1161-A-B]

3.3. The High Court held that TIP with respect to Accused Nos. 5 and 6 was vitiated because accused No. 5 had a squint in the right eye and the dummies used in the TIP did not have the similar squint in the right eye. But, the High Court did not make it clear as to why the identification of accused No. 6 was also vitiated. Accused Nos. 5 and 6 were also identified by ten witnesses. Therefore, the TIP is a reliable piece of evidence as the same proves the identity of accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 75] [1161-B-C]

3.4. It cannot be said that there was inordinate delay in conducting the TIP in view of the fact that TIP was conducted only after a period of 45 days which is not such a long period to cast any doubt over the evidentiary value of the TIP. Even otherwise, a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence but can only be used for corroboration of the statement in court. It is primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an assurance that their progress with the investigation is proceeding on the right lines. The substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court, which in the present case has been done by PW-18. [Para 76] [1161-D-G]

Amitsingh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 310, relied on.

3.5. The plea that the photograph of accused No. 5 was published in an Urdu Daily thereby making the identity of accused No. 5 public also does not find favour in view of the fact that the witnesses are Maharashtrians and, therefore, there is no likelihood of their reading the paper and seeing the photograph of accused No. 5. [Para 77] [1163-G-H; 1164-A]

3.6. The evidence of another eye-witness PW-13, a student who was a by- stander, was not believed by the High Court on the premise that he did not disclose the incident to anybody for four days. His evidence ought to have been relied upon by the High Court as he clearly stated in his evidence that though he did not see the faces of the assailants, he saw the face of accused No. 8. He stated that PW 3 chased the car with a rifle. He also noted the number of the car. His statement gets support from the evidence of PW-3, who was an eye-witness of the incident and from the evidence of PW-30, who was an injured witness of the incident. Therefore, it would not be proper and justified to discard his evidence only because he did not state about the incident to anyone for four days. Since his evidence is corroborated and supported by other material evidence on record the same cannot be discarded only because of the aforesaid reason. [Para 78] [1164- A-E]

3.7. The injured witnesses as well as the other eye-witnesses have no reason to falsely depose against the accused persons as it was not shown that they had either any prior enmity with the accused persons or they are interested parties. In fact, they are the victims of the horrendous and ghastly attack made by the perpetrators. [Para 79] [1164-H; 1165-A]

3.8. PW-2 and PW-3, who were the bodyguards of the intended target, were eye-witnesses of the incident. Their statements are corroborated by the evidence of PW-30. Their Statements are also supported by the evidence of another eye-witness PW-13. Both of them were the persons who actually witnessed the shootout and were present at the site of the shootout. Furthermore, both of them have given a description of the physical features of the assailants including Accused Nos. 5 and 6. Therefore, the High Court ought to have relied upon the evidence of PWs-2 and 3 in the light of the circumstantial evidence brought on record. The trial court rightly found the evidence of PW-2 and 3 trustworthy and reliable as both of them have the best available opportunity to see the assailants. [Para 80] [1165-B-F]

3.9. On an analysis of the confessional statement of accused No. 5 it is found that he has made a detailed statement of the instructions he received from the leaders of the gang to kill the intended target and has stated the involvement of accused Nos. 1, 6, 7 and 8 in the shootout. [Para 81] [1165- G-H; 1166-A]

3.10. Accused No. 6 stated about his earlier involvement in murder cases in his confessional statement. He also stated as to how he met accused No. 5 and that accused No. 5 introduced him to the gang. Confessional statement of accused No. 6 is found to be almost identical to the confessional statement of accused No. 5. [Para 82] [1166-C]

3.11. On analysis of the material on record and the confessional statements of accused Nos. 5 and 6, it is found that although the fact that the pre- confessional statements were recorded on 23.07.1999 is not traceable, the fact that they were actually recorded is corroborated by the evidence of PW-64, the typist who had deposed that the preliminary statements were recorded on 23.07.1999. Thereafter, they were given a period of reflection for 48 hours which is corroborated by PW-60, PW-63 and PW-64. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the accused were sufficiently warned in advance about the consequences of their confessions. The High Court altogether failed to take into account the evidence of PW-64, the typist. The trial court has rightly held that all the requirements u/s. 18 (3) of MCOCA were fully complied with while recording the confessional statements. [Para 84] [1166-F-H; 1167-A]

3.12. Accused Nos. 7 and 8 also described the involvement of accused Nos. 5 and 6 in the shootout in their respective confessional statements. The confessional statements are consistent with the confessional statements of accused Nos. 5 and 6. [Para 84] [1167-B-C]

Jaywant Dattatray v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 10 SCC 109, relied on.

3.13. The reasoning of the High Court that the confessional statements of the co-accused are not admissible in evidence because Section 313 CrPC had not been complied with, is not tenable as there is a non-obstante clause in Section 18 (3) which precludes the application of CrPC and, therefore, the evidence of a co-accused is admissible as a piece of substantive evidence. [Para 85] [1167-D]

State vs. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253, relied on.

3.14. The report of the ballistic expert shows that the weapon and bullets tally with each other and, therefore, the court comes to a clear conclusion that the weapon was used in firing during the shootout. Moreover, there is a clear finding of fact by both the courts below that the 9 mm pistol was recovered at the instance of accused No. 5 from his hut. Therefore, this recovery of weapon clearly proves and establishes the guilt of accused No.

5. [Para 86] [1167-E-G]

3.15. It is clear from the material on record that accused No. 5 made certain telephone calls to gang leaders in Karachi, Pakistan. This fact gets corroboration from the discovery of 3 telephone booths at the instance of accused No. 5 wherefrom telephone calls were made by him to the gang leaders. This evidence gets further corroboration from the evidence of the owners of the telephone booths. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court with respect to accused No. 5 is not a plausible view as the same is in contradistinction of the view taken by the High Court with regard to other accused persons. [Para 87] [1167-H; 1168-A-E]

3.16. The High Court erroneously held that conviction u/s. 27(3) r/w Section 7 of the Arms Act could not be sustained although a 9 mm pistol was recovered at the instance of accused No. 5 and it is proved that accused No. 5 had used the pistol. Further, the report of the ballistic expert establishes and proves that the weapon and the bullets tally each other. The ballistic expert also opined in the report that one of the victims of the shootout was killed due to a bullet from a 9 mm pistol. Apart from the report of ballistic expert there is medical evidence available on the record which show that the death of the three deceased persons was caused by the injuries sustained due to fire arms during the shootout and, therefore, it can be inferred that the weapon was used in the shootout. Accused No. 6 had also used the pistols and fired during the shootout. [Para 88] [1168-F-H; 1169-A]

3.17. The finding of the High Court that the sanction order u/s. 39 of the Arms Act suffered from non-application of mind is not sustainable in view of the material available on record. The sanction order in the present case is a detailed one and displays proper application of mind. [1169-B]

Gunvantlal v. State of M. P. (1972) 2 SCC 194, relied on.

4.1. Even though Accused No. 8 has not fired any shot and he was not carrying any arms with him but he played an active role in the crime and his participation in the crime was significant. He was the person who took the assailants to the place of incident by driving the stolen Maruti car and he received the money for driving the car which fact was admitted by him in his confessional statement. It is also clear from the records that he was an active member of the gang and was involved in the criminal activities of the organized crime syndicate run by the gang leaders. Therefore, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court against him is upheld. The sentence of imprisonment of life is maintained on the same ground. [Paras 98 and 99] [1172-C-D; 1173-B]

4.2. The confessional statement of accused No. 8 was recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA. The statement is found to be admissible in evidence and relied upon by both the courts below having been found to be recorded in compliance with Section 18 of MCOCA. The statement has given a detailed account of the incident and the modus operandi of the accused persons. He has given complete description of the role played by Accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7 in the shootout. [Para 95] [1171-B-C]

4.3. The confessional statement of accused No. 8 is supported by the confessional statements of the co-accused namely, accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7. The confessional statement of accused No. 7 which is found to be admissible in evidence and relied upon by both the courts below clearly establishes the role played by Accused No. 8. The role played by accused No. 8 is also proved and established from the evidence of PW-22, who has given a sufficiently detailed account of what he saw on the day when the car was abandoned. He identified accused No. 8 in the TIP. Accused No. 8 was also identified by PW-13, an eye-witness to the crime. The High Court found the testimony of PW-22 as truthful and trustworthy. [Para 96] [1171-E-G]

4.4. Evidence of PW-54, and PW-31, pancha witness proves that accused No. 8 led the police to the palce where his parents were also present and he took out two number plates of the car from the place which was used in the shootout wrapped in a paper underneath a wooden bench. [Para 97] [1171-H; 1172-A-B]

5. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence placed on record against accused No. 7, it is found that capital punishment in the instant case would not be justified and, therefore, the appeal of the State so far the issue with regard to alteration of the sentence of imprisonment of life to that of capital punishment is dismissed. [Para 91] [1170-B-C]

PER S.B. SINHA, J. (Supplementing)

1. The review courts are supposed to assess the findings emerging from the pre-sentencing hearing at the trial stage as also other available material and then arrive at conclusion of its own on the propriety of sentence. Apex Court as the final reviewing authority has a far more serious and intensive duty to discharge. The court not only has to ensure that award of death penalty does not become a perfunctory exercise of discretion u/s. 302 IPC after an ostensible consideration of rarest of rare doctrine, but also that the decision making process survives the special rigors of procedural justice applicable in this regard. [Para 6] [1174-H; 1175-A-C]

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCC 684; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariya v. State of Maharashtra 2009 (7) SCALE 341, relied on.

2. Administration of death penalty is carried out in the intensive gaze of Article 14 and Article 21 requirements of the Constitution of India. Article 14 applies to judicial process including exercise of judicial discretion as it applies to the executive process. The nature of Article 14 application in this case will be on a different plane altogether and an objective analysis on that count would have to meet the Ceteris paribus (with other things the same) requirement. [Para 6 and 7] [1175-D; 1176-A-B]

Aloke Nath Dutt and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal 2006 (13) SCALE 467; Swamy Shraddananda @ Murli Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka 2008 (10) SCALE 669, referred to.

3. Rule based judging norms and sound rules of prudence are the only guarantee to fair and equitable sentencing. This emerges from the constitutional context to the administration of capital sentencing problem as also a closer reading of rarest of rare test. The assessment of "rarest of the rare case" is incomplete without coming to the conclusion that the "the lesser alternative is unquestionably foreclosed' and procedural fairness and justice concerns form part of the latter condition. [Para 8] [1176-D-F]

4. The selection of life imprisonment as a lesser alternative can not be deemed to be "unquestionably foreclosed" till the time objective fairness standards as to the sentencing process are attained with regard to capital sentence. Capital Sentencing is not a normal penalty discharging the social function of punishment. In this particular punishment, there is heavy burden on court to meet the procedural justice requirements, both emerging from the black letter law as also conventions. In terms of rule of prudence and from the point of view of principle, a court may choose to give primacy to life imprisonment over death penalty in cases which are solely based on circumstantial evidence or where High Court has given a life imprisonment or acquittal. [Para 9 and 11] [1176-F-G; 1178-D-E]

State of Maharashtra v. Suresh 2000 (1) SCC 471, referred to.

5. In the light of serious objections to disparity in sentencing by this court flowing out of varied interpretations to the rarest of rare expression, it is clear that the test has to be more than what a particular judge locates as rarest of rare in his personal consideration. There has to be an objective value to the term rarest of rare, otherwise it will fall foul of Article 14. In such a scenario, a robust approach to arrive at rarest of rare situations will give primacy to what can be called the consensus approach to the test. In the tiered court system, an attempt towards deciphering a common view as to what can be called to be the rarest of rare, vertically across the trial court, High Court and apex court and horizontally across a bench at any particular level, will introduce some objectivity to the precedent on death penalty which is crumbling down under the weight of disparate interpretations. This is only a rule of prudence and as such there is no statutory provision to this effect. [Paras 12 and 13] [1178-F-H; 1179-B]

Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan and Ors. v. State AIR 1999 SC 3700; Devender Pal Singh v. State N.C.T. of Delhi and Anr. 2002 (5) SCC 234; Licchamadevi v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1988 SC 1785; State of Maharashtra v. Suresh 2000 (1) SCC 471; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram 2000 (4) SCC 515; State of Maharashtra v. Damu s/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors. 2000 (6) SCC 269; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar AIR 2002 SC 16; State of Rajasthan v. Kheraj Ram 2003 (8) SCC 224; Devender Pal Singh v. State, N.C.T. Of Delhi and Anr. AIR 2003 SC 886 and State of U.P. v. Satish AIR 2005 SC 1000, referred to.

6. Swinging fortunes of the accused on the issue of determination of guilt and sentence at the hand of criminal justice system is something which is perplexing for the Court when it comes to fair trial. The situation is accentuated due to the inherent imperfections of the system in terms of delay, mounting cost of litigation in High Courts and apex court, legal aid and access to courts and inarticulate information on socio-economic and criminological context of crimes. In such a context, some of the leading commentators on death penalty hold the view that it is invariably the marginalized and destitute who suffer the extreme penalty ultimately. [Para 18] [1181-D-E]

State of Haryana v. Sher Singh and Ors. 1981 (2) SCC 300; State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 184; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 631; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sahai and Ors. 1982 (1) SCC 352; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suresh alias Chhavan and Ors. 1981 (3) SCC 635, relied on.

Amnesty International report titled " Lethan Lottery: The Death Penalty in India - A Study of Supreme Court Judgments in Death Penalty Cases 1950-2006.

7. One of the accused in the instant case was acquitted in December 2003 by the High Court. It has been more than 8 years since he was freed in relation to the matter at hand. At this juncture, this becomes a relevant factor. [Para 19] [1181-F-G]

State of Maharashtra v. Manglya Dhavu Kongil AIR 1972 SC 1797; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh and Ors. AIR 1978 SC 19, relied on.

8. The alleged criminal history of the accused had a mojor bearing on the imposition of the death sentence by the trial court on the three accused. This is why he had erred in this respect. Nothing has been brought on behalf of the State that the criminal trials that had been pending against the accused had resulted in their conviction. Unless the same is shown by documents on records, presumption would be to the contrary. Presumption of innocence is a human right. The trial judge should also have presumed the same against all the three accused. The trial court has brought on record various irrelevant and invidious considerations with respect to sentencing. [Paras 26, 27 and 28] [1184-A-E]

9. The High Court had acquitted both accused 5 and 6. If at least one of the courts below had acquitted the accused person in respect of the crimes for which they are to be sentenced, the burden on the prosecution would be even more heavier, which the State has not been able to discharge. [Para 29] [1184-G-H]

10. If a person sentenced to imprisonment, even if it be for life, and subsequently it is found that he was innocent and was wrongly convicted he can be set free. Such a reversal is not possible where a person has been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. The execution of the sentence of death in such cases makes miscarriage of justice irrevocable. It is a finality which cannot be corrected. [Para 30] [1185-A-B]

11. Once accused 5 and 6 have been sentenced to life, there remains no question of awarding a death sentence to accused 7, who had played no greater a role in the said incident as accused 5, and 6. All the three accused stand on an equal footing and therefore the sentences to be imposed upon them must not differ. [Para 31] [1185-C-D]

State of Punjab v. Manjit Singh and Ors. 2009 (8) SCALE 622; Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat 2009 (6) SCALE 469 referred to.

Case Law Reference:

Judgment of Mukundakam Sharma, J.:

(1999) 5 SCC 253 Relied on. Paras 59

and 85

(2002) 5 SCC 234 Relied on. Para 60

(2003) 9 SCC 673 Relied on. Para 61

(2007) 2 SCC 310 Relied on. Para 76

(2001) 10 SCC 109 Relied on. Para 84

(1972) 2 SCC 194 Relied on. Para 89

Judgment of S.B. Sinha, J.:

1980 (2) SCC 684 Relied on. Para 6

Referred to. Para 10

2009 (7) SCALE 341 Relied on. Para 6

Referred to. Para 10

2006 (13) SCALE 467 Referred to. Para 7

2008 (10) SCALE 669 Referred to. Para 7

2000 (1) SCC 471 Referred to. Para 9

AIR 1999 SC 3700 Referred to. Para 13

2002 (5) SCC 234 Referred to. Para 14

AIR 1988 SC 1785 Referred to. Para 15

2000 (1) SCC 471 Referred to. Para 16

2000 (4) SCC 515 Referred to. Para 16

2000 (6) SCC 269 Referred to. Para 16

AIR 2002 SC 16 Referred to. Para 16

2003 (8) SCC 224 Referred to. Para 16

AIR 2003 SC 886 Referred to. Para 16

AIR 2005 SC 1000 Referred to. Para 16

AIR 1972 SC 1797 Relied on. Para 19

AIR 1978 SC 191 Relied on. Para 20

1981 (2) SCC 300 Relied on. Para 20

AIR 1980 SC 184 Relied on. Para 20

AIR 1981 SC 631 Relied on. Para 20

1982 (1) SCC 352 Relied on. Para 20

1981 (3) SCC 635 Relied on. Para 20

2009 (8) SCALE 622 Referred to. Para 21

2009 (6) SCALE 469 Referred to. Para 22

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 85-86 of 2006.

From the Judgment & Order dated 17.12.2003 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal Nos. 679 & 758 of 2000. WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 87 of 2006.

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 91-94 of 2006.

Zafar Sadique, Asghar Khan, Balraj Dewan, Vivekanand Rana for the Appellants.

Madhuri Divan, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Dr. Rajeev B. Masoodkar (A.C.),

K.M.M. Khan N.R. Ramkumar, Varinder Kumar Sharma for the Respondent.