1. The assessee is the petitioner in the above tax revision case. The assessee was carrying on business in chemicals and for the assessment year 1977-78, though he returned a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 43,99,134 and Rs. 29,09,064, respectively, on the basis of the materials secured on a surprise inspection of the shop, the accounts were rejected and making an addition, a best judgment assessment was made determining the total and taxable turnover of the assessee at Rs. 33,62,653 and Rs. 33,52,031, respectively. Penalty under section 12(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", was also levied. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the appellate authority, namely, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, what was disputed by the assessee was the quantum of addition of Rs. 3,82,572 on the basis of the materials secured from the inspection. The appellate authority, after considering the various contentions raised, while sustaining the addition and repelling the challenge to the turnover assessed by the best judgment assessment, cancelled the penalty levied under section 12(3) of the Act.
2. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a further appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal, though, repelled the challenge to the best judgment assessment made, reduced the turnover by Rs. 1,23,224 by adopting an average rate of Rs. 2 per kilogram as against Rs. 3 per kilogram adopted by the assessing officer in quantifying the turnover said to have been suppressed. In respect of a further submission made by the assessee that sodium nitrate sold by them falls under item 21(5) of the First Schedule and, therefore, was liable to tax at 3 1/2 per cent instead of 8 per cent as adopted by the assessing authority, the Tribunal rejected the claim on the ground that such a point was not raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who is the first appellate authority and that having regard to the decision of this Court reported in  46 STC 341 [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] the assessee cannot raise such a point for the first time before the Tribunal. At any rate in respect of a portion of the turnover to the tune of Rs. 86,400, which was the subject-matter of dispute before the first appellate authority as well as the Tribunal, the rate of 3 1/2 per cent as claimed was allowed to be raised and sustained. Not satisfied with the order of the Tribunal, the above tax revision case has been filed.
3. Mr. D. Pramod Chopda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the addition made on the basis of the materials secured on an inspection was not warranted. In addition, it was contended that the quantum of addition as made was excessive and unjustified. Learned counsel further contended that the fact that the point relating to the rate of taxation applicable was not raised before the first appellate authority does not really matter and that the assessee was entitled to raise it even before the Tribunal for the first time. Reliance for the petitioner was placed on the decisions reported in  51 STC 381 (Mad.) [FB] (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company),  57 STC 215 (Mad.) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyarelal Malhotra),  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) and  74 STC 303 (Mad.) [FB] (Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu).
4. The learned Additional Government Pleader (CT), referred to the decision reported in  14 STC 861 (State of Madras v. Voltas Limited Madras : No. 2) of a Division Bench of this Court and further contended that the decision reported in  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] squarely governs the issue in favour of the Revenue and the other decisions relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are not only distinguishable and besides the point, but have no force of a binding a precedent.
5. In Universal Radiators v. State of Tamil Nadu  33 STC 341 (Mad.), the assessee disputed the levy of tax in respect of a portion of a turnover on the ground that they really represented works contract and not transactions of sale both before the assessing authority as well as the first appellate authority. When a further appeal was filed before the Tribunal, in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, the assessee raised the only question whether the transactions were works contract or not. Later, at the time of hearing of the appeal, the assessee filed an application for leave to file the additional grounds that even if the turnover is held to represent the contracts of sale, the assessee having procured C forms from the purchasing dealers, he was entitled to the benefit of the concessional rate of tax. The Tribunal declined to grant leave to raise the additional grounds on the ground that it was filed beyond the time fixed for filing an appeal. When the matter came up before this Court, the view expressed was that the limitation prescribed under section 36 of the Act was only for filing appeals and it is not as if the assessee sought to bring a new or fresh turnover for attack by raising an additional ground. It was further held that in view of the fact that the assessee only sought to raise an additional ground in respect of a turnover which has already been questioned by him, this Court considered that the additional ground should have been allowed to be raised, and relegated the matter to the Tribunal for consideration afresh of the claim based on the additional ground based on the production of the C forms.
6. In Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar  46 STC 341 (Mad.), the assessee, who was a dealer in cotton and cotton-seeds was assessed to tax on best judgment. An addition of Rs. 50,000 was made towards the omission of sales of cotton-seeds. In the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the dispute related only to the addition of Rs. 50,000 and also the penalty that was levied in a sum of Rs. 1,326 and not in respect of any other turnover. The appeal was dismissed and thereupon the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the assessee disputed the two items of turnover assessed, viz., (1) the sum of Rs. 1,33,858.18 being the value of the closing stock as on March 31, 1963; and (2) the estimated addition towards suppression of cotton-seeds to the tune of Rs. 50,000. So far as the challenge relating to the sum of Rs. 1,33,858.18 is concerned, the Tribunal pointed out that under section 4 of the Act read with the Second Schedule thereto, the assessee was not liable to pay tax on purchases of cotton until the purchases acquired the quality of being the last purchase inside the State relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court which came to be subsequently reported in State of Madras v. Narayanaswami Naidu  21 STC 1. The Revenue challenged the same before this Court contending that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the assessee to agitate the dispute regarding the sum of Rs. 1,33,858.18 which was never in challenge before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the first appellate authority and that unless the point was agitated before the first appellate authority, the point could not have been the subject-matter of a dispute before the Appellate Tribunal. In a connected tax case also, which was dealt with in common, a similar issue arose for consideration and Sethuraman, J., came to the conclusion that the assessee could not raise any point for the first time before the Appellate Tribunal without raising it before the authorities below and an appeal of such a nature would not be competent at all and the Tribunal could not have dealt with such a point raised for the first time before it. The learned Judge relied upon the earlier decisions of this Court reported as Easun Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Government of Madras  33 STC 350, State of Madras v. Spencer and Company Limited  34 STC 249, State of Tamil Nadu v. K. R. and P. Shanmugavel Nadar  39 STC 391 and a Full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported as State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Venkata Rama Lingeshwara Rice Mill  39 STC 57 to come to such a conclusion. Balasubrahmanyan, J., who was a party to the said Bench, differed from the view taken by Sethuraman, J., and came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was competent to hear and decide the objection though raised for the first time before it. The matter was, therefore, referred to for decision by another learned Judge of this Court and thereupon the matter came up for hearing before Ramaprasada Rao, C.J., who concurred with the view expressed by Sethuraman, J., and differed from the view expressed by Balasubrahmanyan, J. Consequently, it was categorically laid down in the said decision that the assessee was not justified in raising a dispute for the first time before the Tribunal without raising such a dispute before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal was held to be in error in deciding such an issue. It was also held therein that the maintainability of an appeal is one thing and moulding the relief in an appeal in accordance with the supervening circumstances is another and that the powers of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal are not of the same amplitude as that conferred on the Appellate Tribunal functioning under the Income-tax Act.
7. The decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company  51 STC 381 (Mad.) related to two tax revision cases which were directed to be placed before a Full Bench for consideration. In one of the cases, though under rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, a declaration in form C shall be furnished to the prescribed authority up to the time of assessment by the first assessing authority, the assessee did not produce C forms before the assessing officer. The C forms were produced before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner at the time of appeal and the appellate authority declined to entertain the C forms at that stage. A further appeal before the Tribunal was made and the Tribunal received the C forms, set aside the order of assessment and remanded the matter. It is in that context the matter came up before this Court for consideration as to whether such a course was possible to be adopted. In the second on of the cases, the C forms as in the other case had not been filed by the assessee before the assessment was concluded. The assessment was taken in appeal and at the stage of appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee produced the C forms. On such production, the Tribunal entertained the C forms which had not been filed before the assessing authority and once again the question arose as to whether such a course is possible. Therefore, the matter was placed before the consideration of the Full Bench having regard to the earlier decision on the point reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Chellaram Garments (P.) Ltd.  44 STC 239 (Mad.). Balasubrahmanyan, J., who spoke for the Bench, came to the conclusion that the real question that was before the said Bench was as to whether the appellate authority has the same power as the assessing authority to allow further time for accepting the C forms and not how and by what process the assessing authority itself could exercise the power after the completion of the assessment. A careful consideration of the judgment goes to show that the entire discussions centered round the proviso to section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the scope of rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 and the power of the appellate authority to do in an appeal what the original authority itself could have done. None of the earlier judgments of this Court either reported in  46 STC 341 [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] or those considered and followed in the said judgment, have been either referred to or considered. Apparently, that was on account of the fact that an issue of the nature and in the form it arose before the Court which decided the case reported in  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] or the issue in the manner it is now raised before us, was never in the forefront or projected for consideration, except making a passing reference to section 36 of the Act and an observation that the Tribunal has the power under section 36 to set aside an assessment either in whole or in part and direct the assessing authority to redo the assessment.
8. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyarelal Malhotra  57 STC 215 (Mad.), the assessee purchased scrap locally, converted the same into M.S. rods and then sold the same locally. The local sales of M.S. rods were not taxed by the assessing authority following the decision of this Court reported in Pyarelal Malhotra v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer  26 STC 416 which held that the local sales made out of locally purchased scrap cannot be subjected to tax once again. Against the order of assessment, there was an appeal before the appellate authority by the assessee. The appeal having failed, the assessee filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. While the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, the Supreme Court in its decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra  37 STC 319 reversed the judgment of this Court reported in  26 STC 416 (Pyarelal Malhotra v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer). Therefore, taking note of the decision of the Supreme Court, the State filed an enhancement petition before the Tribunal contenting that the first sales of M.S. rods in the State also should be taxed. The Tribunal rejected the enhancement petition. When the matter was challenged by the Revenue before this Court, a Division Bench, following the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Panayappan Leather Industries  47 STC 88 (Mad.) held that in an appeal preferred by the assessee under section 36, the entire assessment is set at large before the Tribunal and the Tribunal can go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of assessment by the assessing authority himself and that it was always open to the Tribunal to set aside the order of the assessing authority and revise the assessment or direct him to make a fresh assessment in the light of the opinion expressed by it. This decision also turned more on the scope of the enhancement powers, for which there is specific provision.
9. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu  63 STC 63 (Mad.), the court considered a batch of cases which involved a common point relating to the same assessee. The assessee therein was a manufacturer and dealer in cement and was a registered dealer under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessee sold cement to the consumers as well as stockists. On the coming into force of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Surcharge) Act, 1971, the assessing authority levied surcharge on the company from the assessment year 1971-72 onwards up to 1975-76. When the assessee questioned its liability before the appellate authority, the appeals were rejected and on further appeals before the Tribunal, it was held that freight charges are liable to sales tax and dismissed the appeals. So far as the appeals preferred by the Company relating to the surcharge were concerned, the assessee moved separate applications to have the appeal grounds amended to enable them to raise additional grounds. The move of the assessee was opposed by the State on the ground that as the company had not raised a dispute before the authorities below as regards the higher figures sought to be brought in by means of an amendment application, it would not be open to the assessee to raise additional grounds in that regard or even pray for an amendment. The Tribunal was of the opinion that its jurisdiction was confined only to the subject-matter of the dispute before the first appellate authority and as the items covered by the proposed amendment and additional grounds of appeal were not so disputed by the assessee before the assessing authority or the first appellate authority, they could not be brought before the Tribunal properly as the subject-matter of the appeals either at the time of filing of the appeals before the Tribunal or even at a later stage, by means of a request for additional grounds or petitions for amendment. The assessee canvassed the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal before this Court by means of a tax case. Besides, the company also preferred writ petitions for the issue of a writ of mandamus to refund the surcharge paid, according to the assessee, under a mistake of law. The said writ petitions were dismissed in limine and writ appeals were filed thereon and those cases were also taken up for consideration along with the tax cases referred to above. That apart, in respect of some other assessment years, writ petitions were separately filed and those writ petitions also came to be heard along with the above cases. The Divisional Bench relied upon the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company  51 STC 381 (Mad.) [FB] and also the decision under the Income-tax Act reported in Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) v. Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd.  140 ITR 705 (Mad.), and came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that it was not open to the assessee to raise a dispute with reference to a subject-matter which did not figure either before the assessing authority or before the first appellate authority, that the levy of surcharge on the assessee being one not under the authority of law and the demand of surcharge was illegal, the Revenue had a duty to refund the illegal exactions to the assessee and that the plea of limitation on the facts of the cases before the court was misconceived. Unfortunately, the catena of cases of this Court which consistently took a contra view including that of the decision reported in  46 STC 341 [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] were neither referred to nor considered. What was considered was only the decision of the Full Bench reported in  51 STC 381 (Mad.) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company) which, as noticed earlier, has been rendered in the context of production of C forms at a belated stage and without reference to any of the earlier decisions of this Court.
10. In Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu  74 STC 303, a Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of section 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. In the said case, the assessee was a dealer in hides and skins. They claimed exemption in respect of purchase turnover of raw hides and skins to the tune of Rs. 8,97,014.34 and the same was rejected. The assessee appealed against the said judgment. In the memorandum of grounds of appeal, the assessee did not question the inclusion in the assessment of the purchase turnover referred to above. However, subsequently, the assessee filed additional grounds before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner objecting to the inclusion of the said turnover for levy of tax. When the appeal was disposed of by the appellate authority, it considered and decided only the ground as originally raised and completely overlooked the grounds raised by way of additional grounds in respect of the turnover referred to above. The matter was taken up on further appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal refused to entertain the grounds. In the view of the Tribunal, the additional ground was in the nature of a supplemental appeal and, therefore, was incompetent besides being out of time. It is in those circumstances, the matter came up before this Court and the matter was placed further before the Full Bench. The reference to the Full Bench was felt necessitated on account of the decision of this Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Limited  39 STC 285. The Full Bench considered the question in the light of the decision reported in  140 ITR 705 (Mad.) [Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd.] and  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) and after noticing the fact that the special leave petition preferred by the State against the decision reported in  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) was dismissed, considered that the view expressed in  39 STC 285 (Mad.) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Ltd.) cannot be approved, and overruled the same.
11. Reference to the decision of this Court reported in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd.  140 ITR 705 becomes necessary inasmuch as in some of the decisions, particularly  51 STC 381 (Mad.) [FB] (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company),  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) and  74 STC 303 (Mad.) [FB] (Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu) a reference has been made to this case which arose under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. That was on a reference to this Court and the point raised was about the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal functioning under the said Act. The assessee was a newspaper publisher having in its labour force as well as staff of a number of employees. Year after year, provision was being made towards its possible gratuity liability for its workmen. Since payment was to be in future on the happening of an event, the assessee showed it as a regular outgoing in its books of account. But, the assessee did not claim any deduction of the said amount and the deduction was restricted to the actual payments, if any, made in any particular year. The Income-tax Officer also, when considering a return filed by the assessee on that basis, had no occasion to grant any deduction in respect of provisions made for future liabilities on this account. The assessee merely objected to certain calculations of income and additions made and even in an appeal filed the assessee did not raise the issue before the first appellate authority. When a further appeal was filed before the Tribunal, the same grounds were raised but at the time of hearing of the appeal, an application was filed to raise an additional ground relating to the provisions made towards gratuity liability also claiming deduction. When an objection was raised, the Tribunal overruled the same and viewing the matter as one within its discretion, allowed the assessee to raise the new grounds, but sent the case back to the Income-tax Officer for going into the factual details and other considerations on the new point. The reference, therefore, to this Court was at the instance of the department. This Court held that the assessee was not precluded from raising a new ground and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not precluded from examining and determining that issue merely because it was not put forward at the earlier stages during assessment and in the first appeal. The court followed and applied the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in  66 ITR 710 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd.) and  66 ITR 722 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Nelliappan). Reference has been also made to  51 STC 381 [FB] (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company) of this Court. It could be seen from the above catena of decisions that, Balasubrahmanyan, J., was consistently persisting in his view even at the risk of overlooking the earlier decisions and whenever there was an occasion, the learned Judge was voicing his theory that the Tribunal shall not be precluded from entertaining even a plea which the assessee did not raise before the assessing authority or the first appellate authority. It is pertinent to notice at this stage that the Bench which decided  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] specifically referred to (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd.) and held that the ratio in the cases decided under the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, has no relevance or application to the case under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, in construing the scope of the powers of the Tribunal functioning under the State Act.
12. A careful analysis and consideration of the various case laws referred to would go to show that when an issue arose directly, as it has now arisen before us, it was held in earlier series of cases as well as in  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] that the Tribunal cannot entertain and deal with a plea which was never in issue or raised before the authorities below and what could be raised or agitated before the Tribunal at the second appellate stage was only those points or grounds or challenge that were raised before the authorities below and in respect of issues kept alive at subsequent stages and points or questions arising incidentally out of, or as a further elaboration of a challenge already made. A new ground in respect of a turnover which was already the subject-matter of challenge before the authorities below and before the Tribunal was held to be permissible. Notwithstanding certain observations made in the two decisions of the Full Bench of this Court reported in  74 STC 303 (Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu) and  51 STC 381 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company), it should not be overlooked that the issue in the above two Full Bench judgments never directly arose in the form in which it arose in  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] or is now being raised before us. There was no occasion for the court therein to consider the consequence of an appeal filed before the Tribunal raising a new ground in respect of a liability never agitated before the hierarchy below, be it in respect of a part of a turnover or its other liability. As a matter of fact, in State of Madras v. Voltas Ltd., Madras : No. 2  14 STC 861, a Division Bench of this Court has held that it is not open to a revision petitioner before this Court under section 38 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, to seek permission to raise questions of law relating to a turnover not comprised in the petition by filing a miscellaneous petition after the period of limitation for filing the revision expired and that if such a plea or petition is only an application for leave to raise additional grounds, there can be no objection. The court in that case further held that once a revision petition is filed and that embraced only some of the points decided against the petitioner, it would not be unjust or improper to infer that the petitioner has waived or abandoned his rights to challenge the other portions of the order which are against him and that there cannot be a challenge of a particular turnover not included in the original memorandum of revision. Even this case has not been referred to in any of the subsequent decisions which struck a different view.
13. The decision in  51 STC 381 (Mad.) [FB] (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company) is concerned the consideration of the scope of the power of the appellate authorities to permit the filing of C forms even at a subsequent stage during the pendency of an appeal and further appeal. The decision in  74 STC 303 (Mad.) [FB] (Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu) also concerned the raising of a new ground, no doubt, in respect of a turnover which was not in dispute in the memorandum of appeal filed initially, but did not deal with a case where a plea sought to be raised at the second appellate stage was not raised before the first appellate stage or before the original authority nor regarding the consequences of such a lapse on the part of an assessee. The scheme underlying the determination of net liability and the procedure prescribed therefor having regard to the peculiar method of calculation of the net taxable income radically differs from the one relating to sales tax law in their basic concepts, scheme, design and purport and it may be open to further discussion and deliberation as to whether there can be any comparison at all between the powers of those authorities operating in their respective fields with distinct and different purpose and aims assigned to them in the relevant law concerned. But, be that as it may, it is not necessary to go into those aspects and it will be enough if we notice, as done supra, the vital difference between the issues which arose in those cases and the issue substantially in issue before us. So far as the decision in  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) is concerned, the Division Bench, which decided the said case, did not advert to or consider the catena of earlier decisions directly on the point taking a different view including the one reported in  46 STC 341 (Mad.). [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar]. The mere fact that a special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court has been rejected and leave to appeal was not granted, does not have the effect of elevating the decision of this Court to the status of a decision of the Supreme Court or a declaration of law by the Supreme Court itself within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that having regard to the fact that the decision in  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) was rendered without reference to the several decisions of the Court striking a different note rendered by the Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction, it cannot be considered to be a precedent authoritatively binding on us and the same is only a judgment rendered per incuriam and as such has no authority of a binding precedent. [Vide Syed Mohideen v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu (FB].
14. We are of the view that the decision reported in  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] has considered the questions at length and with reference to all the relevant earlier case laws on the subject and lays down propositions reasonably and fairly and the ratio of the said decisions commends our acceptance rather than the ratio in  63 STC 63 (Mad.) (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu) and consequently we refer to follow the said decision and apply the same to the facts of the present case. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal also rejected the plea of the petitioner relying upon and applying the ratio of the decision reported in  46 STC 341 (Mad.) [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar]. That being the position, we are unable to hold that the Tribunal committed any error of law in so doing and the plea of the petitioner, therefore, fails and shall stand rejected.
15. So far as the jurisdiction for addition and the correctness of the quantum of additions are concerned, the authorities below including the Tribunal properly adverted to those aspects and as a matter of fact, the Tribunal also gave relief in part to the petitioner. The conclusions rendered otherwise on merits being not only concurrent and pertain to the arena of appreciation of facts mainly depending upon the nature and sufficiency of the materials available, we are unable to find anything palpably wrong in the reasoning of the Tribunal or other legal infirmity in the conclusions warranting our interference in the scope of our revisional jurisdiction.
16. For what has been stated above, the revision fails and shall stand dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
17. Petition dismissed.
After the judgment was pronounced, learned counsel for the petitioner sought a certificate of fitness to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. No question of law of general importance which has not been settled by the Supreme Court and which may require consideration by the Apex Court is involved in this Case. The judgment has been delivered on the basis of the law settled by the various High Court and the Apex Court. The certificate prayed for is refused.