S.R. Singh, J.
Petitioner herein was suspended from service by means of the order dated 27.2.97 with retroactive effect from 17.2.97. The reason listed out in the impugned order is that the petitioner was incarcerated in jail with effect from the said date, being involved in Case Crime No. 120 of 1997 under Sections 498A/304B, 318/201. I.P.C.
2. The suspension order reads as under :
"Whereas Sri Rajendra Prasad Pandey, Lower Division Assistant, Second Appeal Section, High Court, Allahabad was lodged in Jail with effect from 17.2.1997 in connection with a Criminal Case No. 120/97, under Section 498A/304B/318/201 of Indian Penal Code, He is accordingly placed under suspension with effect from 17.2.1997. He will be entitled for subsistence allowance as admissible in the relevant Rules."
On being enlarged on bail in June, 1997, the petitioner, it seems, moved an application seeking revocation/modification of the suspension order propped up by Full Bench decision of this Court in Chandra Shekhar Saxena v. Director of Education (Basic) U. P. Lucknow and another, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 165, in which following amongst other conclusions were arrived at by the Full Bench in answer to the questions referred to it :
"(D) The deemed suspension by an order of the appointing authority under the legal fiction provided in sub-rule (2) may be continued after release by the appointing authority by passing an express order taking into account the guidelines provided in other sub-rule of Rule 49A according to the facts and circumstances of the case,
(E) The deemed suspension under sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A may be modified or revoked by the appointing authority on a representation made by the Government servant which shall be considered and decided taking into consideration the guidelines provided in sub-rules (1) and (1A) of Rule 49A."
The representation ended up in being rejected by the Registrar vide order dated 8.1.1998, which has been communicated to the petitioner by means of the impugned order dated 15.1.1998. Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for the respondents produced the original record containing the order dated 8.1.1998. The order dated 8.1.1998, passed by the Registrar is quoted below :
"Sri Rajendra Prasad Pandey, L.D.A. who was detained in Crime Case No. 120/97 under Sections 498A. 304B. 318 and 201, I.P.C. P. S. Colonelganj Allahabad for the period from 17.2.1997 to 25.5.1997. He was placed under suspension vide the order dated 27.2.1997. He has now made representation referring the provisions as contained in sub-rules (1) and (1A) of Rule 49A of the U. P. (Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and also the judicial pronouncement made by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Chandra Shekhar Saxena v. Director of Education (Basic) U. P. Lucknow and another, 1997 (1) UPLBEC 165 (FB), wherein it was held that the deemed suspension under Rules 49A (2) (a) and 49A (2) (b) shall be limited only till to the period of detention. Under such circumstances, request has been made by him that since he was suspended under the aforesaid rule and so it should be deemed that his suspension order has already been revoked as soon as he has been released on bail by the Court. The case cited by Sri Rajendra Prasad Pandey is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of his case because in his case vide office Memorandum No. 945/Accounts (A-1) dated 27.2.1997 separate suspension order was passed considering not only deemed to have been placed under suspension. Looking to the gravity and the seriousness of the offence. It is not a fit case where the suspension order be revoked.
No further action is required in the matter."
3. The submission made by Sri A. P. Sahi is two-fold. Firstly that the suspension order sought to be revoked is essentially a communication of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A of the C.C.A. Rules, 1930 and the Registrar fell into error in holding that the case of Chandra Shekhar Saxena was not applicable ; secondly, that in any view of the matter, the provisions of sub-rule (1A) of Rule 49A of the C.C.A. Rules were attracted and the order dated 8.1.1998 having been passed sans proper-self-direction as to whether the indictment against the petitioner is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude, has rendered itself ultra wires. In reply, Sri Sunil Ambwani, appearing for the Opposite Parties, brought to bear the submissions that having regard to the gravity and seriousness of the offences, the Registrar has rightly held that it was not a fit case where suspension order could be revoked.
4. I have bestowed my anxious considerations to the submissions made across the bar. From the language in which the suspension order is couched, it is abundantly clear that the order placing the petitioner under suspension does not appear to have been passed because an enquiry was 'contemplated' or 'proceeding' against his conduct as visualised by sub-rule (1) of Rule 49A of the C.C.A. Rules. Rather, the suspension order appears to have been passed because the petitioner was incarcerated in Jail with effect from 17.2.1997 for the offences in Case Crime No. 120 of 1997 under Sections 498A, 304B, 318 and 201, I.P.C. The suspension has been ordered with retroactive effect, i.e., from 17.2.1997 which is the date on which the petitioner was taken into custody in connection with the aforestated criminal case. The legal position well-settled is that suspension cannot be ordered with retrospective effect and it is by virtue of sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A of the C.C.A. Rules that. retrospective operation has been imparted to the suspension order Inasmuch as sub-rule (2) clearly postulates that a Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed or, as the case may be, continued to be placed under suspension by an order of the Appointing Authority with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. A deemed suspension as visualised by sub-rule [2) takes effect by operation of law and no order need be passed in that regard. However, if an order comes to be passed by the Appointing Authority, placing a Government servant under suspension with effect from the date of his detention, while he is still in jail, such an order would be tantamount to an order communicating the deemed suspension. The order dated 27.2.1997 was, certainly not an order for the petitioner to be 'continued' under suspension for that situation could arise only if an order to that effect, had been passed after the petitioner was enlarged from jail. In my opinion, therefore, the order placing the petitioner under suspension was substantially and essentially a communication of deemed suspension within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A particularly in the absence of any stipulation therein to the effect that the petitioner would remain under suspension "until the termination of all proceedings relating to the criminal charge". Even otherwise, any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have been continued, can be modified or revoked by the Appointing Authority as visualised by sub-rule (5) of Rule 49A and as held by the Full Bench in the case aforestated. The Registrar in the above conspectus wandered off into error in holding that the Full Bench decision in the case of C. S. Saxena (supra) was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
5. Coming down to the second limb of the argument advanced by Sri A. P. Sahi, I am persuaded to the view that the Appointing Authority was right, in the galaxy of the facts and material on record, in holding that 'regard being had to the gravity and the seriousness of the offence, it was not a fit case where the suspension order could be revoked. In the considered opinion of the Court, the order dated 8.1.98 cannot be said to have been passed sans application of mind to any relevant material or on consideration of any irrelevant material. Concededly, the criminal charge against the petitioner is not connected with his position as a Government servant. Still if the charge is such as is likely to embarrass the petitioner in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude, the order refusing to revoke the suspension being discretionary would not be liable to be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the absence of any mitigating circumstances being brought on record.
6. The expression 'moral turpitude' has not been nailed down to the rules. "Moral turpitude", as held by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, JT 1996 (5) SC 155, "is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved, or having any connection showing depravity." Killing a person per se may not come within the periphery of 'moral turpitude' but subjecting a woman to cruelty and/or killing her for or in connection with demand of dowry, would certainly be an offence involving 'moral turpitude'. The expression 'moral turpitude' is not a term of a rigid connotation to be defined in any strait-jacket formula, but regard being had to socio-ethical ethos, and mores of a people, at a given time and their cultural heritage, it would not be difficult for the Courts to conclude if a particular offence involves moral wickedness. According to American Encyclopaedia of Law, anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals, an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or society in general ; any thing contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Involves moral turpitude. In Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, AIR 1959 All, 71. It was held :
"The expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore, the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another Individual or to the society in general to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man."
7. In Mangali v. Chhakki Lal AIR 1963 All. 527, the term 'moral turpitude' was explained as under :
"From consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words 'moral' and 'turpitude' as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. It is not every punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Had that been so, the qualification "involving moral turpitude" would not have been used by the Legislature and it would have disqualified every person who had been convicted of any offence. The tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appear to be : (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general. (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society."
8. Judging on the anvil of the principles and guidelines discussed above. I veer round the view that the criminal charge against the petitioner involves moral turpitude. I may hasten to add that it is the fundamental duty of every citizen "to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women" as per Article 51A of the Constitution. The charge against the petitioner besides being punishable, is "derogatory to the dignity of women". It is true that the Registrar in his order dated 8.1.98 has not stated that it was not a fit case for re vocation/modification of suspension order because it involved charge of moral turpitude, but on the administration file, produced before the Court, there is a report dated 5.4.98 scripted by Officer On Special Duty (Establishment) that the petitioner "is involved in serious criminal case, which comes into moral turpitude". The report forms part of the record on consideration of which the Registrar in his order dated 8.1.98 held : "Looking to the gravity and seriousness of the offence, it is not a fit case where the suspension order be revoked". It is worthwhile to quip here that no extenuating material was brought to bear on the record by the petitioner, articulating any doubt about his involvement in the criminal case nor was any material placed by him pointing to the fact that prima facie dowry related offence punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 318 and 201, I.P.C. was not made out. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, the contention does not commend itself for acceptance that the suspension order has been passed sans proper-self-direction as to whether the indictment against the petitioner in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The second submission made by Sri A. P. Sahi, therefore, cannot be accepted and in the back-drop of the entire facts and circumstances of the case. I do not feel called to Interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution at this stage.
9. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition fails and is dismissed, the petitioner is, however, given liberty to move a fresh application, if so advised, if he finds any mitigating circumstances in the charge-sheet submitted in the criminal case before the Registrar for consideration afresh in the light of the above observations.