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Mahaboob Ali Alias Khalid vs Abdul Rasheed Alias Zeehan on 1 June, 1999

Cites 9 docs - [View All]

The Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Section 3(1) in The Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Section 3(1)(b) in The Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Section 3(1)(b) in The Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights On Divorce) Act, 1986

Section 125 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973


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Karnataka High Court
Equivalent citations: 1999 (2) ALT Cri 358, 1999 CriLJ 3822, II (2000) DMC 624
Bench: G Bharuka, M Anwar
    Mahaboob Ali Alias Khalid vs Abdul Rasheed Alias Zeehan on 1/6/1999

ORDER

   G.C. Bharuka, J.

   1. The present civil revision petition is filed under Section 19(1) of the
Family Courts Act, 1984, is directed against the order dated 27-2-1999 passed by
the Family Court at Raichur, in Cr. Misc. No. 28 of 1998 by which the petitioner
has been directed to pay Rs. 500/- per month as maintenance to his minor child
born out of his wife who is subsequently divorced.

   2. This case has been referred to Division Bench on a reference made by the
learned Single Judge in his order dated 11-1-1999 for considering the following
questions of law:

     "The first question is:

     Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the child is not entitled to claim any maintenance
under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code from his father, who has
divorced the child's mother, irrespective of whether child was born before or
after the divorce?

     The second question is:

     If the answer to Question No. 1 is in the affirmative i.e., if child's
right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. during the period
of his minority stands, barred by Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Whether such provision can be said to be hit by
Article 21 which gives right to life as well as is hit by Articles 14, 15 and 16
of the Constitution of India and preamble of the Constitution which talk of
assuring dignity of human being and the basic structure of the Constitution of
India?"

   3. The present petitioner had married Smt. Sajeeda Begum, the mother of the
respondent-child, on 2-6-1994 but subsequently he divorced her on 28-12-1996 by
giving 'Talak'. The respondent-child was born to them on 17-8-1995. Presently he
is in the custody and care of the mother as per the order of the Court dated
7-8-1997. The respondent-child, represented through her mother, filed an
application for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. on 6-10-1997,
which has been allowed by the impugned order.

   4. In our opinion, referring of questions by the learned Single Judge to
Division Bench would not have at all necessitated if the attention of the Court
would have been drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case ofNoor
Saba Khatoon v Mohd. Quasim, wherein an identical question has been answered by
the Supreme Court. The question raised before the Supreme Court was:

     "Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act, 1986, in any way affect the rights of the minor children of divorced Muslim
parents to the grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C.".

   Section 3 of the 1986 Act to the extent it is relevant for the present case
reads as under:

     "3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time
of divorce.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to.-

     (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to
her within the iddat period by her former husband;

     (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after
her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid
by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of
birth of such children;

     (c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at
the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and

     (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or
after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives
of the husband or his friends".

   In paragraph 7 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has held that:

     "From a plain reading of the above section it is manifest that it deals
with "Mahr" or other properties of a Muslim woman to be given to her at the time
of divorce. It lays down that a reasonable and fair provision has to be made for
payment of maintenance to her during the period of iddat by her former husband.
Clause (b) of Section 3(1) supra, provides for grant of additional maintenance
to her for the fosterage period of two years from the date of birth of the child
[of marriage] for maintaining that child during the fosterage. Maintenance for
the prescribed period referred to in clause (b) of Section 3(1) is granted on
the claim of the divorced mother on her own behalf for maintaining the
infant/infants for a period of two years from the date of the birth of the child
concerned who is/are living with her and presumably is aimed at providing some
extra amount to the mother for her nourishment for nursing or taking care of the
infant/infants up to a period of two years. It has nothing to do with the right
of the child/children to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. So
long as the conditions for the grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.
P.C. are satisfied, the rights of the minor children, unable to maintain
themselves, are not affected by Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act. Under Section
125 of the Cr. P.C. the maintenance of the children is obligatory on the father
(irrespective of his religion) and as long as he is in a position to do so and
the children have no independent means to their own, it remains his absolute
obligation to provide for them. Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are
concerned there is nothing in Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. which exempts a Muslim
father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not
affected by clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be
unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of
Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. to the children only on the ground that they are
born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125
of the Cr. P.C. cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions
of a statute. We do not find manifestation of any such intention in the 1986 Act
to take away the independent rights of the children to claim maintenance under
Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. where they are minor and are unable to maintain
themselves. A Muslim father's obligation, like that of a Hindu father, to
maintain his minor children as contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. is
absolute and is not at all affected by Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act. Indeed a
Muslim father can claim custody of the children born through the divorced wife
to fulfil his obligation to maintain them and if he succeeds, he need not suffer
an order or direction under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. but where such custody
has not been claimed by him, he cannot refuse and neglect to maintain his minor
children on the ground that he has divorced their mother. The right of the
children to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. is separate,
distinct and independent of the right of their divorcee mother to claim
maintenance for herself for maintaining the infant children up to the age of 2
years from the date of birth of the child concerned under Section 3(1) of the
Act. There is nothing in the 1986 Act which in any manner affects the
application of the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 of the Cr. P.C. relating to
grant of maintenance insofar as minor children of Muslim parents, unable to
maintain themselves, are concerned".

   Again the proposition of law has been set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the
report, which reads thus:

     "Thus, both under the Personal Law and the statutory law (Section 125 of
the Cr. P.C.) the obligation of a Muslim father, having sufficient means, to
maintain his minor children, unable to maintain themselves, till they attain
majority and in case of females till they get married, is absolute,
notwithstanding the fact that the minor children are living with the divorced
wife.

     Thus, our answer to the question posed in the earlier part of the opinion
is that the children of Muslim parents are entitled to claim maintenance under
Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. for the period till they attain majority or are able
to maintain themselves, whichever is earlier and in case of females, till they
get married, and this right is not restricted, affected or controlled by the
divorcee wife's right to claim maintenance for maintaining the infant
child/children in her custody for a period of two years from the date of birth
of the child concerned under Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act. In other words
Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act does not in any way affect the rights of the
minor children of divorced Muslim parents to claim maintenance from their father
under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. till they attain majority or are able to
maintain themselves, or in the case of females, till they are married".

   5. In the above view of the matter, in our opinion, the judgment of the
learned Single Judge reported in the case of Mohammed Jahir u Smt. Nazrath
Fatima, on which reliance was sought to be placed by Sri K.S. Savanur, learned
Counsel for the petitioner stood impliedly overruled in respect of the question
here in much before the filing of the present revision petition itself.
Therefore, the question under reference was no more available for being
adjudicated" either before the Family Court or this Court.

   6. So far as quantum of maintenance is concerned, keeping in view the
evidence adduced in the case and the findings of fact recorded by the Trial
Court, it does not warrant any interference by this Court in revisional
jurisdiction.

   7. In the above view of the matter, this revision petition is dismissed being
wholly misconceived with costs assessed at Rs. 5,000/- to be paid by the
petitioner to the respondent-minor child through a crossed bank draft to be
drawn in favour of the child through her mother which should be remitted within
two weeks from today under registered post with acknowledgment due.

   8. A copy of this order be sent to the respondent-child at the cost of the
Court.