ORDER

JUDGMENT

1. The Writ Petition is filed seeking writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents not to permit the 5th respondent to set up Rice Mill at Akiveedu village or any other place within the residential area of Akiveedu Gram Panchayat by setting aside the resolution passed by the 1st respondent Gram Panchayat dated 19-10-1996 as also the permission granted by the 3rd and 4th respondent dated 15-9-1996 and 25-4-1996 respectively.

2. According to the averments in the Writ Petition- the permission was given by the authorities for construction of the Rice Mill in the residential area of Akiveedu Gram Panchayat where there are pucca residential houses. Further, the 1st petitioner obtained permission for construction of a hospital and they also have residential house in that area The 5th respondent was proposing to construct a Rice Mill in S.No.334/12,334/13,335/1 and 335/2 of Akiveedu village abutting the Kalavapudi- Ganapavaram Road with 74 H.P. Electric Motor and 82.5 KVH Generator. Coming to know such a proposal by the 5th respondent they made complaints to the District Collector and other authorities, but there was no response- It is the case of the petitioners that the Medical Officer of Mandal Primary Health Centre inspected the site and found that the establishment of Rice Mill was objectionable. A resolution was passed by the Gram Panchayat on 19-10-1996 and consequently, the permission was granted to the 5th respondent to construct the Rice Mill. It is stated that the permission was contrary to G.O.Ms.No.63 dated 2-5-1995, as it prohibits the setting-up of a Rice Mill in the residential areas. Further, there are all residential houses abutting the Rice Mill. Lions Club had constructed an Auditorium and Public School is existing in that area. If the Rice Mill is allowed to be constructed, it creates nuisance, health hazards. Therefore, petitioners seek appropriate directions.

3. While admitting the Writ Petition, interim stay was granted, but subsequently, the directions were modified to the effect that it is open for the 5th respondent to construct a Rice Mill at his peril.

4. Counters have been filed by the Gram Panchayat and the 5th respondent and also the Government.

5. The 1st respondent in the counter stated that there were no residential houses nearby the place proposed for construction of Rice Mill by the 5th respondent. All the survey numbers mentioned are all agricultural lands and they have not been converted into residential area, it is the case of the 1st respondent that the petitioner is running a Nursing Home in the village itself Petitioners No.2 to 5 are residing in the Industrial area, Petitioners No.6 and 7 are the encroachers on the P.W.D1 and Petitioner No.8 is the wife of the 1st petitioner, Petitioner No.9 and 10 have no house sites within the Gram Panchayat limits. 5th respondent made an application in March,1996. Technical approval was granted on 15-4-1996 and the 4th respondent directed the Gram Panchayat to grant permission duly incorporating the conditions. Basing on the clearance issued by the Inspector of Factories and also the Regional Dy. Director for Town & Country Planning, Rajahmundry, the Gram Panchayat has considered the matter and passed the resolution granting permission to construct the Rice Mill by the 5th respondent. With regard to the permission by the medical authorities, it is stated that in view of G.O.Ms. No.9 dated 10-1-1994 and 385 dated 29-6-1994 and 316 dated 20-6-1994, the permission is required under Section 125(4)(b) of A.P. Gram Panchayat Act could be dispensed with The Gram Panchayat granted the permission which is valid and is in accordance with law. It is also the case of the Gram Panchayat that no objections were received after the permission was granted. The proposed Rice Mill was Binny Modem Rice Mill and therefore, there will not be any nuisance or health hazards, as the dust would not emanate from the Rice Mill. It is the further case that is was only after all other concerned authorities granted clearances, the Gram Panchayat has permitted them. When the technical permission and the permission by the Town and Country Planning authorities were granted by the competent authorities, there should not be any impediment for the Gram Panchayat to grant permission to construct the Rice Mill.

6. The District Medical and Health Officer also filed counter affidavit. It is also his case that the Reserve M.P.H.E.O. was deputed to inspect the site and report the physical features. The said Officer had reported that the shed is ready for installation of the machinery. That there is a vacant site in which RCC Pipe Industry was running. There was one Yoga building and Primary Schools adjacent to the site, two irrigation channels are there. About 11 dwelling houses are existing on the road margin in the agricultural fields. From the Public Health point of view, it is stated that the establishment of Rice Mill will be a source of nuisance and it is objectionable. Additional plea was raised by the petitioner to the effect that under Sections 89 and 92 of the A.P. Public Health Act each area in the village has to be demarcated for the residential purposes and until such time the demarcation takes place, nobody is permitted to establish the industries. Therefore, the Gram Panchayat is not entitled to grant permission for construction of a Rich Mill in the residential area.

7. On a query raised by the Court whether any notification has been issued by the Gram Panchayat converting the lands in question into residential area, it is stated that the Gram Panchayat has not issued any notification so far from the inception converting of land into residential area.

8. The issue that arises for consideration is whether the resolution of the Gram Panchayat in permitting the petitioner to establish a Rice Mill is within its jurisdiction?

9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Raju made elaborate arguments touching the provision of A.P, Public Health Act and the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, which repealed the A.P.Gram Panchayat Act. He submits that under Section 89 of A.P. Public Health Act, the duty is cast on the authorities to declare the area in the village as residential area and it is only on such declaration the further action could be taken by the local authority for allowing the establishment of the Rice Mill, Secondly also he submits that under Section 125 of the repealed Gram Panchayat Act, the Gram Panchayat is entitled to grant permission for construction of the Industrial Units in accordance with the procedure contained therein and such a procedure has not been followed. He submits that even though the said provision has been repealed under the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, yet by virtue of protection given in Section 66, the Rules made under Section 125 of the repealed Act would continue to hold the field inasmuch as no new Rules were framed under Section 120 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, Therefore, he submits that the permission of the Public Health Authority is necessary and the action of the Respondents is wholly illegal and arbitrary. He also submits that the establishment of rice mill in the residential area is prohibited and the Government issued various G.Os directing that the permission for establishment of the industries should not be given in the residential area. He also submits that on account of pollution which may emanate from the Rice Mill would cause any amount of health hazards to the residents. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the 5th respondent submits that the application of the 5th respondent for establishing the Rice Mill was referred to the Town Planning Authorities and also the Factories Authorities and both the authorities have given concurrence subject to certain conditions. Even the District Industries Centre also granted permission. Basing on this permission the Gram Panchayat has considered the matter and passed resolution permitting the petitioner to establish the Rice Mill. It is also the case of the 5th respondent that the 1st petitioner has been acting to the detriment of the interest of the 5th respondent. Even though the 1st petitioner obtained permission for construction of hospital he never made any attempt to construct the hospital and on the other hand he has been trying to interfere with the establishment of the Rice Mill by the 5th respondent. He also submits that the petitioner No. 1 and his wife i.e 8th petitioner purchased about 40 cents of the land from the 5th respondent which is adjacent to the place proposed for construction of the Rice Mill and they have leased out the place where the R.C.C. Pipes Factory is now functioning. It is also stated that there are two rice mills and other industries around the place where the present Rice Mill is sought to be established. Further, it is stated that the area is predominantly is an agricultural area and only some of the huts are existing which are constructed without valid permissions. Even otherwise, it is stated that so long as the permission is granted by the competent authorities it would not be open for the petitioners to make any objections. It is also sought to be contended that the petitioners can file an appeal before the appropriate authority as required under the Act. Further the learned Counsel for the 5th respondent also says that the Writ Petition is beyond time and it has to be dismissed on the question of laches. The petitioner is a rival business person and he cannot be said to be person aggrieved and hence he has no locus standi as held by the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the case reported in M.I. Varghese v. The Chattssery Panchayat, (FB), He further submits that the Sub-Registrar has also issued a certificate to the effect that the Survey Numbers in which the 5 In respondent is proposed to construct a Rice Mill, is an industrial zone and not residential zones.

10. The learned Counsel for the Gram Panchayat submits that the action taken by it is quite legal and valid and it cannot be assailed.

11. Though the petitioners did not make reference to Sections 89 and 92 of the A.P. Public Health Act, yet by way of additional affidavit, he has sought to stress this point. But, however, for the proper appreciation of the case, let us consider the said provision. Sections 89 and 92 are extracted below:

"89(1) Every urban local authority shall, within one year from the commencement of this Act or within such further time as the Government may allow in the case of any such authority, notify in the prescribed manner the localities, divisions, wards, streets or portions of streets in its local area which shall be reserved for residential purposes.

(2) An urban local authority may, at any time subsequent to the issue of a notification under sub-section(1), notify additional localities, divisions,wards,streets,or portions of streets, as areas which shall be reserved for residential purposes.

(3) A notification issued under sub-seclion(1) or sub-section(2) may declare that operations in any factory, workshop or workplace in existence at the time when it comes into force, or that the continuance of any offensive trade carried on by any person at such time, shall be subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be specified in the notification.

92. Upon the issue of a notification under Section 89, the following consequences shall ensue, namely:

(a) The construction or establishment of any new factory, workshop or workplace, or the carrying on any new offensive trade in the areas specified in the notification shall be absolutely prohibited.

(b) In the case of any factory, workshop or workplace in existence at the time when the notification comes into force or of any offensive trade in existence at such time, the restrictions, limitations, and conditions, if any specified in the notification, shall be observed in the areas aforesaid.

Explanation (1) :-If work in any factory, workshop, or workplace existing at the time when the notification under Section 89 comes into force or any offensive trade carried on by any person at such time ceases to be carried on for a continuous period of not less than one year, the resumption of work in such factory, workshop, or workplace of such offensive trade, as the case may be, shall, unless the Government otherwise order, be deemed to be absolutely prohibited under clause (1).

Explanation (2) :--In the case referred to in explanation (1),where the period exceeds six months but does not extend to one year, work in the factory, workshop or workplace or the offensive trade, as the case may be, shall not be resumed without the written permission of the Health Officer, unless the Government otherwise order".

12. From the reading of the above sections, it is evident that the local authority has to issue notification reserving certain area of the land for residential purposes. The regulation of permission for certain industries is also covered by Section 92 for which a permission is necessary. We need not go into the provisions of the A.P. Public Health Act, inasmuch as, the application has been made by the 5th respondent for grant of permission under the provisions of A.P.Panchayat Raj Act. Therefore, I find that reference to Sections 89 and 92 is wholly irrelevant and unwarranted.

13. The learned senior Counsel for the 5th respondent also urges that the petitioners cannot be said to be aggrieved persons and in the guise of public interest litigation the petitioners cannot be allowed to claim standing. He further submits that petitioner No. 1 and his wife 8th petitioner which have substantial vested interest in the issue have filed the writ petition by adding other persons to colour the litigation as public interest litigation alleging violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India If at all the petitioners No. 1 and 8 are aggrieved it is open for them to file Revision before the Government under Section 264 of the Act. To circumvent the said hurdle the present writ Petition has been filed in the garb of public interest litigation. The learned senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court reported in M.I. Varghese 's case (supra), wherein it is held that the right to carry on (he trade is under Article 19(i) (g) of the Constitution of India, the same could not be challenged by way of Writ Petition not only be a rival trade objector, but also by a mere objector, who has been given statutory right to object under Section 97 of the Panchayat Raj Act. Such a statutory right of objection was not sufficient to found a claim for locus standi to maintain a Writ petition.

14. Let us now consider the 'locus stand? of the petitioners to file the Writ Petition. There is no dispute about the proposition that to have 'locus standi' to move the Court, one must show some of his legal rights or interest is infringed, threatened or clouded. The traditional view was based on the theory that the Courts have to give relief to the individuals seeking redress of a private wrongs done to them. Legal right has been understood to mean a private law right, such as to property or right to relief against a tort committed against the individuals. The infraction of such a right constitutes a legal injury or wrong remediable under Rules of Private Law. Injury to Public Interest is however different from injury to private interest, but at the same time, the public, interest cannot be disassociated from the interest of the individual because it is the mere total of the interest of the individuals. The question of 'Standing' in case of injury to public interest has been considered by the Courts time and again. The orthodox view proved to be an inadequate remedy during the course of time and liberalising trends had taken roots in the system. The Courts have now recognised that whenever the public interest is involved a public law is violated, a member of public should have a say and thus they have the 'locus standi' to agitate the matter. The Courts felt that even a member of a Public who has sufficient interest in the matter should be accorded 'locus stand? for relief In Bar Council of Maharashra v. M V.Dabhalkar, , it was observed that the phrase 'person aggrieved' needs more liberal approach in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under Advocates Act is comparable to the role-of a guardian in professional ethics. It was held that the Bar Council was a person aggrieved because the Bar Council represented the collective functions of a standard of professional conduct and is protector of the purity and dignity of the profession; and if any decision prejudiced the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics, the Bar Council will have a grievance. But, however, the existence of 'locus stand? depends on various factors i.e. the statute and its message, social conditions and scheme of the legislation in the social context, even though the locus standi has been liberalised. In Fertilizer Corporation, Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344, the Supreme Court observed that if public properly is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the public or atleast a section of public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations. The public enterprises are owned by the people and those who run them are accountable to the people. Justice Krishna Iyer stated "Law as I conceive it, is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action only when someone with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction'. He further elaborated'' if a citizen is no more than a way fairer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond that belongs to any one of 660 million people of this country, the door of the Court will not be ajar for him. But, if he belongs to an organistion which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busy body, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered.

15. In S.P.Gupta v. Union of India, (popularly known as Judges transfer case), 'standing' was made available in cases wherein either the individual or the determinate class or group of persons had suffered a legal injury. The Supreme Court pointed out that there may be cases where the State or public authority have acted in gross violation of the constitutional or statutory obligations resulting an injury to public interest. When the question was as to who would have locus standi to complain against such act or omission of the State or public authority, the Court observed that," if no one is allowed to maintain an action for redressal of such public injury or public wrong, it would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to state or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it, Justice Bhagwati observed that "the Courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened".

16. Thus, it is made clear in Judges case that "whenever there is a public wrong or public injury, caused by an act or omission of the State or public authority, which is contrary to the Constitution or Law, any member of public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The Court held that, "the strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busybody or a meddle some interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding". This view was felt essential for maintaining the rule of law and to further the case of justice and accelerating peace of realisation of the constitutional objective. But, however, a warning came from the Court that this remedy is available only for those who are acting bow fide and not for personal gains or political motivation or other oblique consideration.

17. Number of cases have stemmed upon the principles set out in the Judges case. The relaxation of locus standi principle is referable to public interest litigation which can be traced through important decisions of the Supreme Court, namely S.P.Gupta's case (supra), Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, , Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,

and subsequent catena of decisions. The Supreme Court declared that public interest litigation is a strategic arm of legal aid movement and it is intended to bring justice within the reach of poor masses who constitute low feasibility of humanity. Thus, the public interest litigation is not in the nature of adversorial litigation, but essentially cooperative or collaborative effect on the part of the petitioners, the State and public authority and the Court to secure observance of the consistutional or legal benefits and previleges confensed upon the vulnerable section of community and to reach social justice to them.

18. Thus, the social welfare organisations, Journalists, Lawyers, social reformers, social activites have come forward to move petitions on behalf of indegent, helpless, poor masses and they were granted standing.

19. Whether the petitioners have 'standing' to file the writ petition and whether the present petition can be traceable to public interest litigation Admittedly, the 1st petitioner and the 8th petitioner (wife of 1st petitioner) have a Nursing Home in the midst of Akiveedu and they do not have any house near the site proposed for Rice Mill, they purchased 40 cents of land from the 5th respondent for purpose of construction of hospital. This land is situate by the side of the land where the Rice Mill is proposed to be contracted. It also appears that they obtained permission for construction of hospital, but however it was leased for a cement pipe manufacturing industry. The learned Counsel for the petitioner categorically submits that since the Rice Mill construction was permitted, the petitioners did not construct the hospital. This itself manifests that they have business interest. Petitioners No.2 to 5 are residing in industrial area, petitioners No.6 and 7 are slaying on the road margins and PWD land, Petitioners No.9 and 10 have no house sites. Thus, for all practical purposes petitioner No. 1 and 8 are only ostensibly championing the alleged cause of public injury. A private dispute or a Us generated for personal ends cannot be treated as public cause simply because the petitioner adds some more persons as supporters to the cause. Public cause ought to be real and bona fide uncoupled with extraneous factors. Public Interest Litigation is not meant for resolving inter se disputes and it cannot be permitted to be expensed by persons who have an axe to grind against the opposite party. It was ruled in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578, that the proprietor of a cinema theatre hodling a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is not entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justice, to get a 'No-objection Certificate', granted under the rules, in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction. We may extract paras 48 to 50:

"48. It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ'' petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other well-established self devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money.

"49. While a Procrusteen approach should be avoided, as a rule, the Court should not interfere at the instance of a 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger', and not a busy body, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2 which they have under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law.

50. The instant case falls well-neigh within the ratio of this Court's decision in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda, wherein it was held that a Rice Mill-owner has no

locus standi to challenge under Article 226 the setting up of a new Rice Mill by another - even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8(3) (c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958-because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed."

The Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.116/1998 dated 4-2-1998 following the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. P. Anand v. H.D.Deva Gowda., , held that the Courts should

exercise circumspection before entertaining public interest litigation. It further held that there should be effectuation of right of public at large and individual rights cannot form subject matter of public interest litigation. Thus I find no public interest is involved and that the writ petition lacks bona fides and 'standing'. Accordingly, I hold that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the writ petition.

20. Even on merits also we are unable to find fault with the action of the Gram Panchayat. We may now consider the effect of Section 120 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Section 125 of erstwhile Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 to locate any infraction of the statutory provisions. Section 120 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 reads thus:

"Applications to be made for construction establishment, or installation of factory, workshop or work-place in which steam or other power is to be employed:

(1) Every person intending,

(a) to construct or establish any factory, workshop or work-place in which it is proposed to employ steam-power water-power or other mechanical power or electrical-power; or

(b) to install in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by steam, water or other power as aforesaid, not being machinery or manufacturing plant exempted by rules made in this behalf, shall, before beginning such construction, establishment or installation, obtain the permission of the Gram Panchayat in the prescribed manner for undertaking the intended work.

(2) The application to be made under sub-section(1) shall conform to such rules and shall be processed in such manner and in consultation with and approval of such authorities and subject to such conditions as maybe prescribed."

Section 125 of A. P. Gram Panchayat Act, is extracted thus:

"Applications to be made for construction establishment or installation of factory workshop or work place in which steam or other power is to be employed:

(1) XXXX XXXX XXXX

(2) XXXX XXXX XXXX

(3) XXXX XXXX XXXX

(4) Before granting permission under subsection (3) the Gram Panchayat:

(a) shall obtain the approval of the Inspector of Factories appointed under the Factories Act, 1948, having jurisdiction in the village, or if there is more than one such inspector, of the Inspector designated by the Government in this behalf by general or special order, as regards the plan of the factory, work-shop work-place or premises with reference to-

(i) the adequacy of the provision for ventilation and light

(ii) the sufficiency of the height and dimensions of the rooms and doors

(iii) the suitability of the exits to be used in case of fire and

(iv) such other matters as may be prescribed:

(b) shall consult and have regard to the opinion of such officer of the Medical and Health Departments as the Government may, from time to time, by order specify, as regards the suitability of the site of the factory, work-shop, work-place or premises, for the purpose specified in the application; and

(c) shall obtain the approval of the Director of Town Planning as regards(i) the suitability and adequacy of the site of the factor, work-shop,work-place or premises for the purpose, and (ii) the laying out arrangements and architectural appearance of buildings."

21. Under Section 125 of the erstwhile Gram Panchayat Act, the opinion of the medical authority was necessary, but since that provision has been repealed necessarily, we have to only rely on only Section 120 of the Act. The learned Counsel for both the parlies stated that no Rules are framed under Section 125 of A. P. Gram Panchayat Act and under Section 120 A.P.Panchayat Raj Act. But, the Government have issued certain guidelines with regard to the grant of permission for establishment of industry under the erstwhile Section 125 of Gram Panchayat Act. In G.O.Ms.No.9 dated 10-1-1995 it was stated that under Section 125 of the Act, the opinion of the Medical and Health Department was necessary for assessing the suitability of the site of the Factory, workshop etc. But, however, in view of the subsequent enactment namely Environment Pollution Act and establishment of AP. Pollution Control Board, which takes care of the pollution in the area, the certificate of medical and health department was dispensed with. The certificate was required under Section 125(4) (b) of the Act, pending the amendment. Thus, the Government, in view of the provisions of the Environment Pollution Act, and pending amendment to the Gram Panchayat Act, the certificate of Medical Officer was dispensed with. Subsequently, G.O.Ms. No.366 dated 20-6-1994 was issued dispensing with the certificate in Gram Panchayat in respect of Industrial Estates, Industrial Development Areas/Growth Centres/Developed/Being Developed by Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited etc. for grant of permission in industrial areas for setting up of Industries by the Enterprenuers, pending issue of Rules under Section 127 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act. Thus by this G.O. it was made clear by the Government that insistance of certificate by Medical and Health Department was not necessary pending the framing of Rules. Further, the Government issued G.O.Ms. No.63, dated 2-5-1995. The Government alter consideration of the various proposals sent by the Commissioner, directed that all Small Scale and Tiny Industries operating upto 30 H.P and employing upto 30 persons be exempted from obtaining clearance/approval under the Panchayat/Municipality as the case may be, Director of Town Planning and Director of Factories. However, this clearance was subject to the condition that in the Gram Panchayat the Small Scale Industries should not be set up in the residential areas. Therefore, the learned Counsel relying on this G.O. submits that the Gram Panchayal cannot grant permission for establishment of Rice Mill in the residential area. The very moot question is whether the area is a residential area. The Gram Panchayat has categorically stated that there are fields and only some huts were existing and the area is not fully developed. Moreover, the Town Planning authorities and the Factories Authorities have considered this aspect-also and granted permission subject to certain conditions duly safeguarding the interest of the Health and Environment Such conditions were prescribed by the Director of the Factories in letter dated: 15-4-1996. It is also pertinent that a Commissioner was appointed to know the physical features but he could not complete the same. There is also no provision under the Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 for earmarking the residential, non-residential and industrial areas. But the Sub-Registrar of the area has issued a clarification that it falls in the industrial area.

22. The Panchayat Raj Act repealed the A.P. Gram Panchayat Act and consequently Section 8 to 18 of the A.P. General Clauses was made to apply. If any rules were framed under Section 125 of the Gram Panchayat Act, the same could have held the field till such time new rules were framed under Section 120 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act. Moreover, the Competent Officer under the Town Planning Act and the Factory Authority under the Factories Act have already cleared the application of the 5th respondent for establishing a Rice Mill. That itself would establish that the authorities have taken care to see that no nuisance or any interference to the public health is caused by establishing such a Rice Mill. Though G.O.Ms.No. 63 stipulates that the permission should not be given for establishing industries in the residential areas in the Gram Panchayat, yet the fact that the proposed Rice Mill is situated in the fields along with the water channels, not en-circled by any buildings would itself indicate that it is not a residential area. The Gram Panchayat has only stated that there are some huts and some encroachers for which no permission was given. It is also to be noted that the 1st petitioner and the 8th petitioner are running a Nursing Home in the village itself and though they have taken permission to construct a hospital they have not made any construction so far. The learned Counsel submits that because the Rice Mill was permitted by the authorities establishment of hospital would be detrimental to the interest of the patients. Therefore, they have not commenced the construction, it is only after the permission to the Rice Mill is cancelled, they would start the construction of the hospitals. I am not inclined to go into this hypothetical question. The issue is whether a permission could be granting. Having regard to the facts and circumstances. I find that the action of the Gram Panchayat in permitting the establishment of Rice Mill by the 5th respondent cannot be said to be illegal and contrary to the provisions of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994.

23. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merits in the writ petition, Accordingly the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.