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Article 19(2) in The Constitution Of India 1949
Article 19(1)(a) in The Constitution Of India 1949
Section 5 in the Cinematograph Act, 1952
the Cinematograph Act, 1952
Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978
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Utv Software Communication vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 February, 2008
The Employees' Federation And ... vs Tvs And Sons Ltd. And Anr. on 15 December, 1994
Ms.A.Arulmozhi vs The Government Of India on 5 August, 2005
Dr.Ambedkar Mandran-Thiruchuli vs The Superintendent Of Police on 13 April, 2015
S. Tamilselvan vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu on 24 February, 2015

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Supreme Court of India
S. Rangarajan Etc vs P. Jagjivan Ram on 30 March, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1989 SCR (2) 204, 1989 SCC (2) 574
Author: K Shetty
Bench: Shetty, K.J. (J)
           PETITIONER:
S. RANGARAJAN ETC

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
P. JAGJIVAN RAM

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/03/1989

BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:
 1989 SCR  (2) 204	  1989 SCC  (2) 574
 JT 1989 (2)	70	  1989 SCALE  (1)812


ACT:
Cinematograph Act, 1952 (Cinematograph (Certificate) Rules,
1983.
    Sections  4, 5, 5A, B, C and 8/Guidelines  (1)--(3)	 and
notification dated January 21, 1987.
    High  Court revoking 'U' certificate granted  by  Censor
Board-Validity	 of   High  Court  order--Duty	 of   Censor
Board--Obligatory  duty of state to protect freedom  of	 ex-
pression.
    Constitution    of	  India--Articles    19(1)(a)	 and
19(2)--Freedom of speech and expression--Reasonable restric-
tions  must  be justified on anvil  of necessity   and	 not
quicks--Sand   of  convenience	 and  expediency--Obligatory
duty of State to protect freedom of expression.



HEADNOTE:
    The	 appellant,  S. Rangarajan is a	 film  producer.  He
produced  a Tamil film "Ore Oru Gramathile" and applied	 for
certificate  for  exhibition of the  film.  The	 examination
committee upon seeing the film refused to grant the Certifi-
cate  but  on  a reference being made to  the  2nd  Revising
Committee for review and recommendation, the Committee by  a
majority  of 5:4 recommended the grant of a 'U'	 certificate
subject to deletion of certain scenes.
    On	7.12.87 'U' certificate was granted which was  chal-
lenged in the High Court by means of writ petitions. It	 was
contended before the High Court that the film is treated  in
an irresponsible manner, the reservation policy of the Govt.
has  been  projected in a biased manner	 and  the  so-called
appeal	in the film that "India is one" is a  hollow  appeal
which  touches	caste  sensitivity of  the  Brahmin  forward
caste.	It was also asserted that the film would create	 law
and  order  problem in Tamil Nadu. The Writ  Petitions	were
dismissed  by  the Single Judge but upon  appeal  they	were
allowed	 and  the 'U' certificate issued to  the  appellant-
producer was revoked. These two appeals, one by the producer
of  the film and the other by the Union of India  have	been
filed by
205
special leave of challenging the decision of the High Court.
    The principal contentions raised on behalf of the appel-
lants  were:  (i) that the fundamental right of	 freedom  of
free  expression  guaranteed under the	Constitution  covers
even  the  medium of movies; that the opinion  on  the	film
ought not to be rested on the isolated passages disregarding
the  main theme and its message; (ii) That the Court  should
not  concern itself with the correctness or legality of	 the
views  expressed in the film and the Court cannot limit	 the
expression on any general issue even if it is  controversial
and  that the writings of the film must be considered  in  a
free  and  liberal  manner in the light of  the	 freedom  of
expression guaranteed under the Constitution. It was assert-
ed  that the theme of the film is that reservation could  be
on the basis of economic backwardness instead of caste.
    Counsel  for  the  Respondents was	critical  about	 the
manner in which the reservation policy of the Govt. has been
condemned and the events and the characters portrayed in the
film,  as they are depicted in a biased manner and  reaction
to the film in Tamil Nadu is bound to be volatile and likely
to create law and order problem. Allowing the appeals,	this
Court,
    HELD: The motion pictures were originally considered  as
a  form of amusement to be allowed to titillate but  not  to
arouse.	 They were treated as mere entertainment and not  an
art  or a means of expression. Movie motivates	thought	 and
action and assures a high degree of attention and retention.
It  makes its impact simultaneously arousing the visual	 and
aural  senses. The movie had unique capacity to disturb	 and
arouse feelings. It has as much potential for evil as it was
for  good. It has an equal potential to instil or  cultivate
violent or good behaviour. [211D-E; 212G; 213D]
    Censorship	by prior restraint is, therefore,  not	only
desirable but also necessary. [213E]
    The	 Censors Board should exercise considerable  circum-
spection on movies affecting the morality or decency of	 our
people	and  cultural  heritage of the	country.  The  moral
values in particular, should not be allowed to be sacrificed
in  the	 guise of social change	 or  cultural  assimilation.
[216G-H]
    The	 Censors should be responsive to social	 change	 and
they  must  go	with the current climate.  The	Censors	 may
display more sensitivity
206
to  movies which will have a markedly deleterious effect  to
lower the moral standards of those who see it. [217C-D]
    If the film is unobjectionable and cannot  constitution-
ally  be restricted under Article 19(2), freedom of  expres-
sion cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstra-
tion  and  processions or threats of  violence.	 That  would
tantamount to negation of the rule of law and a surrender to
black mail and intimidation. It is the duty of the State  to
protect	 the  freedom of expression since it  is  a  liberty
guaranteed  against  the State. The State cannot  plead	 its
inability to handle the hostile audience problem. It is	 its
obligatory  duty  to prevent it and protect the	 freedom  of
expression. [230C-D]
    The	 Revising  Committees have approved  the  film.	 The
members	 thereof  come	from different walks  of  life	with
variegated experiences. They represent the cross section  of
the community. They have judged the film in the light of the
objectives  of the Act and the guidelines provided  for	 the
purpose. There is nothing wrong or contrary to the Constitu-
tion in approving the film for public exhibition. [230E-F]
    The	 framework of the Indian Constitution  differs	from
the  First  Amendment  to  the	U.S.  Constitution.  Article
19(1)(a) guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom  of
speech	and expression. The freedom of the expression  means
the right to express one's opinion by words of mouth,  writ-
ing, printing, picture or in any other manner, it would thus
include the freedom of communication and the right to propa-
gate or publish opinion. The communication of ideas could be
made  through any medium, newspaper, magazine or movie.	 But
this right is subject to reasonable restrictions on  grounds
set  out under Article 19(2). Reasonable limitations can  be
put  in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of  India,
the  security of the State, friendly relations with  foreign
States, public order, decency or morality or in relation  to
contempt  of court, defamation or incitement to an  offence.
[212B-D]
    In matters of certification of films, it is necessary to
take  prompt action by the respective authorities. The	pro-
ducer who has invested a large capital should not be made to
wait needlessly. He has a statutory right to have the valid-
ity of the film determined in accordance with law. It  would
be, therefore, proper and indeed appreciative if the film is
reviewed  as  soon as it is submitted. It is not  proper  to
form an opinion by dwelling upon stray sentences or isolated
passages disregarding the main theme. [219E; 220B-C]
207
    Freedom  of expression is the rule and it  is  generally
taken for granted. Every one has a fundamental right to form
his own opinion on any issue of general concern. He can form
and inform by any legitimate means. [223C]
    Democracy  is Government by the people via open  discus-
sion.  The democratic form of government itself demands	 its
citizens an active and intelligent participation is a  basic
features  and a rational process of democracy which  distin-
guishes	 it from all other forms of govt. Public  discussion
on  issues  relating to administration had  positive  value.
[223D-E]
    Our commitment to freedom of expression demands that  it
cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allow-
ing  the freedom are pressing and the community interest  is
endangered.  The  anticipated danger should not	 be  remote,
conjectural  or	 far fetched. It should have  proximate	 and
direct nexus with the expression. The expression of  thought
should	be intrinsically dangerous to the public  interests.
In other words, the expression should be inseparably  locked
up  with  the action contemplated like the equivalent  of  a
"spark in a power keg". [226G-H]
    It is difficult to understand how the expression in	 the
film  with criticism of reservation policy or  praising	 the
colonial  rule	will  affect the security of  the  State  or
sovereignty and integrity of India. There is no utterance in
the  film threatening to overthrow the Govt. by unlawful  or
unconstitutional means. There is no talk of secession either
nor is there any suggestion for impairing the integration of
the  country.  The film seems to suggest that  the  existing
method	of  reservation	 on the basis of caste	is  bad	 and
reservation on the basis of economic backwardness is better.
The  film  also deprecates exploitation of people  on  caste
considerations. [222G-H; 223A]
    The	 fundamental  freedom  under Art.  19(1)(a)  can  be
reasonably  restricted	only for the purposes  mentioned  in
Art.  19(2)  and the restriction must be  justified  on	 the
anvil of necessity and not the quicks and of convenience and
expediency. Open criticism of Government policies and opera-
tions  is not a ground for restricting expression.  We	must
practice tolerance to the views of others. Intolerance is as
much dangerous to democracy as to the person himself. [230H;
231A-B]
    The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of
the High Court and dismissed the writ petitions. [231B-C]
208
    Mutual  Film Corporation v. Industrial  Commission,	 235
U.S. 230 (1915) referred to, Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
referred  to, Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S.  47  (1919)
referred to, Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, [1973] 3
SCR 533 followed, K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, [1971] 2 SCR
446  referred  to, Ramesh v. Union of India,  [1988]  1	 SCC
668;  Bhagwat  Charan Shukla v. Provincial  Government,	 AIR
1947  Nag 1 at 676, Rajkappoor v. Laxman, [1980] 2 SCR	512,
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Naraindas
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 3 SCR 624; Sakal v. Union
of  India,  [1962] 3 SCR 842, Whitney v.  California,  [274]
U.S.  357,  375-378, 1927; Manohar v. Govt. of	Bombay,	 AIR
1950  Bombay 210; Niharender Dutt Majumdar v.  Emperor,	 AIR
1942 FC 22 and Handyside v. United Kingdom, [1975I  EHRR/737
at p. 754 referred to.



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1668 and 1669 of 1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.4.1988 of the Madras High Court in W.R. Nos. 469 and 488 of 1988. Soli J. Sorabjee, V.C. Mahajan, C.A. Sundaram, U.A. Rana, M. Mudgal, Ms. Indu Malhotra, C.V. Subba Rao, A. Mariar Autham, Aruna Matbur, N.N. Sharma, Jose Varghese, Bhagwan Das, R. Mohan, R.A. Perumal and A.V. Rangam for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. These appeals by leave are from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court revoking the 'U-Certificate' issued to a Tamil film called "Ore Oru Gramathile" (In one Village) for public exhibition. Civil Appeal Nos. 1668 and 1669 of 1988 are by the producer of the film and the Civil Appeal nos. 13667 and 133668 of 1988 are by the Union of India.

The story of "Ore Oru Gramathile" can be summarised as follows:

"A Brahmin widower, Shankara Sastry, has a talented daughter Gayathri. He apprehends that she would not be able to get admission to college because she belongs to a Brahmin community. He seeks advice from his close friend Devashayam, a Tehsildar. The Tehsildar who otherwise belongs to a very poor family and whose father was working in a local Church responds with gratitude. He divises a 209 method to help Gayathri because it was through Sastry's father that he got proper education and rose to become a Tahsildar. He prepares a false certificate showing Gayathri as Karuppayee belonging to an Adi Dravida Community and as an orphan. He issues the certificate under the reservation policy of the Government for the benefit of 'backward commu- nities' identified on caste consideration. On the basis of the false certificate, Karuppayee gets admitted to college and enters I.A.S. witness to this arrangement is the broth- er-in-law of Tahsildar called Anthony who later turns out to be a villain of the piece. "

"Years later, Karuppayee, who was working in Delhi is sent to a rural village called Annavayil as a Special Offi- cer for flood relief operations. Her father, Shankara Sastry happens to work in the same village as Block Development Officer. However, both of them pretend not to recognise each other. Karuppayee takes her work seriously and improves the living conditions of people to such an extent that she is held by them in high esteem. By a coincidence, after the death of the Tahsildar, Anthony comes to live in the same village and recognises Karuppayee. He starts blackmailing her and threatens to reveal the fraudulent means by which she got the caste certificate. His attempt is to extract money from her frequently. One evening when he visits Karup- payee's house, he is confronted by Shankara Sastry who puts a halt to his blackmailing. Later Anthony dies of sudden heart attack but not before he informs the Government about the facts relating to Karuppayee. Upon preliminary enquiry, the Government suspends both Karuppayee and her father and eventually they are put on trial in the Court. The people of the village resentful of the action taken against Karuppayee rise as one man and demonstrate before the Court in a peace- ful manner for her release. They also send petitions to the Government."

"Karuppayee and her father admit in the Court the fact of their having obtained the false caste certificate but they attribute it to circumstances resulting by Government reservation policy on caste basis. They say that they are prepared to undergo any punishment. They contend hat some politicians are exploiting the caste consideration and that would be detrimental to national integration. They also argue that the reservation policy should not be based on caste, but could be on economic backwardness. Just about the time when the judgment is to be pronounced the Court re- ceives intimation from Government that in the light of petitions received from the public, the case against Karup- payee and her father stands withdrawn. Karuppayee goes back to her Government job with jubilent people all round."

210

This is the theme of the picture presented. As usual, it contains some songs, dance and side attractions to make the film more delectable.

On August 7, 1987, the producer applied for certificate for exhibition of the film. The examining committee upon seeing the film unanimously refused to grant certificate. The appellant then sought for review by a Revising Committee which consisted of nine members. This Committee reviewed the film. Eight members were in favour of grant of certificate and one was opposed to it. The Chairman of the Censor Board however, referred the film to Second Revising Committee for review and recommendation. This again consisted of nine members and by majority of 5:4 they recommended for issue of 'U' certificate subject to deletion of certain scenes. The 'U' certificate means for unrestricted public exhibition as against 'A' certificate restricted to adults only. The minority expressed the view that the film is treated in an irresponsible manner. The reservation policy of the Govern- ment is projected in a highly biased and distorted fashion. They have also stated that the so called appeal in the film "India is One" is a hollow-appeal, which in effect touches caste sensitivity of the Brahmin forward caste. One of the members felt that the impact of the film will create law and order problem. Another member said that the film will hurt the feelings and sentiments of certain sections of the public. But the majority opined that the theme of the film is on the reservation policy of the Government suggesting that the reservation could be made on the basis of economic backwardness. Such a view could be expressed in a free country like India, and it did not violate any guideline. On December 7, 1987, 'U' certificate was granted for the exhibition of the film which was challenged before the High Court by way of writ petitions. The writ petitions were dismissed by the Single judge, but the Division Bench upon appeal allowed the writ petitions and revoked the certifi- cate. The Division Bench largely depended upon the minority view of the Second Revising Committee and also the opinion of the Examining Committee. The producer of the film and the Government of India by obtaining leave have appealed to this Court. The film has since been given National Award by the Directorate of Film Festival of the Government of India. In these appeals, the fundamental point made by Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned counsel for the producer is about the freedom of free expression guaranteed under our Constitution even for the medium of 211 movies. The counsel argued that the opinion on the effect of the film should not be rested on isolated passages disre- garding the main theme and its message. The Film should be judged in its entirety from the point of its overall impact on the public. The writings of the film must be considered in a free, fair and liberal spirit in the light of the freedom of expression guaranteed under our Constitution. The counsel said that the Court is not concerned with the cor- rectness or legality of the views expressed in the film and the Court cannot limit the expression on any general issue even if it is controversial. Mr. Mahajan for the Union of India supported these submissions. Mr. Varghese learned counsel for the contesting respondents did not dispute most of the proposition advanced for the appellants. He was, however, critical about the manner in which the reservation policy of the Government has been condemned and the events and characters shown in the film. He contended that they are depicted in a biased manner and reaction to the film in Tamil Nadu is bound to be volatile.

Before examining these rival contentions, a few general observations may be made as to the utility of movies and the object of the film Censors Board. The motion pictures were originally considered as a form of amusement to be allowed to titillate but not to arouse. They were treated as mere entertainment and not an art or a means of expression. This theory was based on the concept that motion picture was a business "pure and simpe originated and conducted for prof- it, like other spectacles." It was considered strictly as an "amusement industry". It was so held in 1915 by the unani- mous decision of the American Supreme Court in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). It was not without significance since there were no talking pictures then. The talking pictures were first produced in 1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision (Encyclopedia Britinnica) (1965 Vol. 15 p. 902). The later decisions of the American Supreme Court have therefore declared that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First Amend- ment. (See Burstyn v. Wilso, 343 U.S. 495). The First Amend- ment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." This Amendment is absolute in terms and it contains no exception for the exercise of the fight. Heavy burden lies on the State to justify the interference. The judicial decisions, however, limited the scope of restriction which the State could impose in any given circumstances. The danger rule was born in Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes for a unanimous court, evolved the test of "clear and present danger". He used the danger test to 212 determine where discussion ends and incitement or attempt begins. The core of his position was that the First Amend- ment protects only utterances that seeks acceptance via the democratic process of discussion and agreement. But "Words that may have all the effect of force" calculated to achieve its goal by circumventing the democratic process are howev- er, not so protected.

The framework of our Constitution differs from the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of expression means the right to express one's opinion by words of mouth, writ- ing, printing, picture or in any other manner. It would thus include the freedom of communication and the right to propa- gate or publish opinion. The communication of ideas could be made through any medium, newspaper, magazine or movie. But this right is subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds set out under Article 13(2) of the Constitution. The reason- able limitations can be put in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, deceny or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Framers deemed it essential to permit imposition of reasonable restrictions on the larger interests of the community and country. They intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed and the social interest specified under Article 19(2). (See Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, [1973] 3 SCR 533). This is the difference between the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitu- tion. The decisions bearing on the First Amendment are, therefore, not useful to us except the broad principles and the purpose of the guaranty.

Movie doubtless enjoys the guaranty under Article 19(1)(a) but there is one significant difference between the movie and other modes of communication. The movie cannot function in a free market place like the newspaper, magazine or advertisement. Movie motivates thought and action and assures a high degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact simultaneously arousing the visual and aural senses. The focusing of an intense light on a screen with the dramatizing of facts and opinion makes the ideas more effective. The combination of act and speech, sight and sound in semi-darkness of the theatre with elimination of all distracting ideas will have an impact in the minds of spectators. In some cases, it will have a complete and im-

213

mediate influence on, and appeal for every one who sees it. In view of the scientific improvements in photography and production the present movie is a powerful means of communi- cation. It is said: "as an instrument of education it has unusual power to impart information, to influence specific attitudes towards objects of social value, to affect emo- tions either in gross or in microscopic proportions, to affect health in a minor degree through sleep disturbance, and to affect profoundly the patterns of conduct of chil- dren." (See Reader in Public Opinion and Communication Second Edition by Bernard Betelson and Morris Janowitz p.

390). The authors of this Book have demonstrated (at 391 to

401) by scientific tests the potential of the motion pic- tures in formation of opinion by spectators and also on their attitudes. These tests have also shown that the effect of motion pictures is cumulative. It is proved that even though one movie relating to a social issue may not signifi- cantly affect the attitude of an individual or group, con- tinual exposure to films of a similar character will produce a change. It can, therefore, be said that the movie has unique capacity to disturb and arouse feelings. It has as much potential for evil as it has for good. It has an equal potential to instil or cultivate violent or good behaviour. With these qualities and since it caters for mass audience who are generally not selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with other modes of communication. It cannot be allowed to function in a free market place just as does the newspapers or magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but also neces- sary.

Here again we find the difference between the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The First Amendment does not permit any prior restraint, since the guaranty of free speech is in unqualified terms. This essential difference was recognised by Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., concurred in Kingsley Corporation v. Regents of the University of New York, 3 L.Ed. 1512 at 1522. In holding that censorship by "prior restraint" on movies was unconstitutional, the learned Judge said:

"If we had a provision in our Consti- tution for "reasonable" regulation of the press such India has included in hers, there would be room for argument that censorship in the interests of morality would be permissi- ble. Judges sometimes try to read the word "reasonable" into the First Amendment or make the rights it grants subject to reasonable regulation ..... But its language, in terms that are absolute is utterly at war with censorship.
214
Different questions may arise as to censorship of some news when the nation is actually at war. But any possible exceptions are extremely limited."

The Cinematograph Act 1952 ("The Act") which permits censorship on movies is a comprehensive enactment. Section 3 of the Act provides for constitution of Board of Film Cen- sors. Section 4 speaks of examination of films. A film is examined in the first instance by an Examining Committee. If it is not approved, it is further reviewed by a Revising Committee under Section 5. Section 5A states that if after examining a film or having it examined in the prescribed manner, the Board considers that the film is suitable for unrestricted public exhibition, such a certificate is given which is called 'U' certificate.

Section 5(a) provides principles for guidance in certi- fying films. It is significant to note that Article 19(2) has been practically read into Section 5(B)(1). Section 5(C) confers right of appeal to Tribunal against refusal of certificate. Under Section 6, the Central Government has revisional power to call for the record of any proceeding in relation to any film at any stage, where it is not made the subject matter of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Under Section 8 of the Act, the Rules called the Cine- matograph (Certification) Rules 1983 have been framed. Under Section 5(B)(2) the Central Government has prescribed cer- tain guidelines for the Censors Board. Guideline (1) relates to the objectives of film censorship. The Board shall ensure that: (a) the medium of film remains responsible and sensi- tive to the values and standards of society; (b) artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed and

(c) censorship is responsive to social change. Guideline (2) requires the Board to ensure that: (i) anti-social activities such as violence not glorified or justified; (ii) the modus operandi of criminal or other visuals or words likely to incite the commission of any offence are not depicted; (iii) pointless or avoidable scenes of violence, cruelty and horror are not shown; (iv) human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity and depravity; (vi) the sovereignty and integrity of India is not called in question; (vii) the security of the State is not jeopardised or endangered; (viii) friendly relations with foreign states are not strained; and (ix) Public Order is not endangered.

Guideline (3) also requires the Board to ensure that the film: (i) 215 is judged in its entirety from the point of view of its overall impact and; (ii) is examined in the light of contem- porary standards of the country and the people to whom the film relates.

It will be thus seen that censorship is permitted mainly on social interest specified under Article 19(2) of the Constitution with emphasis on maintenance of values and standards of society. Therefore, the censorship by prior restraint must necessarily be reasonable that could be saved by the well accepted principles of judicial review. In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, [1971] 2 SCR 446 a Constitution Bench of this court considered important ques- tions relating to pre-censorship of cinematograph films in relation to the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. K.A. Abbas, a noted Indian journalist and film producer produced a short documentary film called "A tale of Four Cities". In that film he sought to contrast the self indulgent life of the rich in Metropolitan cities with the squalor and destitution of labouring masses who helped to construct the imposing buildings and complexes utilised by the rich. The film also goes on to explore the theme of exploitation of women by men, dealing in particular prosti- tution. Abbas applied to the Board of Film Censors for a 'U' certificate, permitting unrestricted exhibition of the film. He was informed by the regional officer that the Examining Committee had provisionally concluded that the film should be restricted to adults. The Revising Committee concurred in this result, whereupon Abbas, after exchanging correspond- ence with the Board, appealed to the Central Government. The Government decided to grant 'U' certificate provided that the scenes in the red light district were deleted from the film. Abbas challenged the action of the Board mainly on four issues out of which two did not survive when the Solic- itor General stated before the Court that the Government would set on foot legislation to effectuate the policies at the earliest possible date. The two issues which survived thereupon were: (a) that pre-censorship itself cannot be tolerated under the freedom of speech and expression; (b) that even if it were a legitimate restraint on the freedom, it must be exercised on very definite principles which leave no room for arbitrary action.

With regard to the power of pre-censorship, Hidayatul- lah, C.J., observed (at 473-74):

"The task of the censor is extreme- ly delicate ..... The standards that we set out for our censors must make a 216 substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and society with some of its foibles along with what is good. We must not look upon such human relationships as banned in toto and for ever from human thought and must give scope for talent to put them before society. The requirements of art and litera- ture include within themselves a comprehen- sive, view of social life and not only in its ideal form and the line is to be drawn where the average man moral man begins to feel embarassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius of social value. If the depraved begins to see in these things more than what an average person would, in much the same way as it is wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of things ideas having redeeming social or artistic value must also have impor- tance and protection for their growth." Recently, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., in Ramesh v. Union of India, [1988] 1 SCC 868 which is popularly called "TAMAS" case laid down the standard of judging the effect of the words or expression used in the movie. The learned Judge quoting with approval of the observation of Vivian Bose, J., as he then was, in the Nagpur High Court in the case of Bhagwati Charun Shukla v. Provincial Govern- ment, AIR 1947 Nag 1 (at 676):
"That the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating. This in our opinion is the correct approach in judging the effect of exhibition of a film or of reading a Book. It is the standard of ordinary reasona- ble man or as they say in English law, "the man on the top of a Clampham omnibus. "

We affirm and reiterate this principle. The standard to be applied by the Board or courts for judging the film should be that of an ordinary man of common sense and pru- dence and not .that of an out of the ordinary or hypersensi- tive man. We, however, wish to add a word more. The Censors Board should exercise considerable circumspection on movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultural heritage of the country. The moral values in particular, should not be allowed to be sacrificed in the guise of social change or cultural assimi-

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lation. Our country has had the distinction of giving birth to a galaxy of great sages and thinkers. The great thinkers and sages through their life and conduct provided principles for people to follow the path of fight conduct. There have been continuous efforts at rediscovery and reiteration of those principles. Adi-guru Shankaracharya, Ramanujacharya, Madhwacharya, Chaitanya Maha Prabhu, Swami Ram Krishan Paramhansa, Guru Nanak Sant Kabir and Mahatma Gandhi, have all enlightened our path. If one prefers to go yet further back, he will find "TIRUKKURAL" the ethical code from Tiruv- alluvar teaching which is "a general human morality and wisdom." Besides, we have the concept of "Dharam" (right- eousness in every respect) a unique contribution of Indian civilization to humanity of the world. These are the bedrock of our civilization and should not be allowed to be shaken by unethical standards. We do not, however, mean that the Censors should have an orthodox or conservative outlook. Far from it, they must be responsive to social change and they must go with the current climate. All we wish to state is that the Censors may display more sensitivity to movies which will have a markedly deleterious effect to lower the moral standards of those who see it. Krishna Iyer, J., in Rajkapoor v. Laxman, [1980] 2 SCR 512 in words meaningful expressed similar thought. The learned Judge said (at 5 17):

"The ultimate censorious power over the Censors belongs to the people and by indifference, laxity or abetment, pictures which pollute public morals are liberally certified, the legislation, meant by Parlia- ment to protect people's good morals, may be sabotaged by statutory enemies within."

With these prefactory remarks, let us now turn to the reasons which weighed with the High Court to revoke the 'U' certificate and rule out the film altogether. The High Court has found fault with the Constitution of the First Revising Committee. It has held that the Revising Committee was constituted hurriedly and its constitution by "delegate Board Member" was illegal and without authority of law. The Committee also showed unusual favour to the producer by reviewing the film with hot haste. In the absence of a First Revising Committee having come into existence as known to law; the High Court said that the constitution of the Second Revising Committee was invalid and inoperative. We do not think that the High Court was justified in reaching this conclusion. Under the rules, the Regional Officer shall appoint an 218 Examining Committee to examine the film. The reports and records relating thereto shall be treated as confidential. The Rule 22 inter alia, states that after screening the film, the Examining Officer shall within three working days send the recommendations of all the members of the Examining Committee to the Chairman. Rule 24(1) provides for constitu- tion of a Revising Committee. It states that on receipt of the record referred to in rule 22, the Chairman may, of his own motion or on the request of the applicant, refer the movie to a Revising Committee. In the instant case, the Chairman did not constitute the first Revising Committee but a member of the Board did. The question is whether the member of the Board was competent to constitute the Revising Committee. Our attention was drawn to the Government order dated January 21, 1987 made under sec. 7(B) of the Cinemato- graph Act. The order reads;

"No. 803/1/86-F(C) Government of India Ministry of Human Resource Development Department of Culture.
New Delhi, the 21st January, 1987 ORDER In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 7B of the Cinamatograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the Central Government hereby directs that any power, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by the Board of film, Certifica- tion (hereinafter referred to as the Board) in relation to matters specified in sec. 4, sub- sees. (3) and (4) of sec. 5, sec. 5-A and sec. 7C of the said Act shall also be exercisable subject to the condition given below by the following members of the Board at the Regional Office indicated against each, with immediate effect and until further orders:
1. Shri Samik Banerjee Calcutta
2. Ms. Maithreyi Ramadhurai Madras
3. Dr. B.K. Chandrashekar Bangalore XXX XXXX XXX XXXX"

This order clearly states that the power of the Board shall also be exercisable by the specified members within their regional office. For 219 Madras region Ms. Maithrayi Ramadhurai has been constituted to . exercise such powers.

It cannot be contended that the Central Government has no power to delegate the powers or to issue the said order. Sec. 7(B) empowers the Central Government to issue general or special order directing that any power, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by the Board under the Act shall be exercisable also by the Chairman or any other member of the Board. The section further provides that anything done or action taken by the Chairman or other member specified in the order shall be deemed to be a thing done or action taken by the Board. From the provisions of sec. 7B read with the Government order dated January 21, 1987, it becomes clear that the constitution of the First Revising Committee by the member at the Madras Regional Office is not vulnerable to any attack. It is legally justified and unassailable. The conclusion to the contrary reached by the High Court is apparently unwarranted.

We also do not find any justification for the observa- tion of the High Court that there was unusual favour shown to the producer by the First Revising Committee in reviewing the film. It is true that the film was reviewed within 2-3 hours of the presentation of the application. But there is no reason to attribute motives either to members of the Committee or to the producer. In matters of certification of films, it is necessary to take prompt action by the respec- tive authorities. The producer who has invested a large capital should not be made to wait needlessly. He has a statutory right to have the validity of ,the film determined in accordance with law. It would be, therefore, proper and indeed appreciative if the film is reviewed as soon as it is submitted.

There are two other side issues which may be disposed of at this stage. The scene with song No. 2 in reel No. 3 and the comments by the heroine of looking at the photo of Dr. Ambedkar, have come under serious criticism. It is said that the song has the effect of spreading 'Kulachar' which is 'Poisonous message' to the depressed classes not to educate their children. The complaint, if true, is serious. We, therefore, gave our anxious consideration to the grievance. We, as did the High Court, viewed the movie. The cobbler sings the song in question with his grandson who is eager to go to school. The song contains references to Kamaraj, Anna and MGR who without even college education became Chief Ministers. The cobbler asks the grandson: "What are you going to achieve by education? and don't forsake the profes- sion you know and you can educate yourself as a cobbler."

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While these and other exchanges are going on between the cobbler and grandson, the heroine comes and insists that the boy should go to school. She promises to contribute Rs.50 as an incentive to the cobbler every month and also to make good his income deprived of by the boy's earning. They agree to her suggestion with "Vanakkam, Vanakkam". The song thus ends with a happy note and the cobbler agrees to send his grandson to school. It is true as pointed out by counsel for the respondents that one or two references in the song are not palatable, but we should not read too much into that writing. It is not proper to form an opinion by dwelling upon stray sentences or isolated passages disgregarding the main theme. What is significant to note is that the cobbler ultimately does not insist that his grandson should continue the family pursuits. He accepts the suggestion made by the heroine. It is, therefore, wrong to conclude that the song was intended to convey poisonous message against the inter- ests of depressed classes.

The criticism on the alleged comments on Dr. Ambedkar is equally unsustainable. The confusion perhaps is due to the pronounced accent of an English word in the course of Tamil conversation. The matter arises in this way: Sastry shows the photograph of Dr. Ambedkar to heroine and enquires whether she likes it. Then she makes certain comments. According to the High Court, she states, "Dr. Ambedkar worked for the poor. Not for 'par'." It is said that 'par' in Tamil means equality and if she says 'not for the par', it means that Dr. Ambedkar did not work for equality. If she states like that, it is certainly objectionable since Dr.. Ambedkar did everything to have an egalitarian society. But while viewing the film, we could not hear any such word used by the heroine. On the other hand, we distinctly noted her saying, "Dr. Ambedkar worked for the poor, Not for power.." This being the remark there is no basis for the criticism of the High Court.

The last complaint and really the nub of the case for the respondent is about the reel No. 14 covering the court scene where Karuppayee and Sastry are prosecuted for offence of obtaining a false caste certificate. The reel No. 14 contains almost a dialogue between the prosecution lawyer and Karuppayee. She criticises the reservation policy of the Government. She states that during the British regime, the people enjoyed educational freedom, and job opportunities which were based on merit criteria and not vote caste in a particular constituency. Then the prosecution lawyer puts a question "why do you regret this Madam? Was not 'Bharat Matha' under shackles then?" She replies: "You are right. Then "Bharat Matha" was in chains 221 (Vilangu, is the Tamil word used for shackles which also means animals). Now "Bharat Matha" is under animals' hands." On a further question from the prosecutor she explains that her reference to 'animals' hands is only to those who incite caste, language and communal fanaticism, thus confusing people and making it their profession. She also states that it is the Government and its laws that have made her and her father to tell a lie. The presiding Judge interrupts with a question: "What is wrong in the Government approach? Can you elaborate?" She replies: "That it is wrong not to give credence to her merit and evaluate the same on the basis of her caste and such evaluation would put a bar on the progress." She goes on to explain "Your laws are the barri- ers Sir. You have made propaganda in nook and corner stating "Be an Indian, Be an Indian". And if I proudly say I am an Indian then the Government divides saying 'no, no, no, ..... You are a Brahmin, you are Christian, you are a Muslim. It is the Government that divides." Then she puts a question to herself: "What is the meaning of "Be an Indian?" She explains that it must be without caste, creed and commu- nal considerations, from Kashmir to Kanyakumari, the country must be one. She then blames the Government with these words: "The Government in dealing with all has no one face. Take any application form they want to know your caste and religion. When all are Indians where is the necessity for this question. You have divided the people according to caste. Then if you reel off on "National integration" will not the public laugh."

As to the reservation policy to those who are backward she says: "On Gods name, I have no objection in providing all concessions to those who are backward. The list of those belonging to forward sections and backward sections could be prepared on the basis of economic considerations. And those below a specified limit of income be included in the back- ward list."

How did the High Court look at it? On the remark of heroine as to the situations that existed during British administration, the High Court observed thus:

"It is preposterous and offensive to claim that education was independent when India was under British rule and that, after independ- ence it is not there."
The High Court also said:
"That any denigration of Rule of law would never 222 bring orderly society. To preach that it is- only law that prompted them to utter falsehood and in its absence they would not have done it is a wrong way presenting a view point." As to the allegations that 'Bharat Matha' is now in the hands of politicians, who are instigating the masses on the basis of caste and language, etc., the High Court remarked: "If this sort of decrying India for being an independent nation is to be projected in films repeatedly, then in course of time, citizens will loose faith in the integrity and sovereignty of India. With this sort of glori- fication made, how could it be claimed that the film stands for national integration. That was why one Member rightly said that it is a hollow-claim. Hence Guideline 2(vi) and (vii) are contravened."
On the total impact of the film, the High Court observed:
"That certain peculiar factors will have to be taken into account because of guidelines 3(i) and 3(ii). This film is in Tamil. It deals with reservations now extended to large sections of people on a particular basis, and who have suffered for Centuries, and at a time when they have not attained equality and when their valuable rights which are secured under the Constitution is attempt- ed to be taken away, they get agitated. This film taken in Tamil for Tamil population on being screened in Tamil Nadu, will certainly be viewed in the background of what had hap- pened in Tamil Nadu during the preceding four decades, and the reactions are bound to be volatile."

We find it difficult to appreciate the observations of the High Court. We fail to understand how the expression in the film with criticism of reservation policy or praising the colonial rule will affect the security of the State of sovereignty and integrity of India. There is no utterance in the film threatening to overthrow the Government by unlawful or unconstitutional means. There is no talk for secession either. Nor there is any suggestion for impairing the inte- gration of the country. All that the film seems to suggest is that the existing method of reservation on the basis of caste is bad and reservation on the basis of economic back- wardness is better. The film also deprecates exploita-

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tion of people on caste considerations. This is the range and rigor of the film.

The High Court, however, was of opinion that public reaction to the film, which seeks to change the system of reservation is bound to be volatile. The HIgh Court has also stated that people of Tamil Nadu who have suffered for centuries will not allow themselves to be deprived of the benefits extended to them on a particular basis. It seems to us that the reasoning of the High Court runs a foul of the democratic principles to which we have pledged ourselves in the Constitution. In democracy it is not necessary that every one should sing the same song. Freedom of expression is the rule and it is generally taken for granted. Every one has a fundamental right to form his own opinion on any issue of general concern. He can form and inform by any legitimate means.

The democracy is a Government by the people via open discussion. The democratic form of government itself demands its citizens an active and intelligent participation in the affairs of the community. The public discussion with people participation is a basic feature and a rational process of democracy which distinguishes it from all other forms of government. The democracy can neither work nor prosper unless people go out to share their views. The truth is that public discussion on issues relating to administration has positive value. What Falter Lippmann said in another context is relevant here:

"When men act on the principle of intelli- gence, they go out to find the facts ..... When they ignore it, they go inside themselves and find out what is there. They elaborate their prejudice instead of increasing their knowledge.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 Bhagwati J., observed at 696: "Democracy is based essentially on free debate and open discussion, for that is the only corrective of Government action in a democratic set up. If democracy means govern- ment of the people by the people. it is obvi- ous that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order to enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of public matters is absolutely essential."
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The learned judge in Naraindas v. State of Madhya Pradesh,[1974] 3 SCR 624 while dealing with the power of the State to select text books for obligatory use by students said at 650:
"It is our firm belief, nay, a con- viction which constitutes one of the basic values of a free society to which we are wedded under our Constitution, that there must be freedom not only for the thought that we cherish, but also for the thought that we hate. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in Abramson v. United States, 250 U.S. 616: "The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accept- ed in the competition of the market." There must be freedom of thought and the mind must be ready to receive new ideas, to critically analyse and examine them and to accept those which are found to stand the test of scrutiny and to reject the rest."
In Sakal v. Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842 at 866, Mudholkar, J. said:
"This Court must be ever vigilent in guarding perhaps the most precious of all the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. The reason for this is obvious. The freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of para- mount importance under a democratic Constitu- tion which envisages changes in the composi- tion of legislatures and governments and must be preserved."

Movie is the legitimate and the most important medium in which issues of general concern can be treated. The producer may project his own messages which the others may not ap- prove of. But he has a right to "think out" and put the counter appeals to reason. It is a part of a democratic give-and-take to which no one could complain. The State cannot prevent open discussion and open expression, however, hateful to its policies. As Professor Fraund puts it: "The State may not punish open talk, however, hateful, not for hypocritical reason that Hyde Parks are a safety-valve, but because a bit of sense may be salvaged from the odious by minds striving to be rational, and this precious bit will enter into the amalgam which we forge." (Paul A. Freund-On Understanding the Supreme Court 26 (1950). "When men differ in opinion, both sides ought equally to have 225 the advantage of being heard by the public." (Benjamin Franklin). If one is allowed to say that policy of the government is good, another is with equal freedom entitled to say that it is bad. If one is allowed to support the governmental scheme, the other could as well say, that he will not support it. The different views are allowed to be expressed by proponents and opponents not because they are correct, or valid but because there is freedom in this country for expressing even differing views on any issue. Alexander Meiklejohn perhaps the foremost American philosopher of freedom of expression, in his wise little study neatly explains:

"When men govern themselves, it is they--and no one else--who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, an Ameri- can as well ...... American ..... If then, on any occasion in the United States it is allowable, in that situation, to say that the Constitution is a good document it is equally allowable, in that situation, to say that the Constitution is a bad document. If a public building may be used in which to say, in time of war, that the war is justified, then the same building may be used in which to say that it is not justified. If it be publicly argued that conscription for armed service is moral and necessary, it may likewise be publicly argued that it is immoral and unnecessary. If it may be said that American political insti- tutions are superior to those of England or Russia or German, it may with equal freedom, be said that those of England or Russia or Germany are superiors to ours. These conflict- ing views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but because they are relevant ..... To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self government." (Political Freedom (1960) at 27). He argued, if we may say so correctly, that the guaran- tees of freedom of speech and of the press are measures adopted by the people as the ultimate rulers in order to retain control over the Government, the people's legislative and executive agents.
Brandies, J., in Whitney v. California, 274 US 357,375-8 (1927) propounded probably the most attractive free speech theory:
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" ..... that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public dis- cussion is a political duty; .....It is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones."
What Archibald Cox said in his article though on "First Amendment" is equally rele- vant here:
"Some propositions seem true or false beyond rational debate. Some false and harm- ful, political and religious doctrine gain wide public acceptance. Adolf Hitler's brutal theory of a 'master race' is sufficient exam- ple. We tolerate such foolish and sometimes dangerous appeals not because they may prove true but because freedom of speech is indivis- ible. The liberty cannot be denied to some ideas and saved for others. The reason is plain enough: no man, no committee, and surely no government, has the infinite wisdom and disinterestedness accurately and unselfishly to separate what is true from what is debata- ble, and both from what is false. To license one to impose his truth upon dessenters is to give the same licence to all others who have, but fear to lose, power. The judgment that the risks of suppression are greater than the harm done by bad ideas rests upon faith in the ultimate good sense and decency of free peo-
ple." (Society Vol. 24 p. 8 No. 1
November/December 1986).
The problem of defining the area of freedom of expres-

sion when it appears to conflict with the various social interests enumerated under Article 19(2) may briefly be touched upon here. There does indeed have to be a compromise between the interest of freedom of expression and social interests. But we cannot simply balance the two interests as if they are of equal weight. Our commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched. It should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest. In other words, the expression should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a "spark in a powder keg".

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Our remarkable faith in the freedom of speech and ex- pression could be seen even from decisions earlier to our Constitution. In Kamal Krishna v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Cal 636, the Calcutta High Court considered the effects of a speech advocating a change of Government. There the accused was convicted under sec. 124(A) of Penal Code for making a speech recommending 'Bolshevik' form of Government to re- place the then existing form of Government in Calcutta. While setting aside the conviction and acquitting the ac- cused, Lord Williams, J., who delivered the judgment ob- served (at 637):

"All that the speakers did was to encourage the youngmen, whom he was address- ing, to join the Bengal Youth League and to carry on a propaganda for the purpose of inducing as large a number of people in India as possible to become supporters of the idea of communism as represented by the present Bolshevik system in Russia. It is really absurb to say that speeches of this kind amount to sedition. If such were the case, then every argument against the present form of Government and in favour of some other form of Government might be allowed to lead to hatred of the Government, and it might be suggested that such ideas brought the Govern- ment into contempt. To suggest some other form of Government is not necessarily to bring the present Government into hatred or contempt." To the same effect is the observation by the Bombay High Court in Manohar v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1950 BOM 210. There the writer of an article in a newspaper was convicted for an offence under the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, for incitement to violence. The writer had suggested the people to follow the example of China by rising against Anglo- American Imperialism and their agents. He had also suggested his readers to pursue the path of violence, as the Chinese people did, in order that Anglo-American Imperialism should be driven out of this country. Chagla C.J., while quashing the conviction said (at 2 13): "It is true that the article does state that the working class and the coiling masses can get hold of power through the path of revolution alone. But the expression 'rev- olution' is used here, as is clear from the context, in contradistinction to reformism or gradual evolution. The revolution preached is not necessarily a violent revolution.
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XXX XXX XXX XXX As the writer has not stated in this article that the toiling masses should take up arms and fight for their rights and thus achieve a revolution we refuse to read this expression as inciting the masses to violent methods." In Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 23, the Federal Court examined the effects of a vulgar and abusive outburst against the Government made by the accused for which he was convicted under Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules. Gwyer, C.J., while acquitting the person commented more boldly (at 27):
"There is an English saying that hard words break no bones; and the wisdom of the common law has long refused to regard an actionable any words which, though strictly and liberally defamatory, would be regarded by all reasonable men as no more than mere vulgar abuse.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX The speech now before us is full of them. But we cannot regard the speech, taken as a whole as inciting those who heard it, even though they cried "shame shame" at intervals, to attempt by violence or by public disorder to subvert the Government for the time being established by law in Bengal or elsewhere in India. That the appellant expressed his opin- ion about that system of Government is true, but he was entitled to do so,; and his reference to it were, we might almost say, both common place and in common form, and un- likely to cause any Government in India a moments uneasyness. His more violent outburst were directed against the then Ministry in Bengal and against the Governor in Bengal in his political capacity but we do not feel able to say that his speech whatever may be thought of the form in which it was expressed, exceed- ed the legal limits of comment or criticism." Even the European Court's approach in protecting the freedom of expression is not different although they have the extensive list of circumstances for limiting the free- dom. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom provides:
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"(1) Every one has the right to freedom of expression.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, condi- tions, restrictions or penalties as are pre- scribed by law and are necessary in a demo- cratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of health or mor- als, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclo- sure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
It appears that the second paragraph of Arti- cle 10 virtually removes the right purportedly guaranteed by the first paragraph. However, the European Court in Handyside v. United Kingdom, [1976] EHRR/737 observed at 754; "The court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterising a 'democratic socie- ty'. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to Article 10(2), it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadminded- ness without which there is no 'democratic society'. This means, amongst other things, that every 'formality', 'condition', 'restric- tion' or 'penalty' imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pur- sued."

This takes us to the validity of the plea put forward by the Tamil Nadu Government. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, it is alleged that some organisa- tions like the Tamil Nadu Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes People's Protection Committee, Dr. Ambedkar People's Move- ment, the Republican Party of India have been agitating that the film should be banned as it hurt the sentiments of people belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes. It is stated that the General Secretary of the Republican Party of India has warned that his party would not hesitate to damage the cinema 230 theatres which screen the film. Some demonstration made by people in front of "The Hindu" office on March 16, 1988 and their arrest and release on bail are also referred to. It is further alleged that there were some group meetings by Republican .Party members and Dr. Ambedkar People's Movement with their demand for banning the film. With these averments it was contended for the State that the exhibition of the film. will create very serious law and order problem in the State.

We are amused yet troubled by the stand taken by the State Government with regard to the film which has received the National Award. We want to put the anguished question, what good is the protection of freedom of expression if the State does not take care to protect it? If the film is unobjectionable and cannot constitutionally be restricted under Article 19(2), freedom of expression cannot be sup- pressed on account of threat of demonstration and proces- sions or threats of violence. That would tentamount to negation of the rule of law and a surrender to black mail and intimidation. It is the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed against the State. The State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. It is its obligatory duty to prevent it and protect the freedom of expression. In this case, two Revesing Committees have approved the film. The members thereof come from different walks of life with variegated experiences. They represent the cross sec- tion of the community. They have judged the film in the light of the objectives of the Act and the guidelines pro- vided for the purpose. We do not think that there is any- thing wrong or contrary to the Constitution in approving the film for public exhibition. The producer or as a matter of fact any other person has a right to draw attention of the Government and people that the existing method of reserva- tion in education institutions overlooks merits. He has a right to state that reservation could be made on the basis of economic backwardness to the benefit of all sections of community. Whether this view is right or wrong is another matter altogether and at any rate we are not concerned with its correctness or usefulness to the people. We are only concerned whether such a view could be advocated in a film. To say that one should not be permitted to advocate that view goes against the first principle of our democracy. We end here as we began on this topic. Freedom of ex- pression which is legitimate and constitutionally protected, cannot be held to ransom, by an intolerant group of people. The fundamental freedom 231 under Article 19(1)(a) can be reasonably restricted only for the purposes mentioned in Articles 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicks and of convenience or expediency. Open criticism of Government policies and operations is not a ground for restricting expression. We must practice tolerance to the views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democ- racy as to the person himself.

In the result, we allow these appeals, reverse the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions of the respondents. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.

Y.L.					    Appeals allowed.
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