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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 29 .09..2010 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU W.P.Nos.15517, 15518, 16716 and 16765 of 2001 Textile Technical Tradesmen Association, Rep. by its President, No.16, Ayyanar Koil Street, Veemacoundanpalayam, Pondicherry-605 009. ... Petitioner in W.P.Nos.15517 and 15518 of 2001 -Versus- 1.Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Labour, Shram Sakthi Bhavan, New Delhi. 2.Government of Pondicherry, Rep. by its Member Secretary, Labour Department, Chief Secretariat, Government of Pondicherry, Pondicherry-1. 3.Anglo French Textiles, [A Unit of Pondicherry Textile Corporation Limited] Rep. by its Managing Director, Cuddalore Road, Mudaliarpet, Pondicherry-4. 4.The Pondicherry Textile Corporation Limited, Rep. by its Managing Director, Mudaliarpet, Cuddalore Road, Pondicherry-4. 5.Lok Sakthi Thozhilalar Sangam, Rep. by its President, B.Sathiyaseelan, Office at No.34, Bouvancare Street, Mudaliarpet, Pondicherry. [5th respondent impleaded as per order of this Court dated 03.03.2004 in W.P.M.P.No.598 of 2004] .... Respondents in W.P.Nos.15517 and 15518 of 2001 Prayer in W.P.No.15518 of 2001:- PRAYER: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance Writ of Declaration, declaring that Sections 17-A (1), 17-A(2) and 17-A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Act 14 of 1947] as ultra vires of the Constitution of India. Lok Sakthi Thozhilalar Sangam, [Regn. No.1122/1998] Rep. by its President, B.Sathiyaseelan, Office at No.34, Bouvancare Street, Mudaliarpet, Pondicherry. ... Petitioner in W.P.No.16716 of 2001 -Versus- 1.Union of India, Rep. by Government of Pondicherry, through the Chief Secretary to Government, Chief Secretariat, Pondicherry. 2.The Commissioner, Labour Department, Chief Secretariat, Pondicherry. 3.Anglo French Textiles, Rep. by its Managing Director, Cuddalore Road, Mudaliarpet, Pondicherry. .... Respondents in W.P.No.16716 of 2001 Prayer in W.P.No.16716 of 2001:- Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance Writ of Declaration, declaring that the Notification issued by the 2nd respondent with No.23/2001/Labour/L, dated 11.08.2001 published in the Official Gazette No.111 dated 11.08.2001 is illegal and is ultra vires of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Constitution of India. Lok Sakthi Thozhilalar Sangam, Rep. by its President, B.Sathiyaseelan, Office at No.34, Bouvancare Street, Mudaliarpet, Pondicherry. ... Petitioner in W.P.No.16765 of 2001 -Versus- 1.Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Labour, Shran Sakshana Bhavan, New Delhi. 2.Government of Pondicherry, Rep. by its Chief Secretary to Government, Chief Secretariat, Pondicherry. 3.The Commissioner, Labour Department, Chief Secretariat, Pondicherry. 4.Anglo French Textiles, Rep. by its Managing Director, Cuddalore Road, Mudaliarpet, Pondicherry. .... Respondents in W.P.No.16765 of 2001 Prayer in W.P.No.16765 of 2001:- Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of Writ of Declaration, declaring that Section 17(A)(1), (2) and (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as ultra vires of the Constitution of India. For Petitioner in W.P.Nos.15517 and 15518 of 2001 : Mr.R.N.Amarnath For Petitioner in W.P.Nos.16716 and 16765 of 2001 : Mr.V.Ajaykumar For Respondent 1 in W.P.Nos.15517 and 15518 of 2001 : Mr.S.Haja Mohideen Ghisti, SCGSC For Respondents 3 & 4 in W.P.Nos.15517 and 15518 of 2001, For Respondent No.3 in W.P.No.16716 and Respondent No.4 in W.P.No.16765 : Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, Senior Counsel for Mr.K.S.Ahamed For Respondents 2 & 5 in W.P.No.15517 For Respondent 2 in W.P.No.15518 For Respondents 1 & 2 in W.P.No.16716 and For Respondents 2 & 3 in W.P.No.16765 : Mrs.N.Mala, Government Pleader COMMON ORDER ********************
The constitutionality of Section 17(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"], which was introduced by the Industrial Disputes Amendment Act, 1956 and the consequential order passed under Section 17(A) of the Act by the Government of Puducherry in respect of an award made by the Special Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, under the Act are under challenge in this Writ Petition.
2. The petitioners/Trade Union raised an industrial dispute regarding wage revision before the Special Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal directed the respondents to revise the wages of the workmen, as detailed in the award. However, the Government of Puduchery, by the impugned order issued under Section 17-A of the Act, has declined to enforce the same. Thus, the petitioners are aggrieved by the same.
3. Section 17-A (1,2,3&4) of the Act reads as follows;-
17A. Commencement of the award.- (1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17:
Provided that--
(a) if the appropriate Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a Labour Court or Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute to which it is a party; or
(b) if the Central Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a National Tribunal, that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the appropriate Government, or as the case may be, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days.
(2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the proviso to sub-section (1), the appropriate Government or the Central Government may, within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under section 17, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall, on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a copy of the order before the Legislature of the State, if the order has been made by a State Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government.
(3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section (2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under sub-section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in sub-section (2).
(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the 167 date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or subsection (3), as the case may be.].
4. The main challenge to the constitutionality of Section 17(A) of the Act is on the ground that it is an affront to the independence of the judiciary, which is one of the basic features of the Indian Constitution as laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the famous case in Kesavananda Bharathi vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1973 SC 1461. But, it is the contention of the respondent Puducherry Government that there is no such violation of basic structure, and therefore, the impugned provision cannot be held to be void. It is further contended that the impugned provision falls within the ambit of the Legislative competence of the Parliament.
5. It is brought to the notice of the Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when a similar challenge was made to Section 17(A) of the Act, the High Court of Andra Pradesh in Telugunadu Workcharged Employees vs. Govt of India reported in 1997 (3) ALT 492, has struck down the same as unconstitutional. Relying on the same, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that on the very same grounds, more particularly, on the ground of violence to the independence of judiciary, this Court may also declare the impugned provision as void.
6. It is contended by the respondent Puduchery Government that the Judgment of the High Court of Andra Pradesh is not binding either on the Government of Puducherry or on this Court and at the most, it can only have a persuasive effect in the Union Territory of Puducherry. It is further added that the High Court of Andra Pradesh cannot exercise any extra territorial jurisdiction so as to declare the impugned provision as void even in the Union Territory of Puducherry.
7. The learned counsel on either side have advanced arguments at length taking me through various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as other High Courts in order to substantiate their rival contentions, about which I shall make reference at the appropriate places of this order.
8. Undoubtedly, a statute made by the Parliament can be declared as void as provided in Article 13 of the Constitution of India, in the event the Court comes to the conclusion that the same violates any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Apart from the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharathi's case, while propounding a very popular concept, known as "basic structure concept", has further held that if there is any violence to the basic structure of the Constitution either by any constitutional amendment or Statute, then, the same shall be void.
9. Commencing from Kesavananda Bharathi's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had several occasions to consider the concept of basic structure of the constitution. The independence of the Judiciary and separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary have been held to be basic structures of the constitution by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Paragraph No.555 of the Judgment in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain reported in 1975 supp (SC) 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows;-
"The Constitution is a document recording an act of entrustment and conveyance by the people of India, the political sovereign, of legal authority to act on its behalf to a "Sovereign Democratic Republic". This Constitution has a basic structure comprising the three organs of the Republic; the Executive, the Legislature, and Judiciary. It is through each of these organs that the Sovereign Will of the people has to operate and manifest itself and not through only one of them. Neither of these three separate organs of the Republic can take over the function assigned to the other. This is the basic structure or scheme of system of Government of the Republic laid down in this Constitution whose identity cannot, according to the majority view in Kesavananda Bharati case be changed even by restoring to Article 368."
Another Constitution Bench of nine Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.C.Advocates-on-record Association v. Union of India reported in 1993 (4) SCC 441, while dealing with the concept of independence of the judiciary, has held as follows;-
"To say differently, it is the cardinal principle of the constitution that an independence judiciary is the most essential characteristic of a free society, like ours."
10. In S.P.Gupta v. Union of India reported in 1981 (Supp) SCC 87, in paragraph No.27, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows;-
"The questions are of great constitutional significance affecting the principle of independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the Constitution and we would therefore prefer to begin the discussion by making a few prefatory remarks highlighting what the true function of the judiciary should be in a country like India which is marching along the road to social justice with the banner of democracy and the rule of law, for the principle of independence of the judiciary is not an abstract conception but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the constitutional charter and its nourishment and sustenance from the constitutional values."
11. Later on, another Constitution Bench of Seven Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India reported in 1997 (3) SCC, 261, in Paragraph No.78, has held as follows;-
78. The legitimacy of the power of courts within constitutional democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary.# These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such provisions, the superior courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of their decisions. The Judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations."
12. In Santhosh Kumar Sathishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2009 (6) SCC 498, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again reiterated that both the separation of powers and independence of judiciary are basic structures of the constitution.
13. It has also been held in State of W.B v. Committee for Production of Democratic Rights reported in 2010 (3) SCC 571 that whenever the action of the legislature makes intrusion thereby causing violation to the basic structures, it is for the higher judiciary to invoke its powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to declare the same as void.
14. It has been held in a catena of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Labour Court performs judicial functions, and therefore, it is a Court. In this regard, I may refer to a Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association reported in 1998 (2) SCC 688, wherein, it has been held as follows;-
"The Labour Court performs the judicial functions and it is a Court. The Labour Court adjudicates upon the disputes that, had it not been for the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, would have been within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to decide, although the ordinary civil courts may not be able to grant all the reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts. The Labour Courts are, therefore, Courts and decide disputes that are civil in nature."
15. Therefore, an award made by the Labour Court under the provisions of the Act is an adjudicatory order and the same is enforceable. Since the Labour Court has been held to be a Court, the award passed by the Court is to be executed and the same cannot be allowed to be nullified either by the executive or by the legislature. At this juncture, I may refer to a recent Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd., Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in CDJ 2010 SC 795, wherein the Chief Justice of India [Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.H.KAPADIA], presiding over a three Judges Bench, has made a deep survey of various "doctrines" "concepts" and "principles" relating to the limitations on the power of the Parliament to enact any law or to amend the constitution. The paramount limitation is in respect of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further proceeds to remind the distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law in a rigid constitution like ours. The Hon'ble Supreme Court describes the distinction as follows;-
"The said distinction proceeds on the assumption that ordinary law can be challenged on the touchstone of the Constitution. Therefore, when an ordinary law seeks to make a classification without any rational basis and without any nexus with the object sought to be achieved, such ordinary law could be challenged on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, when it comes to the validity of a constitutional amendment, one has to examine the validity of such amendment by asking the question as to whether such an amendment violates any over-arching principle in the Constitution. What is over-arching principle? Concepts like secularism, democracy, separation of powers, power of judicial review fall outside the scope of amendatory powers of the Parliament under Article 368. If any of these were to be deleted it would require changes to be made not only in Part III of the Constitution but also in Articles 245 and three Lists of the Constitution resulting in the change of the very structure or framework of the Constitution. When an impugned Act creates a classification without any rational basis and having no nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the principle of equality before law is violated undoubtedly. Such an Act can be declared to be violative of Article 14. Such a violation does not require re-writing of the Constitution. This would be a case of violation of ordinary principle of equality before law."
16. From the above, it is manifestly clear that separation of powers falls within the purview of "over-reaching principle". Independence of judiciary is yet another concept falling within the said principle. To cause any deviation from these basic concepts, the Parliament cannot even use its amending power under the Constitution, as otherwise, it would amount to re-writing the Constitution abrogating the basic frame work of the same. When that much of rigidity the constitution has, it is needless to say that the Parliament lacks power under the Constitution to enact any ordinary law to violate the basic structure. Thus, the Parliament can not either expressly or impliedly empower the executive by enacting a law in any manner to negate the judicial pronouncements made by any of the organs of the judiciary. Any such law made by the Parliament is void. No amount of hesitation can be shown by the higher judiciary to strike down the provisions of such enactment.
17. Now, having the above settled position of law in mind, let me turn to the facts of the present case. The impugned provision viz., Section 17-A of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to decline to enforce an award or to modify the same. This, in my considered opinion, is a power vested in the executive so as to sit in appeal over the Award of the Labour Court. Under our constitutional scheme, the executive has not been empowered to exercise an appeal jurisdiction over the judicial verdicts of the Courts. By conferring such power on the executive under Section 17-A of the Act, the Parliament, has in essence, caused a severe jolt to the independence of the judiciary. Apart from that, the celebrated concept of separation of powers as ordained in the Constitution is also infringed by the impugned provision. Thus, the impugned provision is a serious threat to the basic structure and if allowed to remain in operation, it will undoubtedly shake the foundation upon which our democracy rests. If judicial verdicts are to be nullified by the executive, it will be a mockery of the very judicial system. The independence of the judiciary is a very precious and fundamental concept, which needs to be preserved. Therefore, I cannot have any hesitation to hold that the impugned provision viz., Section 17-A of the Act is void, and accordingly, it is liable to be struck down.
18. When a similar challenge was made before the High Court of Andra Pradesh in Telugunadu Workcharged Employees vs. Govt of India reported in 1997 (3) ALT 492, Hon'ble Mr.Justice B.SUBHASHAN REDDY, [as he then was, who later became the Chief Justice of Madras High Court] has struck down the same impugned provision on the ground of violation of basic structure of the constitution. I am in full agreement with the said conclusion arrived by the High Court of Andra Pradesh.
19. The next important question is as to whether this Court needs to strike down the impugned provision, when the same has already been struck down by the High Court of Andra Pradesh. It is to be noticed that before the High Court of Andra Pradesh, the Government of India was a party. The said Judgment has become final. The cardinal of question is as to whether such striking down of the impugned provision by the High Court of Andra Pradesh, has force even beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Andra Pradesh.
20. The learned counsel on record have got divergent views on this point. On one side, it is submitted that the High Courts have got no extra territorial jurisdiction to strike down a provision of a Central enactment beyond its territorial jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel, though the impugned provision has been struck down by the High Court of Andra Pradesh, insofar as the Union Territory of Puducherry or any other State for that matter, the same shall have only a persuasive value and the same shall not bind either the Government of Puducherry or the High Court of Madras.
21. The view expressed by some of the learned counsel is that once a particular provision in a Central enactment has been struck down by a High Court holding that the same is void, as the same is a violation to the basic structure of the Constitution, it is no more in the Statute book for being struck down again by yet another High Court. It is pointed out that under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has got power to test the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Central enactment and if it is once held by one High Court that it is unconstitutional, the said provision will no more remain in the Statute book. Therefore, as of now, Section 17-A of the Act is not available in the Statute book and so, the consequential order passed by the Government of Puducherry in exercise of power under the said provision alone is liable to be quashed, it is submitted.
22. In order to find out the correct legal position on this disputed question, I made a survey of several Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. I also sought the help of the bar to assist me in this regard. But, I am not able to lay my fingers at any Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court directly on this point. Nor the bar is able to bring to my notice any such Judgment. However, the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of three Judges in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd vs. Union of India reported in 2004 (6) SCC 254 may be useful to decide the said question. In Paragraph Nos.21, 22, 28 and 29 of the said Judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows;-
21. A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and published in an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. A writ court, it is well settled would not determine a constitutional question in vacuum.
22. The court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act. [Emphasis supplied].
28.Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. The Union of India and Another [(1961) 2 SCR 828] whereupon the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance was rendered at a point of time when clause (2) of Article 226 had not been inserted. In that case the Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, properly construed, depends not on the residence or location of the person affected by the order but of the person or authority passing the order and the place where the order has effect. In the latter sense, namely, the office of the authority who is to implement the order would attract the territorial jurisdiction of the Court was considered having regard to Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure as Article 226 of the Constitution thence stood stating :
"...The concept of cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Art. 226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may result in some inconvenience to person residing far away from New Delhi who are aggrieved by some order of the Government of India as such, and that may be a reason for making a suitable constitutional amendment in Art. 226. But the argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect the plain language of Art. 226, nor can the concept of the place of cause of action be introduced into it for that would do away with the two limitations on the powers of the High Court contained in it."
29. In view of clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh (supra) has, thus, no application.
23. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if once it is adjudged by a High Court that a particular Parliamentary Act or a provision of the said Act is unconstitutional, in effect, it is as if the said Act/provision had never been in force. As a matter of fact, in D.D.Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India edited by Hon'ble Mr.Justice Y.V.CHANDRACHUD, it has been summed up succinctly as follows;-
"Where a Statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts which depend upon it for their consideration are void; it constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it and no one can be punished for having refused obedience to it before the decision was made. 'And what is true of an Act void in toto is true also as to any part of an Act which is found to be unconstitutional and which consequently has to be regarded as having never at any time been possessed of any legal force."
24. Of course, it is true that the question under consideration in these Writ Petitions was not directly raised and argued before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and answered in Kusum Ingots' case. It is obiter dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But, such obiter dicta is also expected to be followed by the High Courts. In this regard, I may refer to a Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Sarwan Singh Lamba v. Union of India reported in AIR 1995 SC 1729, wherein it has been held by a Constitution Bench that "normally even an "Obiter Dictum" is expected to be obeyed and followed". Recently, in Oriental Insurance Co Ltd., vs. Meena Variyal reported in 2007 (5) SCC 428, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Paragraph No.26, has held as follows;-
"An Obiter Dicutm of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But, as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority."
25. In the light of the above legal position, applying the principles stated in Kusum Ingots case, cited supra, I am of the view that the impugned provision viz., Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is no more in force in the Union Territory of Puducherry also in pursuance of the Judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Telugunadu Workcharged Employess v. Government of India, cited supra. There can be no doubt that the Judgment of the High Court of Andra Pradesh, in which it has been adjudged that Section 17-A of the Act is unconstitutional, will have effect through out the Territory of India.
26. In view of the said position, I am of the view that it would be suffice for this Court to declare that Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is void and the same is unenforceable in the Union Territory of Puducherry also, and consequently, the impugned notification dated 11.08.2001 passed by the Puducherry Government under Section 17-A of the Act is liable to be set aside.
In the result, all these Writ Petitions are allowed; it is hereby declared that Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is void and consequently the impugned notification dated 11.08.2001 passed under Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by the Union Territory of Puducherry is set aside. No costs.
Index : yes 29.09.2010 Index : yes NB/kmk To 1.The Secretary to Government, Union of India, Ministry of Labour, Shram Sakthi Bhavan, New Delhi. 2.The Member Secretary, Government of Pondicherry, Labour Department, Chief Secretariat, Government of Pondicherry, Pondicherry-1. 3.The Commissioner, Labour Department, Chief Secretariat, Pondicherry. S.NAGAMUTHU, J. NB PRE-DELIVERY COMMON ORDER MADE IN W.P.Nos.15517, 15518, 16716 and 16765 of 2001 29.09.2010