IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 18.01.2010 CORAM: THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE K.CHANDRU W.P.Nos.27284 to 27291 of 2009 W.P.No.27284 of 2009: 1 V.PALANIMUTHU 2 S.KALIYAPERUMAL 3 P.GOGULDOSS 4 M.RAMASAMI 5 R.MUNISAMY 6 K.RAMACHANDRAN 7 P.JANAGIRAMAN 8 R.GOVINDARAJU 9 G.SOWRIRAJAN 10 P.AYYAKKANNU 11 V.THANDAVAN 12 M.MUTHUSAMY 13 K.RANGITHAM 14 S.KARUPPAMUTHU 15 A.R.ARUMUGAM 16 P.V.KAMANATHAN 17 K.RAJU 18 K.RAJAMANIKAM 19 N.PREMAVATHI 20 K.PONNAMMAL 21 A.THAMEEMUNNISA 22 S.MUTHULINGAM 23 M.BANGARU 24 S.AMBUJAM 25 A.AMARAVATHI 26 P.VARADARAJAN 27 M.SAMSUDEEN 28 C.PARAMASIVAM 29 R.PANKAJAM 30 N.PONNUSAMY 31 N.JAGADEESAN 32 P.SUBRAMANIAN 33 S.PERIYANNAN 34 P.ANGAMUTHU 35 R.RAJAMANICKAM 36 A.PERIYASAMY 37 M.RAMASAMI 38 K.KALEEL AHMED 39 M.SAHADEVAN 40 K.MANIVELU 41 P.DURAISAMY 42 C.SANTHABAI 43 G.PETHUSAMY 44 M.KRISHNAN 45 A.BALAKRISHNAN 46 P.GOVINDAN 47 K.KALANITHI 48 A.RAMANAN 49 P.VADIVEL 50 S.PUSHPAVALLI 51 W.MERLIN METTILDA 52 R.VENKATACHALAM 53 A.SINGARAM 54 K.GOPALAN 55 R.DHANDAPANI 56 C.SAROJA 57 V.VARADARAJU 58 S.KANDASAMY 59 P.ANGAMUTHU 60 L.RAMAN 61 R.DURAISAMY 62 K.R.RAJU 63 V.PREMAKUMARI 64 A.MUTHUSAMY 65 P.NARAYANAN 66 A.SIVABAGYAM 67 S.SATHIYASEELAN 68 A.ABDUL SALAM 69 A.ABDHULSUKKUR 70 P.ANNAKKODI 71 A.PERIYASAMY 72 A.RAMACHANDRAN 73 R.ERUSAPPILLAI 74 S.MANIMEGALAI 75 I.KRISHNAN 76 C.NALLU 77 A.MURUGESAN 78 M.NALLAKKANNU 79 K.CHELLAIAH 80 K.M.THANGAVEL [ PETITIONERS ] Vs 1 THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT SECRETARIAT FORT ST.GEORGE, CHENNAI-9. 2 THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION COLLEGE ROAD, NUNGAMBAKKAM, CHENNAI-6. 3 THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER SALEM, SALEM (DT). 4 THE ASSISTANT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER THALAIVASAL, SALEM (DT). 5 THE ASSISTANT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER GANGUVALLI, SALEM (DT). [ RESPONDENTS ]
Prayer in W.P.No.27284 of 2009: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to extend the benefit of the G.O.Ms.No.234 School Education (G2) Department dt 10.9.2009 in so far as the petitioners are concerned and accordingly to award selection/special grade scale of pay in the post of Elementary School Headmaster by taking count of their lower cadre Secondary Grade Assistant service as has been given to 61 similarly placed persons .
For Petitioners :: Mr.K.Thennan For Respondents :: Mrs.Ranganayaki, G.A COMMON ORDER
The petitioners are all Teachers. Some of them have got retired 1 to 9 years back. The present prayer of the petitioners was to direct the respondents to extend the benefit of the G.O.Ms.No.234 School Education (G2) Department dated 10.9.2009 in so far as the petitioners are concerned and accordingly award selection/special grade scale of pay in the post of Elementary School Headmaster by taking count of their lower cadre Secondary Grade Assistant service as has been given to 61 similarly placed persons .
2. The cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court as stated in the affidavits is that the Government had issued G.O.Ms.No.234, School Education Department dated 10.9.2009, wherein and by which 63 Teachers were given similar benefit. Therefore, the petitioners should also be given such benefits. Nowhere in the affidavit, the petitioners have stated as to why they never approached the court or the Tribunal at an earlier point of time with reference to their service grievance, if at all there was any grievance. They cannot place their right on the basis of the so-called orders passed by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.234, School Education Department dated 10.9.2009.
3. The circumstances under which the said Government Order came to be passed is set out in the G.O. The G.O itself very categorically states that the benefit will only be available to 63 Teachers, who have filed cases before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. The order of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal came to be challenged before a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench dismissed the Writ Petition. Therefore, the order of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal became final. Merely because the Government had chosen to implement certain orders of the Tribunal or court, that by itself will not give a cause of action to the petitioners to move the Court that too after three decades regarding their so-called service grievance.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr.Santosh Kumari vs. Union of India and others reported in (1995) 1 SCC 269. Emphasis was placed on paragraph 8 of the order. That was a case relating to admission to a Medical College. The Supreme Court held that once the law is laid down, then the persons who came to court alone cannot be granted the relief as that will cause injustice to more deserving candidates not being admitted. It is not clear as to how the said judgment has any application to the facts of the present case.
5. On the contrary, the Supreme Court in Col.B.J.Akkara (Retd.) vs. Government of India and others reported in 2006 (11) SCC 709 has held that merely because the Government had chosen to implement a wrong order which became final, that by itself will not give any cause of action to the other persons without deciding the issue on merit. It is therefore necessary to extract para 26 of the judgment and it reads as follows:
" A particular judgment of the High Court may not be challenged by the State where the financial repercussions are negligible or where the appeal is barred by limitation. It may also not be challenged due to negligence or oversight of the dealing officers or on account of wrong legal advice, or on account of the non-comprehension of the seriousness or magnitude of the issue involved. However, when similar matters subsequently crop up and the magnitude of the financial implications is realised, the State is not prevented or barred from challenging the subsequent decisions or resisting subsequent writ petitions, even though judgment in a case involving similar issue was allowed to reach finality in the case of others. Of course, the position would be viewed differently, if petitioners plead and prove that the State had adopted a pick-and-choose method only to exclude petitioners on account of mala fides or ulterior motives. Be that as it may. On the facts and circumstances, neither the principle of res judicata nor the principle of estoppel is attracted. The administrative law principles of legitimate expectation or fairness in action are also not attracted. Therefore, the fact that in some cases the validity of the circular dated 29-10-1999 (corresponding to the Defence Ministry circular dated 11-9-2001) has been upheld and that decision has attained finality will not come in the way of the State defending or enforcing its circular dated 11-9-2001.
6. Very recently, the Supreme Court in a case in Shanti Sports Club & Another vs. Union of India & others reported in 2009 AIR SCW 6953 after referring to all the previous case laws has held that no court shall issue such a mandamus on the specious plea of either discrimination or they were unequally treated. It is necessary to extract the following passage found in paragraphs 50 to 52, which read as follows:
"50. The plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution put forward by the appellants is totally devoid of substance because they did not produce any evidence before the High Court and none has been produced before this Court to show that their land is identically placed qua the lands on which Hamdard Public School, St. Xavier School, Scindia Potteries, etc., exist. In the representations made to different functionaries of the Government and DDA, the appellants did claim that other parcels of the land have been de-notified and before the High Court a copy of notification dated 6.9.1996 issued under Section 48(1) was produced, but the said assertion and notification were not sufficient for recording a finding that their case is identical to those whose land had been denotified. The burden to prove the charge of discrimination and violation of Article 14 was on the appellants. It was for them to produce concrete evidence before the Court to show that their case was identical to other persons whose land had been released from acquisition and the reasons given by the Government for refusing to release their land are irrelevant or extraneous. Vague and bald assertions made in the writ petition cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the appellants have been subjected to invidious or hostile discrimination. That apart, we are prima facie of the view that the Government's decision to withdraw from the acquisition of some parcels of land in favour of some individuals was not in public interest. Such decisions had, to some extent, resulted in defeating the object of planned development of Delhi on which considerable emphasis has been laid by the Full Bench of the High Court and this Court. This being the position, Article 14 cannot be invoked by the appellants for seeking a direction to the respondents to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The concept of equality enshrined in that Article is a positive concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities. In Chandigarh Administration vs. Jagjit Singh (1995) 1 SCC 745, this Court made a lucid exposition of law on this subject. The facts of that case were that the respondents, who had given the highest bid for 338 sq. yds. plot in Section 31A, Chandigarh defaulted in paying the price in accordance with the terms and conditions of allotment. After giving him opportunity of showing cause, the Estate Officer cancelled the lease of the plot. The appeal and the revision filed by him were dismissed by the Chief Administrator and Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh respectively. Thereafter, the respondent applied for refund of the amount deposited by him. His request was accepted and the entire amount paid by him was refunded. He then filed a petition for review of the order passed by the Chief Commissioner, which was dismissed. However, the Officer concerned entertained the second review and directed that the plot be restored to the respondent. The latter did not avail benefit of this unusual order and started litigation by filing writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on March 18, 1991. Thereafter, the respondent again approached the Estate Officer with the request to settle his case in accordance with the policy of the Government to restore the plots to the defaulters by charging forfeiture amount of 5%. His request was rejected by the Estate Officer. He then filed another writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed only on the ground that in another case pertaining to Smt.Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the plot despite dismissal of the writ petition filed by her. While reversing the order of the High Court, this Court observed as under:-
"We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it cannot be corrected,it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world".(Emphasis added)
51. Similar is the ratio of the judgments in Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2 SCC 265,Gursharan Singh v.New Delhi Municipal Committee (1996) 2 SCC 459, Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain (supra), Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others (supra), State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3 SCC 321], Faridabad CT. Scan Centre v. D.G.Health Services [(1997) 7 SCC 752], Style (Dress land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh [(1999) 7 SCC 89], State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94, Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta Sakthi Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC 337, Sanjay Kumar Munjal v. Chairman, UPSC (2006) 3 SCC 42, K.K.Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others (2006) 3 SCC 581, National Institute of Technology v. Chandra Sekhar Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC 93, Vice Chancellor, M.D.University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77, State of Kerala and others v. K.Prasad and another (2007) 7 SCC 140, Punjab State Electricity Board and others vs. Gurmail Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan and others (2009) 2 SCC 589.
52. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to enter a caveat. In all developed countries, great emphasis has been laid on the planned development of cities and urban areas. The object of planned development has been achieved by rigorous enforcement of master plans prepared after careful study of complex issues, scientific research and rationalisation of laws. The people of those countries have greatly contributed to the concept of planned development of cities by strictly adhering to the planning laws, the master plan etc. They respect the laws enacted by the legislature for regulating planned development of the cities and seldom there is a complaint of violation of master plan etc. in the construction of buildings, residential, institutional or commercial. In contrast, scenario in the developing countries like ours is a substantially different. Though, the competent legislatures have, from time to time, enacted laws for ensuring planned development of the cities and urban areas, enforcement thereof has been extremely poor and the people have violated the master plans, zoning plans and building regulations and bye-laws with impunity. In last four decades, almost all cities, big or small, have seen unplanned growth. In the 21st century, the menace of illegal and unauthorized constructions and encroachments has acquired monstrous proportions and everyone has been paying heavy price for the same. Economically affluent people and those having support of the political and executive apparatus of the State have constructed buildings, commercial complexes, multiplexes, malls etc., in blatant violation of the municipal and town planning laws, master plans, zonal development plans and even the sanctioned building plans. In most of the cases of illegal and unauthorized constructions, the officers of the municipal and other regulatory bodies turn blind eye either due to the influence of higher functionaries of the State or other extraneous reasons. Those who construct buildings in violation of the relevant statutory provisions, master plan etc. and those who directly or indirectly abet such violations are totally unmindful of the grave consequences of their actions and/or omissions on the present as well as future generations of the country which will be forced to live in unplanned cities and urban areas. The people belonging to this class do not realize that the constructions made in violation of the relevant laws, master plan or zonal development plan or sanctioned building plan or the building is used for the purpose other than the one specified in the relevant statute or the master plan etc., such constructions put unbearable burden on the public facilities/amenities like water, electricity, sewerage etc. apart from creating chaos on the roads. The pollution caused due to traffic congestion affects the health of the road users. The pedestrians and people belonging to weaker sections of the society, who cannot afford the luxury of air-conditioned cars, are the worst victims of pollution. They suffer from skin diseases of different types, asthma, allergies and even more dreaded diseases like cancer. It can only be a matter of imagination how much the government has to spend on the treatment of such persons and also for controlling pollution and adverse impact on the environment due to traffic congestion on the roads and chaotic conditions created due to illegal and unauthorized constructions. This Court has, from time to time, taken cognizance of buildings constructed in violation of municipal and other laws and emphasized that no compromise should be made with the town planning scheme and no relief should be given to the violator of the town planning scheme and no relief should be given to the violator of the town planning scheme etc. on the ground that he has spent substantial amount on construction of the buildings etc. - K.Ramdas Shenoy vs. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council Udipi, 1974 (2) SCC 506,Dr.G.N.Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority, 1995 (5) SCC 762, M.I.Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, 1999 (6) SCC 464, Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa, 2004 (8) SCC 733, M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, 2006 (3) SCC 399 and S.N.Chandrasekhar v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (3) SCC 208."
7. It must also be noted that in the present cases, the petitioners have sent representations some time in October 2009 only. The question whether such belated representations can be directed to be considered by courts came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in C.Jacob vs. Director of Geology & Mining and another reported in 2008 AIR SCW 7233, wherein the Supreme Court held that by giving such a direction to consider the representation, a stale cause of action can never be revived. It is relevant to refer paragraphs 6 to 8 of the said judgment.
"6.Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.
7.Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
8.When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of 'acknowledgment of a jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action."
8. Apart from these contentions, some of the petitioners represented by other counsels had also contended that the question of delay and latches will not arise in these cases, since it involves issue relating to pay and allowances, there is a continuing cause of action. Further the relief if granted will not affect the rights of the others. They placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317. Reliance was placed upon the following passage found in para 10 and it reads as follows:
"10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back as November 1, 1956 by the Government Resolution of that date, and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select-list, which was a necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/ Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of years, at any rate from April 7, 1961, and the Rules of July 30, 1959 were also given effect to since the date of their enactment and yet the petitioner did not file the petition until July 14, 1969. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi1 is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. (Emphasis added)
9. Further reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court relating to Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648. Emphasis was made on the following passage found in para 7. The said passage may be extracted below:
"7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition."
10. It is also stated that earlier order of the Tribunal was upheld by an order of this Court. It had become final and implemented by the Government. The order of the Tribunal is judgment in rem and the benefit must go to all similarly placed persons. An unreported decision was also produced in W.P.Nos.29644 and 29645 of 2003 dated 21.2.2008. But, there the Division Bench dealt with order passed by the Tribunal in Original Application relating to the year 1997. But the petitioners have chosen to come 12 years after these petitions. The decision relied on by the petitioners do not help the case of the petitioners. In fact, it goes against the contentions made by them.
11. The validity of the above prayers made by the writ petitioners seeking the benefit akin to the Teachers covered by the Government Order or for reviving the cause of action after three decades can never be countenanced by this Court. Hence, all the Writ Petitions stand dismissed. No costs.
18.01.2010 Index:Yes Internet:Yes ajr To 1 THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT SECRETARIAT FORT ST.GEORGE, CHENNAI-9.
2 THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION COLLEGE ROAD, NUNGAMBAKKAM, CHENNAI-6. 3 THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER SALEM, SALEM (DT). 4 THE ASSISTANT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER THALAIVASAL, SALEM (DT). 5 THE ASSISTANT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER GANGUVALLI, SALEM (DT). K.CHANDRU,J ajr W.P.Nos.27284 to 27291 of 2009 18.01.2010